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WORLD ORDER BASED ON LAWt
JOHN J. PARKER*
Out of every great war of history there has emerged something of
importance to the human race; and the great thing that has come out
of the world war just ended is the world-wide yearning of men, not
merely for peace, but for a world order based, not on force and selfishness, but on law and righteousness. Our own country has led in the
effort to establish this sort of world order. At Dumbarton Oaks, at San
Francisco, in accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice, in setting up the International Tribunal at Nurnberg, this has been her ultimate objective.
The Nature of Law
Those who deny that there is such a thing as international law or
law relating to world relationships are blinded by the false definition
of law, derived from the positivists, to the effect that law is a rule of
conduct prescribed by a superior which an inferior is bound to obey.
Because there is no international legislature to prescribe rules of conduct and no super-state to enforce obedience to rules so prescribed,
they think there is no international law. Law, however, is not properly
thought of as a rule but as the life principle of the social organism. It
is not something imposed from without upon man, but something that
is a necessary part of his life as a member of society. There is something in the nature of matter which causes it to act in certain ways;
and these ways of action we call the laws of physics. There is something, too, in the nature of human beings and the society which they
compose that determines how society should act and how the members of society should act towards each other. This is law in its true
sense. It must be interpreted in terms of rules and these rules must be
enforced; but it must never be forgotten that the source of law is not
tThe final lecture of the third annual John Randolph Tucker Memorial Lectures delivered by Judge Parker before the School of Law of Washington and Lee
University on May 1, 2 and 3, 1951.
*Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
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the power which enforces the rules but the life which gives rise to the
power, and that the source of the rules is not the arbitrary fiat of anyone, but reason applied to the conditions of that life.
This is not something which I have just now discovered. It is
something that all the great lawyers of history have been saying to us
through the ages. "Law" says Cicero, "arises out of the nature of
things." He thus defines it:
"There is in fact a true law-namely, right reason-which is in
accordance with nature, applies to all men, and is unchangeable
and eternal. By its commands, this law summons men to the
performance of their duties; by its prohibitions it restrains them
from doing wrong. Its commands and prohibitions always influence good men, but are without effect upon the bad. To invalidate this law by human legislation is never morally right, nor is
it permissible ever to restrict its operation, and to annul it
wholly is impossible. Neither the senate nor the people can absolve us from our obligation to obey this law, and it requires no
Sextus Aelius to expound and interpret it."1

St. Thomas Aquinas and John Locke taught that the justification
for human regulation, and the coercion by which it is made effective,
lie in the nature of human beings, and that power merely gives force
to that which is reasonable and right.2 Grotius taught that certain broad
principles of justice are natural-that is, universal and unchangeableand that upon these principles are created the varying systems of municipal law. He gives this definition of natural law:
"The law of nature is a dictate of right reason, which points out
that an act, according as it is or is not in conformity with rational
nature, has in it a quality of moral baseness or moral necessity;
and that, in consequence, such an act3is either forbidden or enjoined by the author of nature, God."
This being the true nature of law, there can be no question as to
the reality of international law. When men deal with each other across
international boundaries or travel into other countries for the purposes of trade and commerce or for other reasons, relationships are
established, customs arise and reason prescribes rights and duties in
numberless situations. Without any international legislature, there
arise rules and standards which are enforced by the common consent
of civilized peoples. They are evidenced by decisions of courts, by
'Cicero Republic III, 22, Trans. by Sabine and Smith. Quoted by Sabine, "A
History of Political Theory," 164.
'Sabine, "A History of Political Theory," 255.
'Quoted by Sabine, "A History of Political Theory," 424.
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treaties between nations and by the writings of the wise and the learned.
Between the two world wars these rules and standards were applied
in more than fifty thousand cases decided by ad hoc tribunals, not to
mention the additional thousands tried in national courts involving
questions which could be settled only on the basis of international law.
Any number of such cases have come before the court of which I am
a member. One of the early cases with which I had to deal was that of
The Ship Vinces, a case involving the right of this country to arrest on
the high seas a merchant vessel which had been engaged in violating
its laws. A case which I decided within the last month involved the
right of the United States to set up courts for the trial of civilians in
the American Zone in Germany. The Council of the American Law Institute has recently decided to undertake a restatement of the principles of international law which have become sufficiently well established by court decisions or otherwise to be recognized as law.
Law and World Order
It is this natural law, based on reason and inherent in the social
organism, to which we refer when we speak of government by law, as
distinguished from government by arbitrary will; and the real purpose
of any world order is to give expression to this law and to enforce it
fairly and justly among men and nations. To put the matter in another
way, any world order for the regulation of international affairs should
have as its fundamental basis, not force nor the selfish interest of powerful nations, but reason and justice as applied to the relationships existing in the world community; and the ultimate objective in the effort
to build a world order should be to develop institutions which will give
force and effect to this natural law. In no other way, I think, is it possible to establish an enduring foundation for world peace.
We must never forget that peace is not a negative but a positive
thing. Peace connotes, not mere absence of conflict, but the orderly
functioning of life in accordance with the laws of life. I have peace
within my body when all the members function in accordance with the
laws of the body. We have peace within a city when all elements live in
accordance with the laws of the city. And we shall have peace within
the world only when the life of the world functions in accordance
with the laws that govern world life. It will function in this way only
when we have developed legal institutions which will give form and
content to the rules of international law and provide for their enforcement.
The time is ripe for the development of such institutions. With the
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improvements that have come in transportation and communication,
the world has, almost overnight, become, as it were, one great community, "one world," as Mr. Willkie put it. Any part of the world can
be reached from any other part in a few hours' time. Communication
is a matter of seconds. A disturbance of the peace in any section disturbs the peace of the entire community. There is no longer any such
thing as protection by natural barriers; and a war breaking out anywhere can envelop us and endanger the lives of our people almost before we know that it has begun. It is idle to talk of living in isolation.
We tried to stay out of the last world war and the one before it; but
we were dragged into them in spite of everything we could do. The only
hope for any sort of security lies in cooperation with other nations;
and the only hope for permanent cooperation lies in the development
of institutions based on law.
World organization on the basis of law means primarily three
things: (i) adequate judicial machinery for the settlement, on the
basis of reason, of disputes of an international character; (2) adequate
legislative machinery for bringing to bear the intelligence of mankind
upon the solution of international problems; and (3) adequate organization of the world's force for the preservation of peace and the
enforcement of law. These broad objectives are the things upon which
we must center our attention, not the details of organization.
Machinery for Settlement of Disputes
Just as the first function of orderly government is the enforcement
of law and the administration of justice, the first requisite of world organization is adequate machinery for the settlement of international
disputes. There is no reason why disputes of states should not be subjected to judicial settlement. I remember that some years ago there
was a dispute between my state and the state of Tennessee over a
boundary line, just the sort of dispute that has so often led to war; but
did we call out the militia and declare war on Tennessee? We did notl
We brought suit against her in the Supreme Court of the United States
and the court had a commission run and establish the boundary. Back
in the Seventies, North Carolina repudiated some bonds that she had
issued. Some of them came into possession of the State of South Dakota
and she demanded that we pay them. We refused to do so on the ground
that the bonds were fraudulent. South Dakota did not declare war on
us. She sued us in the Supreme Court; and the court gave judgement
against us; we paid the judgment; and now we have forgotten all about
the matter. An unsettled controversy between men or nations is an
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ever present source of discord and friction. Once settled, it is soon
forgotten.
The Permanent Court of International Justice set up pursuant to
Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations furnishes illustration of successful judicial settlement of disputes between states. It
was manned by judges of outstanding character, including among
others Mr. John Bassett Moore, Chief Justice Hughes, Secretary Kellogg
and Professor Hudson. During its comparatively brief existence it
decided sixty international cases of importance and entered several
hundred orders. That court lacked compulsory jurisdiction except
where such jurisdiction had been voluntarily accepted, and there was
no adequate provision for enforcement of its orders and decrees; but
it made, nevertheless, a real contribution to the law of the world. It
has been succeeded by the International Court of Justice created under
the Charter of the United Nations to which practically all the civilized nations of the world have given their adherence. The compulsory jurisdiction of that court has been widely accepted, and in August 1946 was accepted by this country4 in all legal disputes hereafter
arising concerning
a. The interpretation of a treaty;
b. any question of international law;
c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation;
d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the
breach of an international obligation;
Provided, that this declaration shall not apply to
a. disputes the solution of which the parties shall entrust to
other tribunals by virtue of agreements already in existence or
which may be concluded in the future; or
b. disputes with regard to matters which are essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction of the United States of America as determined by the United States of America; or
c. disputes arising under a multilateral treaty, unless (i) all
parties to the treaty affected by the decision are also parties to
the case before the Court, or (2) the United States of America
specially agrees to jurisdiction.
For the proper handling of international disputes, however, a court
alone is not sufficient. Many matters which threaten the peace of the
world are not legal matters at all but matters of interest or policy,
and are not justiciable or subject to settlement on a juridicial basis.
'61 Stat. 1218.
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For these a system of arbitration should be set up; and, as the purpose
is to prevent war, arbitration should be made compulsory as it is in
the United Nations Charter, which requires that disputes that threaten
the peace of the world shall, unless otherwise settled, be referred to
the Council. President Taft was an ardent advocate of arbitration of
international disputes and pushed through a number of arbitration
treaties that were mutilated by the Senate in passage. His view was
summed up in 1911 when he said: "We now have treaties of arbitration
in which we agree to submit all questions that do not affect our national honor and do not affect our vital interest. Well, that seems to me
to be an agreement to arbitrate everything that is highly unimportant.
We leave out questions which, when they arise, are likely to lead to
war. If arbitration is worth anything it is an instrumentality for avoiding war. But, it is asked, would you arbitrate a question of national
honor? I am not afraid of that question. Of course I would." Peaceful and law-abiding nations like England and the United States have
not hesitated to submit to arbitration international questions of the
most important character. Other nations should not be permitted to
imperil the peace of the entire world by going to war over such matters.
There is another suggestion with respect to the setting up of judicial
power. I believe it would be well to create a system of inferior international courts, to be composed of not less than three judges each and
with appeal to the International Court of Justice, to hear cases arising between citizens of different countries involving large amounts or
delicate international questions, as well as cases arising out of the
exercise of power by the United Nations. One of the fertile sources of
international conflict is alleged injustice to nationals, as where contracts are not properly enforced or property is confiscated by unjust
decisions. One of the reasons for the establishment of extra-territorial
courts has been the fear that justice would not be properly administered by the courts of the countries where there is little confidence in
the courts. It seems to me that such a system of international courts
would command the confidence and respect of those who trade, travel
or invest their money in foreign countries, and would thus do much to
extend commerce and unify commercial and business law, as well as
avoid some of the most fruitful sources of international conflict. A
question may be raised as to the enforcement of judgments of courts
of this character, but I see no reason why the countries which are
members of the United Nations would not be willing to provide that
judgments of such courts be registered with the courts of general juris-
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diction of those countries and enforced as though they were judgments
of the latter.
The jurisdiction to be exercised by courts of this character would
correspond in a general way to the diversity jurisdiction exercised by
the federal courts where the parties litigant are citizens of different
states. It finds analogy also in the jurisdiction exercised by extra-territorial courts such as the United States Court for China or the Mixed
Court of Egypt. They were recommended in the report of the Committee of the American Bar Association composed of some of the ablest
lawyers of the country, among others Mr. John W. Davis, former
Senator George Wharton Pepper and former Attorney General William D. Mitchell. They have been ably advocated in articles by Dr.
James Oliver Murdock, who served as chairman of a committee of the
Section of International and Comparative Law of the Association. 5
Such a system of courts would greatly strengthen the reign of law in
international affairs and would provide a method for the settlement
of disputes between nationals of different countries far superior to the
present system, which requires one who thinks that he has suffered
injustice to seek redress in the courts of the country of his adversary
or have his government seek redress for him through diplomatic
channels with all the delays and pitfalls incident to diplomatic procedure.
Provision should be made for the setting up, under direction of the
International Court of Justice, of criminal courts for trying war
crimes and other criminal offenses against international law. In the
past, persons accused of such crimes have been tried, ex necessitate, in
national courts; but it is highly desirable that an international court
be created for trying crimes of this character, or at least that provision
be made for the setting up of such a court by the International Court
of Justice if occasion for the exercise of its jurisdiction should arise.
Through lack of such a court, those charged with the most heinous
war crimes during the first world war were allowed to escape punishment and the world was deprived of the salutary influence that such a
trial would have had upon world opinion. Crimes committed in the
second world war were brought to trial and punished before the International Military Tribunal and military courts established by the
several victorious nations; but much bitter controversy would have
'See 4 Federal Bar Journal 125 et seq. "International Justice" by Dr. James
Oliver Murdock, being the lectures delivered by him in 1945 before the Inter-American Academy of International and Comparative Law.
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been avoided and the results would have been more readily acceptable,
certainly by the conquered nations and possibly by the world at large,
if the courts which conducted the trials had been set up by an existing
international institution such as the International Court of Justice.
Adequate machinery for the judicial settlement of justiciable disputes between nations and their nationals, with arbitration of disputes
that are not of a justiciable character, and machinery for the trial of
criminals who commit offenses against the law of nations will not
only help preserve the world's peace but will also lead to the healthy
growth and expansion of international law. Every lawyer knows that
the most important developments of the law have come, not from action by a legislature, but from court decisions-from the application of
reason to the settlement of actual controversies. Even where legislation
exists, it must be modified or expanded by that "interstitial" legislation, as Justice Holmes called it, which arises when the courts apply the
legislation to concrete cases.
Legislative Machinery
While adequate machinery for the settlement of disputes is one of
the first essentials in world organization based on law, it is not the
only essential. There must also be adequate legislative machinery for
bringing to bear the intelligence of mankind upon the settlement of international problems. There have been many of these growing out of
the last world war and the post war developments, and they will increase in number rather than diminish as time goes on and the life of
the world grows more interrelated and complex-problems affecting
international trade, travel and communication, problems arising out
of the use of the air and the seas for the purposes of commerce, problems
arising out of the exchange of goods and commodities, problems of international finance and credit, international labor problems, international health problems, international crime problems, etc. The
settlement of these cannot be left to the individual action of nations
nor allowed to await the judicial action of courts or councils or arbitrators. Rules for their solution must in some way be laid down in
advance by the legislative process; and this means that an assembly
must be provided in which representatives of the constituent nations
may be heard and may take action or make recommendations with respect to the problems that confront them.
The Assembly of the United Nations provides just the sort of legislative assembly that the world must have; and it is no objection that it
has not the power to enact laws by majority vote as does Congress or a
state legislature. In the Assembly and in the Economic and Social
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Council the world's problems are debated and explored in the view of
all mankind, and world public opinion is formed with regard to them.
When the adoption of new and binding rules is necessary, this can be
accomplished by the negotiation of multilateral treaties based on the
conclusions which have been reached in the Assembly with regard
thereto. This is the traditional legislative process in the international
field. If the rule desired is a sound one, it will be adopted in this way by
the great majority of nations and will soon gain universal acceptance.
If nations are unwilling to adopt it by treaty, they would probably be
unwilling to enforce it if adopted by vote over their protest. It is
said in the Declaration of Independence that governments derive their
just powers from the consent of the governed; and certain it is that
acceptance of a law by those to be governed by it is essential to its
successful enforcement. This is particularly true of international law,
the enforcement of which must depend in large measure upon the
nations to which it is applied. Real legislative power in the Assembly
will be developed by experience and as a result of the evolutionary
process which will unquestionably take place. Until such development does take place, the Assembly provides a forum in which the
world's intelligence can be brought to bear on the world's problemsin which matters affecting the peace and happiness of mankind can
be openly discussed, not settled in the dark by secret treaties.
One of the important quasi-legislative functions of a world organization is the setting up of commissions to make studies and recommendations as to matters which are important to the development of
world life but which are left entirely within the sphere of national
control. Studies and recommendations with respect to education, labor
conditions, currency stabilization and exchange, agricultural development, production and distribution of food and raw materials, public
health and control of disease, regulation of the traffic in narcotics,
etc.,-these would be of great value to the progress of mankind. I do
not mean that the international organization be given power to legislate with respect to these matters, but merely that it set up commissions to make studies and recommendations with regard thereto, to
serve as a basis of international agreements or legislation by the member
countries.
Among the subjects which should be studied, and which have been
studied, is the formulation of an international bill of rights, a declaration of certain fundamental rights of the individual which all nations
admitted to membership in the world organization should observe in
dealing with their peoples. All men need justice and all men need freedom to express personality and to worship God; and no nation which
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denies these fundamental rights of its people is entitled to be a member
of a community of civilized nations. It is probably not practicable to
secure adoption of the proposed Covenant of Human Rights; but it
is not too much to hope that we may eventually secure an agreement
among nations not to deny to their peoples freedom of religion, freedom of speech or the equal protection of the laws. This would solve
in large measure the troublesome question of dealing with minorities.
If every citizen is given equal justice under law, governmental oppression of minorities cannot arise.
I have little sympathy with those who view with alarm the Declaration of Human Rights by the Assembly of the United Nations or the
proposed Genocide Statute. One who has heard, as I have heard, the
sickening evidence of the oppression of helpless minorities and the
murder of six million Jews has an abiding conviction that no legal
theory ought to be allowed to stand in the way of effective action to
prevent such outrages. No nation should be permitted, under the guise
of exercising its nationality, to engage in conduct which so shocks
the conscience of mankind; and the world community, if it is fit to live,
will find a way to prevent it. Nothing will do more to preserve the
peace of the world than guaranteeing to all the world's peoples the
fundamental rights of human manhood.
Organizationof the World's Force
Any world order to be successful must make provision not merely
for expression of world opinion and juridical settlement of disputes,
but also for the organization of the world's force for enforcement of law
and the preservation of the public peace. As Pascal tells us, government
must rest on two bases, reason and force. Force without reason is
tyranny, but reason without force is anarchy. Ninety per cent of the
people will obey the rules of government willingly; but, unless there is
adequate force to hold the other ten per cent in line, government will
go to pieces. The great weakness of the League of Nations, as General
Smuts pointed out, was that it had no force to carry out its mandates.
We do not expect peace in domestic affairs on any such basis. We did
not leave Capone or Dillinger or Touhy to be dealt with by their
victims, nor did we we content ourselves with preaching sermons to
them. We brought to bear the force of organized society and put an end
to their criminal conduct. When Germany and Italy and Japan started
out on a course of international brigandage, however, there was no adequate organization of the world's force to stop them. If the League
of Nations had had such force available, Japan would never have
dared invade Manchuria, Hitler would never have marched into the
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Rhineland, Mussolini would not have dreamed of seizing Ethiopia,
and the great world war might never have come. And if the force had
been available, there probably would have been no need to use it; for
the mere presence of available force, without more, generally serves as
a sufficient restraint upon those who would otherwise violate the law.
The great superiority of the United Nations over the old League of
Nations is that in the Security Council we have a more effective pooling of the world's force for the preservation of world law and order.
Korea furnishes abundant proof of its value. When the communist
aggressors of North Korea abetted by Communist China and secretly
by Communist Russia began a war of aggression and conquest against
South Korea, they were warned by the Security Council to desist; and,
when they refused to do so, the Council called upon the member nations to aid the South Koreans in resisting the aggression. A bloody
war is being fought; but the result has been that the United Nations
and this country as its most powerful supporter have given proof to
the world that they are in deadly earnest about world organization
and the preservation of the rights of member nations. The salutary
effect of this is already manifest in Formosa, in Indo-China, in Indonesia and throughout the entire continent of Asia.
We in the United States had as well realize that the leadership of
civilization, which was Great Britain's task for a hundred years, has
devolved upon us. Our approach to that responsibility, however,
must be essentially different from hers since our institutions differ so
greatly. Britain is a monarchy and she exercised world leadership by
establishing a great world empire. Our nation, being a republic, is
not fitted for the establishment of an empire. We are better fitted, however, than any nation that has ever existed to lead in establishing an
organization of free nations for the purpose of collective security; and
the leadership that we have given the cause of the United Nations in
the defense of Korea shows that we are alive to the responsibilities of
that leadership. Had we failed to go to the defense of Korea, the United
Nations would have gone to pieces, those upon whom we must depend
as allies in facing the Russian menace would have left us at once and the
resources of Europe as well as of Asia would have fallen into the maw
of Communist Russia.
Notwithstanding the great achievement in Korea, there are those
who think the United Nations doomed because of the veto power and
because of the intransigeance of Russia. These present great obstacles,
of course, but they must be approached realistically and with courage.
So far as the right of the great powers to veto the use of force is concerned, we might as well realize that if the force is to be used against
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one of the great powers, its use would mean another world war in any
event. In so far as it applies to the use of force in defense of the liberties
of a member nation, the force can be organized pursuant to the regional
defense arrangements for which the Charter provides and of which the
Atlantic Pact furnishes outstanding illustration. If the pact had been
in existence at the time of the seizure of Czechoslovakia, that outrage,
in all probability, would not have occurred.
As to the intransigeance of Russia, the answer is that it is better to
have Russia howling in the sunlight than plotting in the dark. Unpleasant as are the insults and threats of the Soviet representatives,
their presence in the United Nations enables them to get the impact
of the public opinion of the world; and I have no doubt but that this
has done a great deal so far to restrain Russian aggression. If Russia
should withdraw from the organization, we should go ahead without
her and, freed from the influence of her opposition, should proceed to
strengthen the organization among the nations that remain, making
it a defensive alliance as well as an instrumentality for preserving law
and order. The United Nations will be the organized life of the free
world. If Russia cuts herself off from that life, her fate will be that
retrogression which was the fate of the Mohammedan countries who
cut themselves off from association with the enlightened nations of
Europe.
The Bugaboo of the Surrender of Sovereignty
World order based on law means that the international organization shall regulate, not the internal affairs of the member nations, but
matters of international character, matters which the individual nations
cannot regulate and which inevitably result in strife and conflict when
ex parte efforts are made to regulate them. It is a mistake to regard
the granting of powers over such matters to an international organization as in any sense a detriment to or a weakening of the nations
granting them. Virginia enjoys a richer and fuller life as a member
of the American union than she would ever be able to attain outside the
union; and our republic has a richer and fuller life because she is associated with other nations in an organization which is given power with
respect to the international phases of her life. It is not strength but
weakness to be charged with responsibility beyond the reach of one's
power; and it is not weakness, but strength, to be able through association with others to exercise power with respect to such matters.
, "Sovereignty," says Chief Justice Jay in Chisholm v. Georgia,6 "is
the right to govern." This right is not arbitrary, but arises out of the
62 Dallas 419, 472 (1793).
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nature of the relationship to which it is applied. In our American union
the people of the several states possess sovereign power with respect
to local affairs, the people of the entire union with respect to national affairs. The international community, on the same principle, should exercise sovereign power with respect to international affairs. If a matter
concerns me and nobody else, I am the one to decide what to do about
it. If it concerns the people of North Carolina and nobody else, the
people of North Carolina should decide. If it concerns the people of
the United States and nobody else, they should decide. If, however, it
concerns the international society of the world, that society, properly
organized, should make the decision. In exercising sovereign power
in matters of national concern, the federal government does not encroach upon any powers which the State of North Carolina ought
in the nature of things to exercise; and in exercising sovereign power
in matters of international concern an international organization
would not encroach upon powers which any nation should exercise.
A whole should be governed by laws relating to the whole and not
by laws relating to a particular part; and only by the exercise of power
having relation to the welfare of the whole can conflict be avoided between conflicting interests of the parts.
For the reasons stated, I think that we should rally to the support
of the United Nations with confident hope and firm purpose that it
shall succeed. For myself I feel that it is succeeding. It has not brought
the millenium, of course; but I shudder to think what might have
happened to the civilization of the world if it had not been in existence.
It has, at least, given us over the five years since the ending of the
war a world forum in which the desperate problems threatening the
peace and safety of mankind have been brought out into the light
where we could see them and take measures for their solution. It has
set up an international court for the juridical settlement of international disputes, which has had its compulsory jurisdiction accepted
by the most powerful nations now existing. It has effected a certain
pooling of the world's force which has preserved the peace in Israel
and Indonesia and has brought the free nations of the world to the
defense of the liberties of Korea.
We are told that the League of Nations failed and that the United
Nations must go the way of the League. I do not accept either premise.
The League was a good beginning and it accomplished a very great
deal. It brought 63 of the 73 nations of the world together around
a common conference table; it found solution for many troublesome
international problems; it brought into being the World Court; it
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furnished the world the best example that it has ever had of how to govern conquered territory; it unquestionably averted a number of wars.
And no one is wise enough to say what it might not have accomplished if
the United States had been a member. The United States was the
richest and most powerful nation on earth. The League had been written into the Versailles treaty at the insistence of our President and was
regarded as in large measure the product of American idealism. The
League without us was like Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark.
Who can say what it might not have accomplished if American statesmen like Root and Baker and Hughes had sat in its councils and this
great, rich and powerful nation had given it unstinted support in the
stormy years following the first world war?
Rome was not built in a day; our own federal union required many
years in coming to maturity; and I have an abiding faith that, given
our support, the United Nations will grow in power and influence with
the passage of time and will eventually give us a stable world order
based on law. The forces of science and commerce have brought the
world to the position where its life must be given unity. It is unthinkable that the strife and conflict which have attended recent years
should continue. False nationalism which forces a nation to undertake
tasks beyond its competence cannot endure. If unity is not achieved
on the basis of reason and law, it will eventually be achieved through
force; and the only hope of defeating those who would unify the world
on the basis of force is for those who believe in the reign of law to rise
above the narrow limitations of nationalism and support a world organization based upon law and righteousness.
This is a time for greatness. It is not a time for selfishness whether
of men or of nations. It is not a time for petty politics whether in
national or international affairs. No greater task, no greater opportunity, has ever come to any generation than that which comes to us
in the challenge to unify the world's life,-to build into strength and
power the organization which alone is capable of preserving the freedom and rights of man. If through cowardice, through selfishness or
through lack of vision we fail to accept the challenge, we shall be
guilty, not only of supreme folly, but of a crime against our children
and our children's children for which history will never forgive us.
We shall not fail. In the spirit of our fathers who organized freedom in
this land, we shall go forward with the organization of the free world,
and shall lay the foundation upon which can be builded a more enduring peace and a greater and grander civilization than the world has
heretofore known.
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METAPHORICAL TAX LEGISLATION:
THE COLLAPSIBLE CORPORATION
by
MANDELL GLICKSBERG

and
RicHARD B. STEPHENS
A first encounter with the phrase "collapsible corporation" is likely

to summon up disagreeable remembrances of things past. Fortunate is
he who has never been associated with a corporation which has collapsed. And yet a notion of the meaning of the phrase based on past unpleasant experience is quite anachronistic. In recent years, corporations
now Congressionally defined as collapsible1 have been the means for
the most fundamental financial pleasure, the realization of substantial
2
income at capital gains rates.
When individual income tax rates have ranged as high as 91 percent,3 the inducement to the taxpayer to couple imagination with logic
in attacking his tax problems has been very great. The desire to convert ordinary income to long-term capital gain, taxable at a maximum
effective rate of 25 percent, 4 has been overpowering. These considerations formed the rootstock for the collapsible corporation, one of the
fragile blossoms in the recent crop of tax-saving devices. If the device
was fragile in the past, its future has been rendered even more tenuous
by the Revenue Act of 195o.
1
Pub. L. No. 814, 81st Cong. 2d Sess., § 212 (1950); Int. Rev. Code § 117 (m), as
amended Sept. 23, 1950.
2The Bureau of Internal Revenue does not agree, contending, but without great
assurance, that the collapsible did not accomplish its supposed tax saving even under
the law as it stood prior to the recent amendment. Hearings before Committee on
Ways and Means on Revenue Revision of 1950, Sist Cong. ad Sess. (1950) 141; see
statement of Secretary of the Treasury Snyder at page 152 infra.
3
This is the combined normal and maximum surtax rate. In recent years the
maximum effective combined rate has been something less than 91 per cent because
of the tax reduction provided by Int. Rev. Code § ia(c), which reduction is eliminated
for the year 1951. Pub. L. No. 814, 2d Sess., § 1oi (195o). Furthermore, the combined normal tax and surtax has not been permitted to exceed 77 per cent, 8o per
cent, or, for 1951, 87 per cent of net income. See Int. Rev. Code §§ 12(c)(2) and 12(f).
'The alternative long-term capital gains tax provided by Sec. ii7(c) permits
an individual to pay a tax of 5o per cent on 50 per cent of his gain in lieu of other
income tax, if that is to his advantage; this, of course equals a tax of 25 per cent
of the entire amount of the gain.
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Why the Collapsible Was Used
Section 22(a) of the Internal Revenue Code5 contains the definition
of gross income for federal income tax purposes and expressly includes
"gains... derived from.. . sales, or dealings in property." Section 111,
with appropriate reference to Section 113 (b), indicates the manner in
which the amount of gain from the sale or other disposition of property is to be determined. 6 Section 23 authorizes certain deductions from
gross income to arrive at net income upon which the tax is imposed.
If the matter rested there, no tax advantages would arise from the
use of the collapsible device. That is, if all income were taxed alike,
the manner in which it was acquired would be of no consequence. But
provision is made for special tax treatment of some gains from the
sale or exchange of property. In the case of an individual, if the gain
is from the sale or exchange of a capital asset 7 as defined in Section
117(a)(i)8 and if such asset has been held for more than six months,
only 50 percent of the gain need be taken into account for tax purposes. 9 Furthermore, an alternative taxing method is provided' 0 under
which, instead of the gain taken into account being taxed at the regular graduated surtax rates, such gain is taxed at a rate of 50 percent
when this alternative favors the taxpayer." The maximum tax rate of
50 percent applied to 50 percent of the gain results in a maximum
effective tax of 25 percent on long-term capital gains, which otherwise
might be subject to much higher combined normal and surtax rates.
There is reason to believe that the collapsible device has been
5Unless otherwise stated, all section references in the text of this article are to
sections of the Internal Reveue Code.
GInt. Rev. Code § s11 also deals with the question of recognition of gain and
loss and in this connection makes reference to Sec. 112. The non-recognition provisions of the Code are not of importance at this point, but Sec. s12(b)(x), (5), (7)
transactions are discussed infra at pages 159 and 166 respectively.
7
Whether capital gains should be taxed, and, if so, how, are problems not fully
settled, even apart from the question of abuse of the present capital gains provisions. See, e.g., Griswold, Cases and Materials on Feredal Taxation (3d ed. 1950)
403-405; Blum. The Decline and Fall of Capital Gains: 1921-1957, 28 Taxes (1950),
digested in Monthly Digest of Tax Articles, Nov. 195o, p. 6 3 ,

8
See also Int. Rev. Code § 117(J), which provides for similar treatment of gain
from the sale or exchange of certain property not included within the definition

of capital assets.

"Int. Rev. Code § 117 (b).
1

01nt. Rev. Code § 117(c).
"The alternative method can favor the taxpayer only if his income without regard to capital gains, or together with his capital gains, is so large that the top increment will be subjected to rates in excess of 50 per cent.
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widely used in the building and motion picture industries.' 2 The nature of the device may perhaps best be explained by three oversimpli14
fied 13 examples based upon the building industry.
i. Jones and Smith acquire Black Acres for $so,ooo, construct
thereon twenty low-cost houses for an added cost of $9o,ooo, and

then sell the houses and lots for an aggregate of $i5o,ooo.
Conceding that Jones and Smith should not be too unhappy about
the venture, much of their enjoyment will evaporate as they watch
a substantial portion of their $5o,ooo gain melt away in the form of
taxes. The houses sold by Jones and Smith, being held primarily for
sale to customers in the ordinary course of business, would not be
within the code definition of capital assets,15 and the gain on the sale
of the houses would not qualify for special tax treatment as long-term
captial gain, but instead would be treated as ordinary income.
2. Jones and Smith form Construction Corporation, to which
they contribute a total of $1oo,ooo for all the stock except qualifying shares. Construction Corporation acquires Black Acres
for $1o,ooo, constructs thereon twenty low-cost houses for an
added cost of $9o,ooo, and then sells the houses and lots for an
aggregate of $15o,ooo.

In this example, the corporation's gain on the sale of the houses
is ordinary income for the same reason that the gain of Jones and
"See, e.g., Sen. Rep. No. 2375, 8ist Cong. 2d Sess. (1950) 45. If it has not been
used in several other industries, it is surprising. As the example in the text suggests, the device is most adaptable to major-project businesses, i.e., the production of
a motion picture, the construction of residential or commercial buildings, etc. But
consider production of a wheat or other crop by a corporate farm or the year's
output of a winery or cannery.
'TFor a somewhat more realistic example see Hearings before Committee on
Ways and Means on Revenue Revision of i95o, 81st Cong. 2d Sess. (1950) 140. "Mr.
Jenkins ... Suppose there is a real estate man, a plasterer and a lumberman and an
electrician, a plumber and two or three more, say ten, who engaged in some construction work. Suppose they go to work and build a big addition. They buy the
land cheap and they do the work economically and well. In other words, it is a
money-making proposition. The ten of them build ioo houses. If it is so simple
as this, after they have done the work can they dissolve and apportion those houses
out ten to each one?" Doubt was expressed that the scheme would be even that obvious. Yet, as is suggested infra, page x62, this may be an example of a collapsible
invulnerable under the new provison.
'For an excellent pre-amendment discussion of the collapsible device as used in
the motion picture industry see Bittker and Redlich, Corporate Liquidations and
the Income Tax (195o) 5 Tax L. Rev. 437. As the title suggests, the authors appropriately treat the collapsible problem as just one aspect of the broader problem
of the taxation of corporate liquidation. This article, however, is limited to collapsibles.
'Int. Rev. Code § 117(a)(i)(A).
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Smith was ordinary income in the first example.' 6 The corporation
will be taxed on the $50,000 gain at regular corporate rates. If it continues in business and distributes earnings to Jones and Smith, they
will have ordinary income in the amount of their dividends.' 7 If, instead, the corporation is dissolved and the assets are distributed to
Jones and Smith, they will have capital gain' 8 subject to special tax
treatment, but the corporate tax will have taken a big bite out of their
gain.
3. Jones and Smith form Construction Corporation, to which
they contribute a total of $ioo,ooo for all the stock except qualifying shares. Construction Corporation acquires Black Acres
for $io,ooo and constructs thereon twenty low-cost houses for an
added cost of $90,0o0. The aggregate fair market value of the
houses and lots is $15o,ooo, but the Corporation does not sell
them. It is collapsed, that is, dissolved, and the houses and lots
are distributed to Jones and Smith, who then sell them for an
aggregate of $15o,ooo.19
Jones and Smith lick their chops. Disregarding for the moment the
recent statutory changes, the distribution to them upon dissolution
is treated as payment in exchange for their stock, 20 and the stock is
within the Code definition of capital assets. 2 ' Assuming they have

held their stock for more than six months, Jones and Smith have long-

"Int. Rev. Code § 117(a)(1)(A).

"Int. Rev. Code § 115(a) defines "dividend" to include any distribution by a
corporation out of earnings and profits accumulated after Feb. 28, 1913, or out of
earnings and profits of the taxable year, with certain exceptions not relevant here.
"Int. Rev. Code § 115(c): "Amount distributed in complete liquidation of a
corporation shall be treated as in full payment in exchange for the stock...." White
v. United States, 305 U.S. 281, 59 S.Ct. 179, 83 L. ed. 172 (1938); Helvering v. Chester
L. Weaver Co., 305 U. S. 293, 59 S. Ct. 185, 83 L. ed. 18o (1938). Int. Rev. Code
§ 115(g), which in effect taxes certain corporate distributions "essentially equivalent
to the distribution of a taxable dividend" as ordinary income, is inapplicable here.
U. S. Treas. Reg. i11, § 29.115-9.
"9There is, of course, some possibility that a sale by shareholders of property
recently distributed to them by a corporation will be treated as a sale by the corporation. Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 66 S. Ct. 537, 90 L. ed.
677 (1945). But if the corporation has not negotiated the sale this result will not
follow. United States v. Cumberland Public Serv. Co., 338 U.S. 451, 70 S. Ct. 280,
94 L. ed. 237 (195o). Apparently the Commissioner will not attempt to use the Court
Holding Company doctrine in attacking preamendment collapsibles; instead of
treating the ultimate sale as made by the corporation, the plan of attack seems
to be to disregard the corporate entity as a mere sham. See Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means on Revenue Revision, 81st Cong. 2d Sess. (195o) 138.
"See note 18 Supra.
"Int.

Rev. Code § 117(a). It is possible, of course, to contend that the stock

itself is held primarily for sale to customers and therefore removed from the definition of capital assets by Sec. 117(a)(i)(A).
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term capital gain, upon dissolution, and the corporation has realized
23
no income.22 Jones and Smith get a stepped-up basis for the property,
$15o,ooo, and therefore they have no gain upon its subsequent sale at
that price.
Again disregarding for the moment the recent statutory changes,
two variations of the collapsible device may have been possible. In the
third example, Jones and Smith may simply sell their stock after construction of the houses, in which case their gain on the sale of the
stock may be treated as capital gain. But in this variation there is a
greater possibility that the stock will be considered as held primarily
for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business and therefore
not a capital asset within the Code definition. 24 If this were true, the
gain would be ordinary income and the device would have failed.
The other possible variation is a distribution in kind without dissolution and prior to realization by the corporation of any gain. Under
Section 115 a distribution by a corporation to its shareholders is a
dividend only if made either (i) out of earnings or profits accumulated
after February 28, 1913, or (2) out of earnings or profits of the taxable
year. Thus, if the corporation has no earnings or profits, and the collapsible would have none, a distribution will not be treated as a dividend. Instead, the distribution is applied against and reduces the
adjusted basis of the shareholders for their stock, and, to the extent
that the distribution exceeds the shareholders' basis, the excess is
taxed "in the same manner as a gain from the sale or exchange of
property. '25 The corporation does not realize gain upon distribution of appreciated property to its shareholders.2 6 Therefore, this
variation can result in the same tax consequences that follow a distribution in liquidation, but the corporation remains in existence. That
is, the shareholders acquire the property produced at a stepped-up
basis, although they are taxed on their gain as capital gain only, not
as ordinary income.
Thus, prior to the recent amendment to Section 117, a corporation
2U. S. Treas. Reg. 111,29.22(a)-2o. But see note ig supra.
23Int. Rev. Code § s 3(a); Marcus Schlitt, P-H 1948 TC Mem. Dec. Serv. Para.
48,1o8 (1948). And see 3 Mertens, The Law of Federal Income Taxation (1942) §
21.16.
-'Int. Rev. Code § 117(a)(i)(A). This result would probably not be reached in
the absence of a series of such sales.
nInt. Rev. Code § 115(d).
"Although the Treasury has argued that it does. For a thorough discussion
of this matter see Molloy, Some Tax Aspects of Corporate Distributions in Kind
(195o) 6 Tax L. Rev. 57, 59. See also General Utilities Co. v. Helvering, 296 U. S.
2oo, 56 S.Ct. 185, 8o L. ed. 154 (1935).
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may have been used to produce property, and then: (i) it may have
been collapsed before realization of any gain by the corporation, or
(2) the property produced may have been distributed in kind to the
shareholders in the same circumstances, or (3) the stock may have been
sold prior to the distribution of any dividends, with the result in each
instance that the corporation may not have been taxed at all and the
shareholders may have been taxed only on long-term capital gain.
Success of the Collapsible under Prior Law
The progenitors of the collapsible device must have had many bad
moments. For one thing, the whole scheme rested upon the legal fiction
of the corporate entity, a notoriously perilous perch, at least since
the Gregory case.2 7 Furthermore, success of the device depended in
large part upon a rather literal reading of the Code in favor of the
taxpayer. In this respect we have come a long way since the Gould
28
case.
Nevertheless, the efficacy of the device under prior law is still a
live question. On February 7, 1950, Thomas J. Lynch, General Counsel of the Treasury Department, toldthe Ways and Means Committee
there were over one hundred cases being examined by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue which involved the collapsible corporation. 29 The
new statutory provision concerning collapsibles does not affect those
cases. It is applicable only to taxable years ending after December 31,
1949, and applies only to gain realized after that date.30 Moreover, it
is expressly provided that the tax treatment of gains from so-called
collapsible corporations realized prior to January 1, 195o, shall be
made as if the new law had not been enacted, without inferences drawn
from the fact that the new subsection is not made applicable to gains
27

"In Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 55 S. Ct. 266, 79 L. ed. 596 (1935), the
Supreme Court disregarded as a mere sham a corporation formed and utilized solely
in an effort to achieve tax advantages supposedly available under the statutory provisions concerning corporate reorganizations.
2In Gould v. Gould, 245 U. S. 151, 153, 38 S. Ct. 53, 53, 62 L. ed. 211, 213 (1917),
the Court said it was the established rule that statutes "are construed most strongly
against the Government, and in favor of the citizen." More recently, however, the
Supreme Court has recognized that "It is the function and duty of courts to resolve doubts. We know of no reason why that function should be abdicated in a
tax case more than in any other...." White v. United States, 305 U.S. 281, 292, 59
S. Ct. 179, 184, 83 L. ed. 172, 179 (1938). But see Burns v. Commissioner, 177 F. (2d)
739, 741 (C.A. 5 th, 1949): "The tax statute in question should be strictly construed
in favor of the taxpayer ... "
8ist Cong. 2d Sess. (195o), 138.
"Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means on Revenue Revision of 195o,
80Pub. L. No. 814, 8ist Cong. 2d Sess., § 212(b) (195o).
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realized prior to such date and also without inferences drawn from
the limitations contained in the new law. 8 '
There are a number of provisions in the tax laws which, reduced to
the jargon of a no-longer-popular song, say to the taxpayer: "It ain't
what you do; it's the way that you do it." Sections 115 and 117 are of

this type. In effect they say to the builder: "If you do it our way
through the use of a corporation, you can make money at capital gains
rates." Years ago the courts might not have recognized any Congressional finger-crossing in this situation. In 1873 Justice Hunt viewed a
32
similar matter as follows:

"The Stamp Act of 1862 imposed a duty of two cents upon a
bank check, when drawn for an amount not less than twenty
dollars. A careful individual, having the amount of twenty dollars to pay, pays the same by handing to his creditor two checks
of ten dollars each. He thus draws checks in payment of his debt
to the amount of twenty dollars, and yet pays no stamp duty ....

He has the legal right to split up his evidences of payment, and
thus to avoid the tax."
Years later, the Supreme Court still did not doubt the legal right
of the taxpayer ". . . to decrease the amount of what would otherwise

be his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means which the law permits."33 But at the same time the Court refused to "exalt artifice above
reality" 34 or to recognize a form which in fact lacked substance. More
recently the Court has expanded the sham principle recognized in the
Gregory case35 and has undertaken to say, in the name of fairness, who
ought to be taxed on what, and when, almost in spite of specific statutory provisions.36 The cases are interesting and when carefully reviewed offer something of a feel for the way in which the pre-amendment collapsible may be treated.
In an article dealing in part with the Hollywood version of the
collapsible, 37 Messrs. Bittker and Redlich have explored the cases and
have suggested a number of ways in which the collapsible was vulner"Pub. L. No. 814, 81st Cong. 2d Sess., § 212(b) (1950).
'United States v. Isham, 17 Wall. 496, 506, 21 L. ed. 728, 729 (U.S. 1873).
"Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 465, 469, 55 S. Ct. 266, 267, 79 L. ed. 596, 599

(1935).

"Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 465, 470, 55 S. Ct. 266, 268, 79 L. ed. 596, 599

(1935).

'1Gregory v. Helvering,

293 U. S. 465, 55 S. Ct. 266, 79 L. ed. 596 (1935).
"See, e.g., Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U. S. 733, 69 S. Ct. 1210, 93 L. ed.
1659 (1949); Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U. S. 737, 67 S. Ct. 1489, 91 L. ed. 1782
(1947); Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331, 6o S. Ct. 554, 84 L. ed. 788 (1940).

"Bittker and Redlich, Corporate Liquidation and the Income Tax (1950) 5
Tax L. Rev. 437.
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able even in the absence of specific legislation. For the most part, their
comments apply as well to the use of the device in the building industry as in the motion picture industry. They conclude that measured,
as it must be, by "such roguish concepts as equity and justice," 38 the
collapsible may be found wanting, conceding, however, that the "area
39
is one of shifting sands, with hazy boundary lines."
There may have been brave men since Agamemnon, but it is doubtful any will come forward to take a stronger position concerning the
efficacy of the pre-amendment collapsible unless it be under the compulsion of advocacy or the obligation of the judicial robe. President
Truman did not do so; in his January 23, 195o, message to Congress

he merely said that the shoreholders of collapsibles "might escape as
40
much as two-thirds of the tax they should pay."
Secretary of the Treasury Snyder, testifying before the House Ways
and Means Committee, made reference to the fact that shareholders
of collapsible corporations ". . have attempted to convert ordinary

business and earned income into long-term capital gain." 41 Before
the same committee, General Counsel of the Treasury Lynch said
"... it is by no means clear that taxpayers using this [collapsible] de-

vice will be able to accomplish their tax saving objective, for the cor42
porate form in many of these cases may be held to be a sham."
Having suggested the nature of the collapsible device, and having
recognized its uncertain pre-amendment status as deftly explained by
Messrs. Bittker and Redlich, 43 it is the purpose of this article to consider in some detail the statutory answer to this recent tax-saving
effort.
The

595o

Amendment

As citizens we all have a right, perhaps a duty, to complain of and
combat waste and extravagance in government. We also have a right
to pay our tax bills in the same fashion as we pay the bills of the
butcher, the baker and the candle-stick maker, the amount properly
SBittker and Redlich, Corporate Liquidations and the Income Tax (1950) 5 Tax
L. Rev. 437 at 448.
'Bittker and Redlich, Corporate Liquidations and the Income Tax (195o) 5 Tax
L. Rev. 437, 447.
"0Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means on Revenue Revision of
195o, 8ist Cong. 2d Sess. (1950) 5. Emphasis added.
"Hearing before Committee on Ways and Means on Revenue Revision of 195o,
8ist Cong. 2d Sess. (1950) 2o. Emphasis added.
"Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means Revision of 1950, 8ist Cong.
2d. Sess. (195o) 138. Emphasis added.
"Bittker and Redlich, Corporate Liquidations and the Income Tax (1950) 5
Tax L. Rev. 437.

1951]

THE COLLAPSIBLE CORPORATION

due and no more. Beyond this, however, we do well to remember that
in present times legitimate costs of government are high and that when
we help to defray these costs by way of tax payments we are paying
for an organized society without which many of our pleasures and
44
privileges could not exist.

However, the existence of loopholes in the tax law through which
persons in special circumstances can escape their fair share of the tax
burden is destructive of the equanimity with which most Americans
otherwise are willing and able to view the federal exactions. Congress
is sensitive to this and quick to close the loopholes as they are brought
to light. 45 Particularly in times such as these, when tax rates are high,

a popular feeling of substantial fairness and uniformity in the imposition of taxes is essential to the relatively smooth operation of the
federal taxing program. Without any thought of moral indignation 46
concerning those who may 47 have benefited from the collapsible device, and, indeed, perhaps with a kind of wish-I'd-thought-of-that feeling, we may well applaud the Congressional effort to eliminate this
recently discovered possible pathway to tax inequality.
In the Code amendments made by the Revenue Act of 1950, 48
Congress has attempted to put an end to the tax advantages which
may have flowed from the use of the collapsible corporation. Under
Section 117, as amended, 49 gain realized upon the sale or exchange,
whether in liquidation or otherwise, of stock in a collapsible corpora"See Griswold, The Blessings of Taxation: Recent Trends in the Law of Federal Taxation (195o) 36 A. B. A. J. 999.
'5See, e.g., Commissioner v. Korell, 339 U. S. 619, 70 S. Ct. 905, 94 L. ed. 862
(1950), and Pub. L. No. 814, 81st Cong. 2d Sess., § 217 (1950), noted (1951) 4 Fla. L.
Rev. xx8. A loophole involving the deduction for amortizable bond premium, Int.
Rev. Code § 125, was recognized by the Supreme Court and closed by Congress in
the same year.
"But see Sen. Rep. No. 2375, 81st Cong. 2d Sess. (1950) 45: "A legitimate corporation ... would ordinarily pay the corporate income tax on its net income and
its shareholders would pay ordinary income tax on their dividends from the corporation." Emphasis added.
' t And it still is "may," as suggested supra page 15o.
"Pub. L. No. 814, 81st Cong. 2d Sess., § 212 (1950).
"For convenient reference, new Int. Rev. Code § 117(m) is set forth here in full:
"(in) Collapsible Corporation."(i) Treatment of gain to shareholders.-Gain from the sale or exchange
(whether in liquidation or otherwise) of stock of a collapsible corporation, to the
extent that it would be considered (but for the provisions of this subsection) as gain
from the sale or exchange of a capital asset held for more than 6 months, shall, except
as provided in paragraph (3), be considered as gain from the sale or exchange of
property which is not a capital asset.
"(2) Definitions.(A) For the purposes of this subsection, the term 'collapsible corporation' means
a corporation formed or availed of principally for the manufacture, construction,
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tion will, subject to certain limitations, be treated as ordinary income.
At the outset it should be observed that under Section 117(m) gain
will be treated as ordinary income only if it would, except for that section, be long-term capital gain. If the stock in a collapsible is not held
more than six months, gain on its disposition retains its character as
short-term capital gain. Although such capital gain is taken into account in full 50 in determining net income and does not qualify for the
25 percent tax limitation applicable to long-term capital gain, nevertheless it is capital gain against which capital losses may be deducted. 51
Therefore, one with a substantial capital loss carry-over, 52 or already
or production of property, or for the holding of stock in a corporation so formed
or availed of, with a view to(i) the sale or exchange of stock by its shareholders (whether in liquidation or
otherwise), or a distribution to its shareholders, prior to the realization by the
corporation manufacturing, constructing, or producing the property of a substantial part of the net income to be derived from such property, and
(ii) the realization by such shareholders of gain attributable to such property.
(B) For the purposes of subparagraph (A), a corporation shall be deemed to
have manufactured, constructed, or produced property, if(i) it engaged in the manufacture, construction, or production of such property
to any extent,
(ii) it holds property having a basis determined, in whole or in part, by
reference to the cost of such property in the hands of a person who manufactured,
constructed, or produced the property, or
(iii) it holds property having a basis determined, in whole or in part, by reference
to the cost of property manufactured, constructed, or produced by the corporation.
"(3) Limitations on application of subsection.-In the case of gain realized by
a shareholder upon his stock in a collapsible corporation(A) This subsection shall not apply unless, at any time after the commencement
of the manufacture, construction, or production of the property, such shareholder
(i) owned (or was considered as owning) more than io percentum in value of the
outstanding stock of the corporation, or (ii) owned stock which was considered as
owned at such time by another shareholder who then owned (or was considered as
owning) more than lo percentum in value of the outstanding stock of the corporation; ,
(B) this subsection shall not apply to the gain recognized during a taxable year
unless more than 70 percentum of such gain is attributable to the property so manufactured, constructed, or produced; and
(C) this subsection shall not apply to gain realized after the expiration of three
years following the completion of such manufacture, construction, or production.
For purposes of subparagraph (A), the ownership of stock shall be determined
in accordance with the rules prescribed by paragraphs (1), (2), (3), (5), and (6) of
section 503 (a), except that, in addition to the persons prescribed by paragraph (2)
of that section, the family of an individual shall include the spouses of that individual's brothers and sisters (whether by the whole or half blood) and the spouses
of that individual's lineal descendants."
'Int. Rev. Code § 117(b).
nInt. Rev. Code § 17(d) limits the deduction for losses from sales or exchanges
of capital assets, in the case of individuals, to the amount of gains from such sales
and exchanges, plus the taxpayer's net income or $,ooo whichever is less.
52See Int. Rev. Code § 117(e).
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aware of substantial capital losses during a taxable year, may still
profitably resort to the collapsible device if he can realize the hoped-for
capital gain within the six months period.
It is equally important to observe that Section 117(m) does not
alter the character of losses from the sale or exchange of stock in a
collapsible corporation. Such losses remain capital losses subject to the
53
statutory limitations on allowance.
As suggested previously in this article, the objective in resorting to
the collapsible device was the realization as long-term capital gain of
what would, except for the device, constitute ordinary income. Before
undertaking a discussion of the detailed provisions of Section 117(m),
it is appropriate to suggest that the new subsection thwarts this objective regardless of which of the three variations of the device described above is used. For this purpose it is assumed the corporation
involved is a collapsible and that none of the statutory limitations
on the application of the new section is applicable. First of all, if the
corporation is dissolved prior to realization of gain by the corporation,
amounts distributed in complete liquidation are to be treated under
Section 115(c) as in full payment in exchange for stock. If the stock
has been held for more than six months and there is a gain, this would
normally be long-term capital gain, and it is converted to ordinary income by Section 117(m).54
Secondly, if the stock in the corporation is sold and there is a gain,
this again would normally be long-term capital gain, 55 and again the
new subsection converts it to ordinary income.
r See Int. Rev. Code § 117(d).
'4Sometimes the value of property distributed in liquidation of a corporation is
not ascertainable at the time of distribution. This was the case in Commissioner v.
Carter, 17o F. (2d) gi (C.A. 2d, 1948), in which upon liquidation 32 oil brokerage
contracts, and certain other assets, were distributed to the corporation's sole shareholder who had owned the stock for more than ten years. No additional services
were to be performed by the corporation under the contracts, but payments under
the contracts were dependent upon future contingencies which made valuation of the
contracts impossible at the time of distribution. When payments under the contracts
were subsequently received by the shareholder, all of which payments together with
prior distributions exceeded the shareholder's basis for the stock given up upon
liquidation, the Second Circuit held such payments constituted capital gain, just as
if the contracts had been valued upon distribution at a figure equal to the payments
finally received. Inasmuch as this result rests on the requirement of Section 115(c)
that amounts distributed in liquidation be treated as in full payment in exchange for
stock, it appears that under Section 117(m) , if the corporation involved in the
Carter case were deemed to be a collapsible, gain there properly treated as capital
gain would now be converted to ordinary income.
'Again assuming the stock is not held for sale to customers in the ordinary
course of business. int Rev. Code § 11T(a)(i)(A). Of course, if the stock is treated as
so held, the gain on the exchange is ordinary income regardless of Sec. 117(m).
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Finally, if corporate assets are distributed to shareholders at a time
when the corporation has no earnings or profits, so that the distribution cannot be treated as a dividend and taxable for that reason as
ordinary income, and if there is a gain on such distribution, the new
subsection again converts the gain to ordinary income. The conclusion as regards this variation is not quite so clear from a reading of the
statute alone. Section 117(m) is concerned only with "gain from the
sale or exchange of stock." As observed previously in this article, Section 115(c) provides that distribution in liquidation "shall be treated
as in full payment in exchange for the stock," so that in the case of
liquidation distributions the resulting gain is gain from an exchange
for tax purposes and therefore within Section 117(m). However, Section 115 (d), which applies to non-dividend distributions other than
upon liquidation, requires instead that the excess of the distribution over the cost bases of the stock ".... shall be taxable in the same

manner as a gain from the sale or exchange of property." This may
seem to leave room for making a technical argument that the third
variation on the collapsible device is not covered by the new subsection.56 The parenthetical clause in the new provision 57 and its legislative history, 58 suggests that the courts will give such an argument
short shrift, if anyone is bold enough to advance it.
Congress had several possible approaches to the collapsible problem. It might have attacked the device by a brief and very general provision similar in nature to Section 45. That section, aimed at a more
ancient income-distorting device, gives the Commissioner broad authority to allocate gross income, deductions, credits or allowances
among commonly owned businesses if he determines such allocation is
necessary to prevent tax evasion or clearly to reflect the income of such
5'The technical argument is: Section 117(m) applies only to "gain from the sale
or exchange ... of stock." Section 115 (d) does not say that gain from a l15(d) dis-

tribution shall be treated as gain from a sale or exchange, but only that it shall be

taxed as if it were such gain. If the gain is not in fact from a sale or exchange and
is not required to be treated as if it were, Section 117(m) is inapplicable.
'"(whether in liquidation or otherwise)."
5'See, e.g., Sen. Rep. No. 2375, 8ist Cong. 2d Sess. (1950) 89: "In like manner,
the corporation might distribute the property in question without liquidating and,
under Section 15(d), the value of the property distributed, to the extent that it was
not a dividend, would first be applied against the adjusted basis of the stock to the

shareholders and the excess, if any, would be taxable in the same manner as a gain
from the sale or exchange or property." While this statement skirts the technical
argument, supra note 36, the context in which it appears makes it evident that the

Finance Committee felt the new provision covered this possibility.
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businesses. Apparently the Commissioner desired a more specific guide
for his attack on collapsibles. 59
On the other hand, Congress could have undertaken permanently
to collapse the collapsible by a destructive statutory provision spelled
out in fine detail. This means has been used, for example, to prevent
the allowance of deductions for artificial losses by enumerating precise circumstances in which losses from sales or exchanges will not be
allowed.6 0 But it would require tremendous imagination and ingenuity
to deal effectively with the collapsible in any such precise fashion.
In any event, the final legislative product is between the two extremes suggested. It combines a full measure of discretion in the Commissioner with difficult fact determinations and some amazingly precise rules of thumb in a manner more reminiscent of Section 129,61 another loophole plugging provision. An analysis of the specific provisions of the new subsection follows.
Use of the phrase "collapsible corporation" requires a definition.
Under Section 117(m)(2) a corporation is a collapsible only if, among
other things, it is ".... formed or availed of 62 principally for the manufacture, construction, or production of property...."63 Obviously,
as far as this part of the definition is concerned, it makes no difference
whether the corporation was created for or merely utilized for the
condemned purpose.
The use of the word "property" in a subsection of Section 117,
which deals with gains and losses from the sale or exchange of property, does not seem surprising. And yet any casual explanation for the
use of the word based on this coincidence is apt to be fallacious. The
wrhomas J. Lynch, General Counsel of the Treasury department, testifying
before the Ways and Means Committee, replied to a question on the nature of
remedial legislation sought as follows: "We would not like to ask for great discretion. On the other hand, we would like to be assured that the legislation does
not place in jeopardy the normal liquidation of corporations, corporations which
are organized and carried on regularly to conduct a business." Hearings before
Committee on Ways and Means on Revenue Revision of ig5o, 8ist Cong. 2d Sess.

(1950) 140.
cOSee Int. Rev. Code § 24(b).
OInt. Rev. Code § 129 deals with acquisitions which have as their principal
purpose the evasion or avoidance of federal taxes, but the Commissioner's authority
to deal with such cases is sharply limited by specific rules laid down in the section.
See, generally, Rudick, Acquisitions to Avoid Income or Excess Profits Tax: Section
129 of the Internal Revenue Code (1944) 58 Harv. L. Rev. 196.
"-For similar language in a long-standing Internal Revenue Code provision see
Sec. 1o2.

13Or principally for the holding of stock in a collapsible. Int. Rev. Code §

117(m)(2)(A).

158

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. VIII

property produced by a collapsible is not a capital asset in the hands
of the corporation originally or, later, in the hands of the shareholders.
The stock in the corporation is a capital asset, and it was this fact,
not the character of the property produced, which made possible
utilization of the device. However, the existence of property, which increased in value without the realization of income either by the corporation or its shareholders, was an essential element in the tax-saving scheme. Increase in the value of the stock resulting from such increase in the value of the corporation property was what made available the beneficial provisions of Section 117.64

It is true, of course, that an increase in the value of stock might
result from appreciation in the value of property owned but in no
sense produced by the corporation. However, if such property is investment property, it qualifies as a capital asset and it would be unnecessary to resort to the collapsible device in an effort to have gain
from its sale or exchange come within the capital gains provisions.
Similarly, property used in a trade or business qualifies for capital
gains treatment under Section 117(0). Thus the new subsection is
pointed at property produced for sale in the usual course of business.
Bearing in mind that there is no direct relationship between the
word "property" as used in Sections 117(a) and 117(m), it still seems
reasonable to suppose that anything which would be considered property under the former may also be regarded as property under the
latter. For example, if a corporation entered into a valuable contract
and then distributed it to shareholders upon dissolution, the contract
would probably be regarded as property produced by the corporation. 63
Definitions concerning the production 6 of property are included
within the principal definition in Section 117(m). First of all, a corporation is deemed to have produced property if it engaged in such
"See 3 Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation (1942) § 21.16.
'5This example does not have reference to what appears to have been the usual
Hollywood procedure of producing a picture, contracting for its distribution, and
then distributing the contract to the shareholders. See, e.g., Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means on Revenue Revision of 195o, 81st Cong. 2d Sess. (95o)
70. In those cases the picture produced would constitute the property for the purpose of Sec. 117(m), and the contract would simply provide for realization of the
gain from such picture. But compare Commissioner v. Carter, 17o F. (2d) 911 (C.A. 2d,
1948), involving the distribution of a brokerage contract to the corporation's sole
shareholder.
"The statutory language is, of course, "manufactured, constructed, or produced."
However, for the sake of simplicity the word produced alone, or one of its variations, is used in the text unless the content requires the use of one of the other two
words.
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production to any extent. Therefore, if Jones and Smith partially construct houses and then transfer them to a corporation for completion,
by means of a taxable sale or exchange, upon completion the corporation has constructed the houses for the purposes of Section 117(m).
Secondly, a corporation which has, in fact had nothing to do with
construction will be deemed to have constructed property if it holds
such property with a substitute basis determined by reference to the
basis of the person who constructed the property. For example, if Jones
and Smith completed the construction of houses and then transferred
them to Construction Corporation in a Section z12(b)( 5 ) tax-free exchange, the corporation would be deemed to have constructed the
67
houses.
Finally, if the corporation holds property which has a basis determined by reference to other property which it has produced, the property held is deemed to have been produced by the corporation. Thus,
in the case of a tax-free exchange under Section l12(b)(1) of property
for property of like kind, the property acquired in the exchange will be
deemed to have been produced by the corporation if the corporation
produced the property given up in the exchange. 68
But, obviously, not every corporation which is formed or availed of
principally for the production of property is a collapsible corporation.
If the new subsection is to apply, such action must have been taken
with a view to the sale or exchange of stock by the shareholders or a
distribution to them prior to the corporation's realization of a substantial part of the net income to be derived from the property and
with a view to realization by the shareholders of the gain attributable
to the property.
In Section 117 (m) (2) (A) (i) and (ii) the phrases "the proper-

ty" and "such property" are used, referring back to the first part of the
MInt. Rev. Code § i12(b)(5) provides against the recognition of gain or loss, in
certain circumstances, upon the transfer of property to a corporation in exchange
for stock in the corporation. In such a case, under Sec. ii3(a)(8), the basis for the

stock received is the same as the shareholder's basis for the property which he transferred to the corporation. So it would appear that if the collapsible device did not
occur to the hypothetical builders, Jones and Smith, until after they had completed construction of the houses, they could run the property through a Sec.
ii2(b)(5 ) incorporation and then collapse it with the same consequences as if they
had undertaken the venture originally by means of a collapsible corporation. The
recent amendment squarely prevents this avoidance possibility as regards future
transactions. It is just as clear that Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 465, 55 S. Ct. 266,
79 L. ed. 596 (1935), prevented successful utilization of this device in the past.
nThis is so because, under Int. Rev. Code § 113(a)(6), a Sec. 112(b)(1) exchange
results in a basis for the acquired property determined by reference to the cost of
the property given up in the exchange.
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definition of a collapsible, concerning property for the production of
which the corporation was principally formed or utilized. In other
words, a corporation is a collapsible only if formed or availed of principally for the production of property with a view to sale or exchange
of stock by the shareholders or distribution to them prior to the realization by the corporation of a substantial part of the gain attributable to
the property for the production of which the corporation was principally formed or utilized and with a view to realization by the shareholders of the gain attributable to such property. The Senate Finance
Committee Report on H.R. 892069 appropriately explains that under
this language the shareholders of an ordinary corporation, which has
produced and disposed of property in the usual manner, will not be
caught by Section 117(m) upon dissolution, or in other circumstances,
merely because the corporation has produced property from which it
has not derived a substantial portion of the available net income. It
would not be held to have been formed or utilized principally for the
production of such property. In general, the effect of Section 117 (m) (2) (i) and (ii) is to narrow the scope of the new subsection down to
the more or less artificial, one-shot collapsible such as is suggested
earlier in this article 70 in the example explaining the nature of the
device. It could hardly be applied to a long-established concern, although there is the possibility that such a concern might be used principally for a particular project and, so availed of, might fall within the
new subsection.
If some ordinary corporations which have a long, continued existence escape difficulties under Section 117(m), as they clearly do, it is not
so clear that all will fare as well. Speaking before the Senate Finance
Committee on behalf of the United States Chamber of Commerce,
Ellsworth C. Alvord called attention to this problem in the following
words: 7 '
"Much worse is the extreme breadth of application of the section, extending to many areas of legitimate enterprise.... The
Bureau might... seek to apply the provision to legitimate business promoters who initiate a business venture and, after its
successful establishment, dispose of their stock in a bona fide sale
"Sen. Rep. No. 2375, 8ist Cong. 2d Sess. (195o) 89.
Supra page 148.
"Statement by Ellsworth C. Alvord, Chairman, Committee on Federal Finance,
Chamber of Commerce of the United States, contained in Hearings before Committee on Finance on H. R. 8920, 8ist Cong. 2d Sess. (195o) 839; see also Statement
of the American Mining Congress, Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means
on Revenue Revision of 195o, 81st Cong. 2d Sess. (1950) 730.
7
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to buyers who expect to continue the business indefinitely. True,
Section 211 [enacted as Section 212] according to Treasury statements and the Ways and Means Committee report, is not intended to apply to these situations. Perhaps the bureau would
not seek to apply it in an improper fashion. Nevertheless, it is
bad law-making to declare everybody a criminal on the assumption that the police will arrest only wrong doers."
In this regard, the new subsection depends very heavily on fair and
enlightened administration. The severe uncertainty facing the taxpayer in this circumstance suggests that the Commissioner should be
required to issue rulings concerning the tax consequences of such sales
of stock. 72

The use of words such as "principally for" and "with a view to,"
which are suggestive of subjective intent, is not new in the tax law. 73
There is some possibility these words may be interpreted as merely
raising questions concerning objective results. 74 The Commissioner
may take the position that the liquidation of a corporation under such
circumstances as would result in the conversion of substantial ordinary
income to capital gain is in itself sufficient indication of the proscribed
purpose and views, if the more objective features of the Section 117(m)
tests are met.
Perhaps it would have been better to inject no subjective element
into the new provision. 75 Tax provisions involving difficult factual determinations, particularly those resting on motive or purpose, do not
promote the kind of certainty that business men reasonably like to
find in the law.
Limitations on Application of Section I17(m)
Even if a corporation is within the statutory definition of the phrase
"collapsible corporation," a sale or exchange of its stock or a distribution by it may not subject a shareholder to the rigors of the new pro"Cf.Mim. 4963, 1939-2 C. B. 459.
"See, e.g., Int. Rev. Code § 129, "the principal purpose for which;" § 8l(c)(s)(a)
"in contemplationof his death;" § 8ii(c)(i)(C), "intended to take effect in possession
or enjoyment." Emphasis added.
711n Estate of Spiegel v. Commissioner, 335 U. S. 701, 7o6, 69 S. Ct. 301, 303, 93
L. ed. 33o, 337 (1949), Justice Black successfully extracted the subjective element
from the estate tax provision concerning transfers "intended to take effect.., at or
after... death," int. Rev. Code § 8i1(c), saying: "...a post-death attempt to probe
the settlor's thoughts in regard to the transfer, would partially impair the effectiveness of the 'possession or enjoyment' provision as an instrument to frustrate estate
tax evasion."
"But it is difficult to see how non-avoiding entrepreneurs could be protected,
even to the extent they are under the new section, by means of an objective, let-thechips-fall-where-they-may provision.
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vision. Section 117(m) is made inapplicable if any of the following three
76
conditions is met:
1. If the shareholder owns, or is considered as owning, no
more than lo% in value of the stock at any time after commencement of production of the property, or
2. If not more than 70% of the gain recognized during the
taxable year upon the sale, exchange or distribution is attributable to the property, or
3. If the gain is realized more than three years after completion of the property.

The report of the Ways and Means Committee explains the objec77
tive of the first limitation as follows:
"It is the purpose of the first limitation to insure that the provision will only be applicable to a shareholder who by virtue
of his stock ownership can be presumed to be an interested party
to the project whether at the time of its organization or at some
intermediate date."
It is difficult to see how this purpose is effectively carried out by the
limiting provision. It is not improbable that a minority shareholder
may be a very interested person in the transaction, and may be influential in promoting the scheme. This is particularly likely since the passage of the new law because a minority shareholder owning no more
than io percent of the stock will escape the pinch of sectioni 17(m).
On the other hand, the new provision will, for example, hit a minority
shareholder who owns 12 percent in value of the outstanding shares
and who is forced by a decision of the majority to participate in a
proscribed distribution.
Interesting in the light of statements before the Ways and Means
Committee 78 is the possibility that under the new provision ten persons may form an invulnerable collapsible corporation. If they divide
the shares so that no one person's equals in value more than lo percent
of the outstanding stock, each shareholder may escape the effects of the
new provision and realize capital gain in lieu of ordinary income.
This arrangement, which the Bureau might have attacked successfully
prior to the recent amendment, 79 now appears impregnable in the
"zThe summary expression in the text of the three principal limitations is in
general terms and is therefore inaccurate in detail. See Int. Rev. Code § 117(m)(3),
supra note 49.
'House Rep. No. 2319, 81st Cong. 2d Sess. (1950) 98.
"'See note 13 supra.
nSee discussion in text supra page 15o.
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light of the very specific terms of Section 1 17 (m) (3) (A) .80 But if the
collapsible device was vulnerable absent Section 117(m), an arrangement such as this may continue to be vulnerable, because the limitation
simply places it outside the scope of the new provision.
For the purposes of the stock ownership limitation, ownership rules
applicable to personal holding companies under Section 503 (a) (i),
(2), (3), (5) and (6) control. In addition, however, the family of an
individual is defined to include the spouses of the individual's lineal
decendants. These rules of stock ownership ". . . prevent any one shareholder's disguising his interest by the placement of stock of the corpo8
ration among the different members of his family." '
The second limitation is intended to insure that the new provision
will apply only in instances in which there is a substantial relationship
between the gain realized by the shareholder and the property produced
by the corporation.8 2 If the gain is substantially attributable to other
transactions on which the corporation has been taxed, the section is appropriately made inapplicable. Accordingly, the new provision does not
apply unless more than 70 percent of the gain recognized by a shareholder during the taxable year is attributable to the property produced
by the corporation with a view to distribution or some other transaction
under which the shareholders, but not the corporation, would realize
the gain attributable to such property.
The 70 percent limitation should be read in connection with the
question of whether the corporation was formed or utilized "principally for" the production of property and with the proscribed view.
Even so, the actual effect of the second limitation is difficult to ascertain
and will depend greatly on the way in which the new provision is administered. Two possibilities, based on the example of a collapsible
previously set out in this article,8 3 will suggest the uncertainty. Suppose
that for the proscribed purpose and with the proscribed view Jones and
Smith establish Construction Corporation, which then carries out the
building project. Upon completion of the houses, Jones and Smith become aware of Section 117(m). At this point they cause the corporation
to sell 3o percent of the houses, and then dissolve the corporation and
distribute the proceeds of the sale and the unsold houses. The corpora8See, e.g., Statement by Ellsworth C. Alvord, contained in Hearings before
Committee on Finance on H. R. 8920, 8ist Cong. 2d Sess. (1950). "The inevitable
consequence is that schemers can tailor their plans so as to avoid the application of
this provision."
8
'House Rep. No. 2319, 81st Cong. 2d Sess. (195o) 98.
2House Rep. No. 2319, 8ist Cong. 2d Sess. (1950) 98.
8Supra page 148.

164

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. VIII

tion is a collapsible and the gain of the shareholders will be taxed as
ordinary income, because the corporation constructed the property; and
it was formed for that purpose; and the property was produced with a
view to distribution and to realization of the gain attributable to it by
the shareholders. Futhermore, the second limitation is not applicable,
because the shareholders' gain is all attributable to the property produced, even though part of the gain has been taxed to the corporation.
This result seems desireable; otherwise the effect of the section would
merely be to make collapsibles 30 percent less efficient taxwise.
However, take a more extreme case. Suppose, upon the same facts as
those in the example just stated, that when Jones and Smith become
aware of Section 117(m) they cause the corporation itself to sell all the
houses.8 4 If the corporation were then dissolved, again all the gain of
Jones and Smith would be attributable to the property, and te second
limitation still would not apply.8 5 It hardly seems likely Congress intended the new provision to cover such a case, and perhaps the new provision should not be so interpreted. And yet, it is difficult to see how
regulations under the new section can solve this dilemma; how can the
first possibility suggested be explained to remain within the section, as
it should, while the second possibility is removed, as it clearly should
be? Such a matter should not be left to ad hoc determinations by the
commissioner.

This seems to be the difficulty. Congress may have intended the part
of the definition dealing with realization by the corporation of a substantial part of the income to be derived from the property to make the
actual operation of the corporation in part determinative of whether a
corporation is a collapsible. But the statute does not say so. The entire
definition makes the collapsible status dependent upon the purpose
and views of those forming or using the corporation. If the corporation
were formed or used for the condemned purpose and with the proscribed view, it would seem not to escape the collapsible definition by
subsequent action, although upon dissolution one of the limitations
written into the new provision might relieve its shareholders of the
rigors of Section 117(m).
"'This might be preferable to a straight 117(m) liquidation under which Jones
and Smith were taxed at ordinary income rates, if the effect was for them to be
taxed at capital gains rates on subsequent liquidation. That is, the corporate tax
plus their capital gains tax might equal less than their tax on the entire gain
treated as ordinary income.
"Note that the corporation is within the definition of a collapsible, because
it was formed and, for a time, utilized with the proscribed purpose and view. The
second limitation does not take into account a change of purpose or view.
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The third limitation establishes an arbitrary time limit of three years
beyond which gain realized will not be affected by the new provision.
That is, if the shareholders do not realize their gain until after three
years following the completion of the production of the property, then
the corporation will not be treated as a collapsible corporation.8 6 The
reasoning behind this limitation appears to be that it would generally
be undesirable for the corporation to hold the completed property in
disuse for a period of three years, and, therefore, if it is held that long a
substantial part of the gain attributable to the property will probably
have been realized by and taxed to the corporation. In so far as the new
provision is aimed at the motion picture and building industries, this
reasoning seems sound, but the limitation may need clarification by way
of the regulations as regards other types of businesses.
There is at last one industry which must store its product for a long
period of time, often exceeding three years. Whiskey, of course, must be
aged. For this reason it may appear that the new provision has in effect
confirmed the efficacy of the collapsible device in the distilling industry.
The use of the collapsible prior to the passage of the new law may have
been vulnerable on corporate sham principles. Seemingly now there is
need for administrative interpretation of the word "completion" as
used in the third limitation, so as to indicate there is not now a certain
loophole where there was only a dubious one before.
One interesting consequence of the three-year limitation should be
mentioned. To go back again to the example at the beginning of this
article,8 7 if Jones and Smith set up Construction Corporation to construct houses but have the corporation rent such houses for three years,
any gain to Jones and Smith upon liquidation or distribution or upon
the sale of their stock will get the benefits of the capital gains provisions. Probably the way to look at this is that, under the new provision, property initially held primarily for sale to customers loses its
characteristics as such if held for more than three years. Thus, gain attributable to such property should be treated as analogous to gain from
a Section 1170) sale or exchangess In any event, it may be greatly to
the advantage of the speculative corporate builder to be in part a landlord. Whether market risks and working capital difficulties render this
impracticable for business reasons will depend upon the facts in a
"See House Rep. No. 2319, 8ist Cong. 2d Sess. (1950) 99.
"Supra page 148.
"In certain circumstances, under Int. Rev. Code § 117(J), gain from the sale or
exchange of property used in a trade or business qualifies for capital gains treatment,
even though the property is outside the definition of capital assets.
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particular case. But, apart from such other considerations, there seem
to be substantial tax advantages.

Collapse under Section ix2(b)(7)
There remains to be considered the relationship between newly revived Section 112(b)(7)89 and new Section 117 (In). It has been suggested 9 ° that for the year 1951 Section 1 2(b)(7) makes possible successful use of the collapsible device by way of a partially tax-free liquidation under that section. Such a suggestion seems to evidence a misunderstanding either of Section i 12(b)(7), of Section 117 (m) or of the
collapsible problem generally.
Under Section 112(b)(7) an individual shareholder of a corporation
which is liquidated within one calendar month in 1951, in conformance
with other specific requirements of the section, may elect to be taxed
specially on his gain on the liquidating distributions. His gain, of
course, is the difference between the adjusted basis of his stock and the
value of what he receives. Upon election, he is taxed as follows:
i. To the extent that his gain does not exceed his ratable
share of the corporate earnings and profits, it is taxed as a
dividend;
2. To the extent that his gain exceed his share of corporate
earnings and profits but does not exceed the value of money or
or of stock or securities acquired by the corporation after August
15, 195o, and received by the shareholder, it is taxed as long-term
or short-term capital gain, depending upon how long he has
held his stock; and
3. To the extent that his gain is not taxed under (i) or (2)
above, it is not recognized.

The important point here, as far as the collapsible device is concerned, is the effect of a 112(b)(7) liquidation on the shareholder's basis
for the property acquired. This is governed by Section 113(a)(18),
which provides that the basis for the property acquired shall be ". .. the
same as the basis of such stock cancelled or redeemed in the liquidation, decreased in the amount of any money received by... [the shareholder], and increased in the amount of gain recognized to him." Thus
a Section 112(b)(7) liquidation would fail to result in the stepped-up
basis for the property acquired upon liquidation which is an essential
cog in the collapsible device, 91 except where the sale-of-stock variation
"'Pub. L. No. 814, 8ist Cong. 2d Sess., § 206 (1950).
9®See, e.g., Landman, Tax Highlights of 1950 (1951) 29 Taxes 39, 42.

OAdmittedly, the suggestion made here presupposes that the property distributed
would not qualify as a capital asset in the hands of the shareholder. If it did so
qualify, the shareholder would secure the benefits of the capital gains provisions,
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is used. Section 112(b)(7) has no bearing, of course, on the latter variation.
Except for flaws and uncertainties in the definition of capital assets, 92 the non-recognition provisions of the Code could hardly promote the collapsible device, 93 because the success of the plan depends
upon recognition of gain, capital gain of course, so as to produce the
necessary stepped-up basis for the property acquired. To go back once
94
more to the example of a collapsible set out previously in this article,
Jones and Smith could resort to a Section ii2(b)(7) liquidation after
Construction Corporation had completed construction of the houses,
but if they did they would simply wind up owning the houses with a
tax basis equal to the cost of their stock, which is exactly what they
would seek to avoid by way of the collapsible.9 5
On the other hand, a consideration of the non-recognition provisions in connection with collapsibles is not wholly unprofitable. These
provisions suggest a manner in which two variations of the collapsible
device could perhaps have been better attacked. The new provision
saps the life of the collapsible by providing ordinary income treatment
for what would otherwise be long-term capital gain. Much the same
thing could have been accomplished by providing for partial non-recognition96 of gain realized upon liquidating or other non-dividend
distributions of collapsibles. The foregoing comments on the relationship between Sections 117 (m) and 112(b)(7) suggest how this would
thwart the device. That is, upon distribution the shareholders would
fail to get the stepped-up basis necessary to the success of the plan.
One advantage in non-recognition treatment of the collapsible
device would be avoidance of imposition of the tax at an inapproand the only effect of Sec. 12(b)(7) would be to postpone his realization of capital
gain until he disposed of the property. In the simple example, supra note 19, used
throughout this article, the houses should be treated as held primarily for sale to
customers even in the hands of Jones and Smith after dissolution, and therefore
they would not be capital assets. But that result would not always follow. See, e.g.,
Commissioner v. Carter, 17o (2d) 911 (C.A. 2d., 1948).

2See note 91 supra.
OExcept for Int. Rev. Code § 117(m), the non-recognition provisions might be of
incidental use. See, e.g., note 67 supra.
"'Supra page 148.
!3This assumes, of course, that Int. Rev. Code § 112 (b)(7) in a sense overrides Sec.
117(m), which seems to be a proper assumption in that Sec. 117 deals with the
manner in which gain shall be taxed but Sec. 112 determines whether it shall be
recognized at all for tax purposes.
GIn this respect the suggested provision could closely parallel Int. Rev. Code
§ 1i2(b)(7). As suggested. supra note gi, this might necessitate further amendment
of the Code definition of capital assets. Int. Rev. Code § 117(a).
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priate time. A shareholder may be hard pressed for cash with which
to pay a tax imposed upon a distribution in kind. More important,
however, would be the avoidance of having to determine the value of
the property distributed. The tax would, of course, be imposed when
the property was disposed of, and if it were disposed of by sale there
would be no valuation problem at all.
Thus, in so far as the use of the collapsible device hinges on corporate distributions, a mandatory Section i12(b)(7) might be a very
satisfactory solution to the problem. However, the sale-of-stock variation would remain to be dealt with.
If the sale of stock in a collapsible were allowed at capital gains
rates, even if the corporation retained its character as a collapsible after the sale, the new shareholder would have a new costs basis for his
shares and the property produced by the corporation could be distributed in such a manner that neither the corporation nor the shareholders ever would be taxed at ordinary income rates on the gain from
the property. Section 117(m) appropriately prevents this. If the nonrecognition approach to the other variations of the collapsible device
were adopted, the sale-of-stock variation could probably be taken care
of by excluding stock in a collapsible corporation from the definition
97
of capital assest.
It will be observed that this treatment of the sale of stock is not
subject to the objections aimed at similar treatment of gain from distributions. That is, the gain is taxed at an appropriate time from the
standpoint of ability to pay, and no valuation problem is presented.
The exchange of stock other than in cancellation or redemption would,
of course, raise the usual valuation problems, but the shareholder who
elected to make the exchange would not be heard to object to the time
of imposition of the tax.
Conclusion
With only minor reservations, new Section 117(m) effectively sounds
the death knell of the collapsible. Properly administered, it will not
give rise to harsh or inequitable results. That there may be more satisfactory methods of dealing with the problem, either along the lines
suggested in this article or otherwise, is hardly to be doubted. It is
even more clear that the collapsible corporation has simply served to
spotlight one of the many small flaws in the capital gains provisions
of the Code. It will probably be a cold day down under before everyone agrees that these provisions contain no imperfections.
"Although it might be considered desirable to treat loss as capital loss and
short-term gain as capital gain, as has, in effect, been done under Int. Rev. Code
§ 117(m).
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RECOVERY IN
WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS IN VIRGINIA
WALTER E. HOFFMAN*

The ancient axiom "actio personalis moritur cum persona" is
gradually becoming obsolete by the passage of statutes in many states
and the liberal interpretation of such statutes. At common law the
"action died with the person" and no recovery was permitted for a
wrongful death, but in 1846, England abrogated the rule with the enactment of "Lord Campbell's Act."' Since that date the several states
throughout this country have similarly passed statutes dealing with the
subject and, in Virginia, Section 8-633 of the 195o Code of Virginia is
now effective, having been revised on numerous occasions since its passage in 1871.

As this article may be of greatest interest to students and practitioners of the laws of Virginia, particular reference will be made to
decided cases and statutes of this state, although it is submitted that
many states have like statutes and similar interpretations.
In Virginia it is strange that so few attorneys have endeavored to
recover in tort actions for medical and hospital expenses preceding
death. Such expenses, as well as funeral expenses, are not provable in
an action for wrongful death. The Virginia statute creates a cause of
action for the benefit of those kin mentioned in the statute, free from
the claims of creditors of the decedent's estate,2 but no damages to the
estate of the decedent are provable under a count alleging and seeking
a recovery under the death by wrongful act statute. We all recognize
that, in the present age of rapidly moving motor vehicles and increasing recklessness, many persons are seriously injured, lingering for many
days and months, and some ultimately die as a result of the injuries
received in such an "accident." With the tremendous increase of medical and hospital expenses, it is not unusual to hear of instances involving required expenditures aggregating several thousands of dollars.
Yet when the action is instituted following the death, we invariably
are faced with the limitation of $15,ooo, 3 which, until 1942 was $1o,ooo,
and with the further realization that, in the trial of such an action,
*Member of the Norfolk, Va., Bar.
& 10 Vict., c. 93 (1846).
The statute goes further and provides that if there be no designated beneficiary entitled to the recovery, the same shall be assets in the hands of personal
representative, to be disposed of according to law.
Wa. Code Ann. (Michie, 1950) § 8-636.
29
2
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the medical and hospital expense cannot be introduced in evidence.
During the year 1950, the General Assembly of Virginia enacted
what is now Section 8-628.1 of the Code of Virginia. This section reads
as follows:
"No cause of action for injuries to person or property shall be
lost because of the death of the person liable for the injury. No.
cause of action for injuries to person or property shall be lost
because of the death of the person in whose favor the cause of action existed, provided, however, in such action no recovery can
'4
be had for mental auguish, pain or suffering."
Insufficient time has elapsed for the Supreme Court of Appeals of
Virginia to have before it the interpretation of this statute. It is submitted, however, that reason and precedent will now permit the recovery of medical, nursing and hospital expenses preceding death, and
it may be effectively argued that funeral expenses are likewise recoverable within reasonable limitations. No doubt the pleadings in such actions will require separate counts or allegations in order to advise the
court and opposing counsel of the several claims, but this is of little
moment, and until the Section is interpreted by a court of last resort,
we may expect an influx of such actions.
By dicta, Virginia's highest court has heretofore inferred that a
recovery for medical expense, etc., preceding the death can be obtained.
In Stevenson v. Ritter Lumber Co. 5 a parent instituted an action to recover for the loss of services of his deceased son, alleging that he was
entitled to recover for such services for a period of five years following
the death of the infant, or until he would have attained his majority.
The court denied the right of recovery but said in its opinion:
"The statute, however, does not affect the right of action for
damages existing at common law in favor of a personal representative or a parent, to recover for losses between the time of an
injury and the resulting death of the person injured; nor, as it
would seem clear from the authorities, the right of the personal
representative of a person dying as a result of an injury caused
by a breach of a contractual duty on the part of the person, or
corporation, inflicting the injury, to recover in an action for
breach of.contract, the damages to the deceased's personal estate
arising in his lifetime from medical expenses and loss occasioned
by his inability to attend to business; nor the right of a parent to
recover in a proper case made for loss of the services of his
minor child to the date of the child's death by wrongful act." 6
'Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1950) § 8-628.1 [italics supplied].
'1o8 Va. 575, 62 S. E. 351 (1908).
'Stevenson v. Ritter Lumber Co., io8 Va. 575, 581, 62 S. E. 353 (1908) [italics
supplied].
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Strange though it may seem, the foregoing case has apparently been
cited or commented upon by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
on only two occasions since the opinion of 19o8 and one of the references was on a point entirely dissimilar from that now under con7
sideration.
The other Virginia cases casting light upon this problem are Anderson v. Hygeia Hotel Co.8 and Watson v. Daniel.9 The Anderson case
discusses the period of limitation for bringing an action of tort and,
while death did not ensue, the decision of the case turned upon the inquiry as to what actions terminated with the life of a person. There
is language in the opinion from which it may be argued that all right
of action respecting personal injuries resulting in death expire with the
death of the injured person, but conversely the opinion mentions the
common law right to sue for an injury done to the property or estate
of the decedent. In Watson v. Daniel, a father instituted an action
against a negligent defendant for medical expenses and loss of services
in connection with injuries sustained by an infant son. The court permitted a recovery and overruled a plea of the one year statute of limitations, holding that this constituted a claim for an injury to the father's
personal estate. The language of the opinion clearly indicates that a
claim for medical expense and loss of services would survive in the
event of the death of the father. With the enactment of Section 8-628.1
of the Code of Virginia, is it not equally clear that a claim for medical,
nursing and hospital expenses in behalf of an adult decedent will survive and constitute a right of action which is in addition to the right
of action granted under the death by wrongful act statute?
The Effect of Lien Statutes
It may be strenuously argued that the existence of certain lien
statutes in favor of physicians, nurses and hospitals in death cases, has
the effect of precluding a recovery in an independent action by a personal representative against a negligent third party. The pertinent portions of these statutes are as follows:
"Whenever any person sustains personal injuries caused by
the alleged negligence of another and receives treatment in any
hospital, public or private, or receives medical attention or treatment from any physician, or receives nursing service or care from
any registered nurse in this State, such hospital, physician or
nurse shall each have a lien for the amount of a just and reason"See Mercer v. City of Richmond, 152 Va. 736, 148 S. E. 803
892 Va. 687, 24 S. E. 269 (1896).
0165 Va. 564, 183 S. E. 183 (1936).

(1929).
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able charge for the service rendered, but not exceeding five
hundred dollars in the case of a hospital, one hundred dollars for
all physicians and one hundred dollars in the case of all nurses,
on the claim of such injured person or of his personal representative, against the person, firm or corporation whose negligence
is alleged to have caused such injuries, unless the injured person, his personal representative or members of his family, is
paid under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation
Act."1 0

"In cases of personal injuries resulting in death and settlement therefor by compromise or suit under the provisions of Sec.
8-633 to 8-640, the liens herein provided for may be asserted
against the recovery, or against the general estate of the decedent,
but not both. If asserted against the recovery and paid, such
liens shall attach prorata to the amounts received respectively
by such beneficiaries as are designated to receive the moneys
distributed and in their respective amounts; and such beneficiaries, or the personal representative for their benefit, shall be
subrogated to the liens against the estate of such decedent provided for by Sec. 64-147. '"1

Thus, while the death by wrongful act statute provides for the payment of any recovery to designated beneficiaries "free from all debts
and liabilities of the deceased... "12 the corresponding lien statutes
do create a method of payment to hospitals, physicians and nurses
which in effect make any recovery subject to the limitations set forth in
the statute for such claims. The late 0. L. Shackelford, Judge of the
Court of Law and Chancery of the City of Norfolk, in a case from
which no appeal was taken, made this comment in discussing the effect
of these lien statutes:
"The only effect of the statute is to protect pro tanto the rights
of those who have rendered services to the injured person pending his demise. In other words, it in effect adds their particular
condition to the extent specified in the statute, to those other
beneficiaries mentioned in the statutes creating the cause of action and regulating the distribution of the recovery."
It is submitted that the reasoning of this learned trial judge is
sound, and it is now better fortified since the passage of Section 8-628.1
of the Code of Virginia.
When medical expenses, etc., are rendered necessary by reason of
the negligent act of a third party, an injury is caused to the property
of the injured party and, under the provisions of Section 8-628.1, it
"Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1950) § 32-138 [italics supplied].
'Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 195o) § 32-141.
'Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1950) § 8-638.
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would appear that the right of action survives to the personal representative in the event of death. In fact, the lien statutes quoted above
give a right of subrogation against the general estate of the decedent;
does this not constitute an injury to the property of the decedent?
Funeral Expenses
The right of recovery of funeral expenses has never been determined
by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. Whether the newly enacted statute is sufficient to sustain the argument that such a recovery
was within the contemplation of the General Assembly of Virginia
is admittedly debatable. In cases involving the death of an infant it
would appear, by the greater weight of authority, that a parent could
maintain such an action. While funeral expenses were not involved
3
in the case of Watson v. Daniel,1
the loss is none the less direct and
would constitute a pecuniary loss to the personal estate of the parent,
as the parent is entitled to the services of the child and, as an incident
to this right, became liable for the infant's support, including the medical care and, upon death, the funeral expenses. Such a claim would be
a damage to the estate of the parent and not to the parent's person. If
the parent is admittedly entitled to a claim for loss of services to the
date of death, it would seem to follow that the same unconditional
right to reimbursement existed for funeral expenses, subject only to
the reasonableness and necessity of such expenses. By reasoning we must
observe that if any infant attains the age of majority, it would no
longer be the legal duty of the parent to pay for such burial expenses;
hence, the loss, in cases involving death of an infant, rests upon the
parent.
The authorities denying a recovery for funeral expenses justify
their ruling upon the theory that the time of payment of such expenses
is merely accelerated by the wrongful death. In infant cases resulting
in death this rule should not be applied. 14 Under the same reasoning
a husband has been permitted to recover funeral expenses incurred in
connection with his wife's death, he being legally obligated to bury
his wife in a suitable manner if he possessed the means to do so.15
When an adult is killed and no member of the family is legally
obligated to incur the burial expenses, we are met with the old adage
that no person can escape "death and taxes." It follows that the wrongful death has merely accelerated the payment of funeral expenses. We
165 Va. 564, 83 S. E. 83 (1936).
" 4Marshall v. Miller,

112 Kan. 7o6, 42 Pac. 883 (1923).
'Philby v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 46 Wash. 173, 89 Pac. 468 (igo7).
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see some elements of danger in permitting the recovery of funeral expenses in such cases which has sometimes been extended to include the
cost of a tombstone. While the reasonableness of such expense remains
with the court and jury, in the absence of a statutory limitation, the
matter of the station-in-life occupied by the decedent may well justify
expenses which are prohibitive, thereby increasing insurance rates and
adversely affecting the public in general. It may be argued that the same
problem exists with respect to burial expenses of an infant but, as has
been suggested, the theory of recovery is entirely different.
Several cases outside of Virginia have been heretofore cited. The
general rule has been stated as follows:
"So, too, without the aid of any statute there may be a recovery
for medical and other expenses up to the time of death, and in
some jurisdictions, but not others, this right has been extended
even to the recovery of funeral expenses." 10
It would be meaningless to discuss the cited cases as it is apparent that
there is a sharp conflict of authority. Under the English, Canadian
and some American cases, it is held that acceleration of burial expenses
is insufficient to justify a recovery. However it appears that a majority
of the cases from this country permit a recovery for medical, hospital
and nursing services, and also permit a recovery for funeral expenses
under the theory that a wrongdoer is responsible for his own acts and
cannot be permitted to take advantage of the theory of accelerated payment of burial expenses.
Conclusion
As the writer analyzes Section 8-628.1 of the Code of Virginia there
should no longer be any real dispute with respect to the recovery for
loss of services, medical, hospital and nursing expenses. The death
statute should not have the effect of limiting the operation of the survival statute to cases where death occurred from causes other than the
injuries on which the action is grounded. The two causes of action are
complementary and not repugnant to each other. They may be maintained independently of each other or, as under the system prevailing
in Virginia to avoid multiplicity of suits, should be instituted under
1
separate counts under the Virginia Notice of Motion Statute. 7
Summarizing the foregoing, it is the writer's conclusion that:
(i) In cases involving the death of an infant, the personal
1025 C.J. S., Death § 13; 25 C.J. S., Death § io8 deals more fully with the subject matter. Other authorities are collected in Notes (1920) 7 A. L. R. 1334, (1935)
94 A. L. R. 438, and (1946) 163 A. L. R. 26o.
"Wa. Code Ann. (Michie, 195o) § 8-715 et seq.
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representative may maintain the action for wrongful death, and
the injured parent may bring a separate suit for loss of services
to the time of death, plus medical, hospital, nursing and burial
expenses within the limits of the rule of reasonableness which
should exclude the cost of a tombstone.
(2) In cases involving the death of an adult, the personal
representative may maintain in one action under separate counts,
a suit to recover for the wrongful death, and the medical, hospital and nursing expenses preceding death. As to the funeral
expenses in such cases, the matter is an open question.
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BANKRUPTCY-REVIVAL OF LIEN IMPAIRED BY REMOVAL OF MORTGAGED
CHATTEL AS CONSTITUTING PREFERENTIAL TRANSFER. [Federal]

A measure for the protection of creditors who have extended credit
or granted loans in reliance on the debtor's possession and apparent
unfettered ownership of property is embodied in the Federal Bank-

ruptcy Act provision for the avoidance by the trustee of transfers of
such property under circumstances which would constitute a "preference," provided that the transferee knew or had reason to know of the
debtor's insolvency at the time of the transfer.i The effect of Section
6o is to defeat the rights of secured creditors in favor of the trustee in
bankruptcy as representative of all creditors of the bankrupt. 2 Unless
these provisions are construed by the courts with great care and applied only after full consideration of the interests of the parties in
each suit, they could seriously hamper the utility of ordinary security
3
devices.
A departure from established principles in construing Section 6o is
apparent in the case of England v. Moore Equzpment Co.,4 involving
the avoidance of a transfer of property under a chattel mortgage. The
mortgage, valid in its inception and duly recorded in the county of
its execution, was obtained by the transferee on certain personal property of the transferor, who subsequently removed the mortgaged property to a different county. A California statute provides that in the
event of such removal, the mortgage will not be affected for a period of
thirty days, but that after that period the property will be exempt
"'A preference is a transfer, as defined in this title, of any of the property of a
debtor to or for the benefit of a creditor for or on account of an antecedent debt,
made or suffered by such debtor while insolvent and within four months before the
filing by or against him of the petition initiating a proceeding under this title, the
effect of which transfer will be to enable such creditor to obtain a greater percentage
of his debt than some other creditor of the same class." Bankruptcy Act (1950) §
6oa(i), ii U. S. C. A. § 96a(i) (Supp. 1950). "Any such preference may be avoided
by the trustee if the creditor receiving it or to be benefited thereby or his agent
acting with reference thereto has, at the time when the transfer is made, reasonable
cause to believe that the debtor is insolvent.
." Bankruptcy Act (195o) § 6ob, ii
U. S. C. A. § 96b (1943).
-'rhe assets of a bankrupt comprise a trust which is administered by the trustee
for the creditors as beneficiaries therof. 2 Collier, Bankruptcy (14th ed. 1950) 1633.
OSee Snedeker, Security Devices and Sec. 6oA of the Chandler Act (1943) 22
Ore. L. Rev. 307, 329.

'94 F. Supp. 532 (N. D. Cal. 195o).
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from the operation of the mortgage, except as between the parties
thereto, until the mortgagee either has the mortgage recorded in the
new county or takes possession of the property as prescribed in subsequent code sections. 5 More than thirty days after the removal, the
mortgagee, having reason to know of the mortgagor's then existing
insolvency, and having failed to record the mortgage in the new location, seized the property and sold it pursuant to the terms of the
mortgage, but not in compliance with the code provisions. Less than
four months thereafter the mortgagor filed a petition in bankruptcy
and was adjudicated a bankrupt. His trustee instituted suit for recovery
of the property and the federal district court granted the plaintiff
judgment in the amount of the value of the property, whereupon the
defendant moved for a new trial which was denied in the instant decision.
Despite the clear language of the California statute that the property in question was exempt from the operation of the mortgage, "except as between the parties thereto," 6 the court reasoned that the
mortgage was not only void as to creditors at the expiration of thirty
days after removal, but was "no longer in existence" 7 after that time,
unless it had been revived by the statutory methods provided for. The
court took the position that the mortgagee's seizure of the property
with intent to dispose of it under the terms of the mortgage was not
sufficient to revive the lien; rather the mortgagee must gain possesssion for the purpose of selling it in the particular manner prescribed
in the statute. From this reasoning it was concluded that the seizure
and sale of the property was invalid as between the parties, amounted
to a conversion of the property, and constituted a preference within
the four months period prior to bankruptcy.
It seems hardly disputable that the court simply ignored the
statutory phrase "except as between the parties thereto" in determin5
Cal. Stat. Ann. (Deering, 1941) § 2965. Subsequent sections, §§ 2966 and 2967,
authorize the seizure by the mortgagee of property removed by the mortgagor
from the county of recordation even before the debt has become due, and provide
for its sale as a pledge for the payment of the debt under a prescribed procedure.
'Cal. Stat. Ann. (Deering, 1941) § 2965; England v. Moore Equipment Co., 94
F. Supp. 532, 534 (N. D. Cal. 195o).
'England v. Moore Equipment Co., 94 F. Supp. 532, 535 (N. D. Cal. 1950). After
concluding that the mortgage was no longer in existence, the court made the statement that "The mortgagee at the time of sale was in the same position as a
mortgagee in possession under an unrecorded chattel mortgage." 94 F. Supp. 532,
535 (N. D. Cal. 1950). This remark is apparently irreconcilable with the court's
theory that the mortgage was non-existent, and is inconsistent with the conclusion that, as between parties, the sale under the terms of the mortgage was invalid
and amounted to a conversion.
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ing that the mortgage was "no longer in existence" and that the property was, unqualifiedly, "exempt from the operation of the mortgage."8
By the terms of the statute the mortgage was still valid as between the
parties thereto, who continued to be bound thereby, regardless of the
statutory effect on the rights of third persons in the property. Thus, the
seizure and sale, being consistent with the terms of the mortgage, could
not have been inconsistent with the property interests of the mortgagor
whose rights in the property were governed by the terms of the mortgage, and the court's theory of conversion must be in error.9
It appears that the controlling issue to be determined was not
whether the mortgage was "no longer in existence" at the time of the
sale,' 0 but whether the seizure and sale of the property, though valid
as between the parties, constituted a voidable preference within the
meaning of Section 6o of the Bankruptcy Act.": All other elements of
a voidable preference being present, the decision on this question in
the England case depends upon whether the chattel mortgage would
be deemed to have been made within the four months prior to bankruptcy. To determine this issue, a preliminary consideration of the applicability of the doctrine of "relation back" becomes necessary. Under
that doctrine, when the mortgaged property is exposed to the hazard of
supervening rights of third parties, the mortgagee must reperfect his
lien, but such reperfection revives the mortgage and relates its validity
to the date of its original execution. Only under this theory is the
question as to whether a revival occurred relevant in determining the
date a transfer is deemed to have been made. Here if no revival had
occurred, the transfer would be deemed to have been made within
the four months, 12 whereas if the mortgage was revived, its validity
would date from the time of original perfection, which was without
: England v. Moore Equipment Co., 94 F. Supp. 532, 535 (N. D. Cal. 195o).
0
A conversion is a "distinct act of dominion wrongfully exerted over another's
personal property in denial of or inconsistent with his title or rights therein, or in
derogation, exclusion, or defiance of such title or right." 53 Am. Jur. 8ig.
2OThat the court considered this question as the controlling issue is clear from
its statement that "There is presented to the Court the question as to whether or
not the mortgage, though valid in its inception, was no longer in existence at the
time of the private sale...." England v. Moore Equipment Co., 94 F. Supp. 532,
534 (N. D. Cal. 1950).

uThe instant case arose prior to the adoption of the i95o Amendments to the
Bankruptcy Act and thus is governed by the Chandler Act, Bankruptcy Act (1938)
§ 6o, ii U. S. C. A. § 96 (1943).
""If any transfer ... is not ...perfected... prior to the filing of a petition
initiating a proceeding under this title, it shall be deemed to have been made immediately before the filing of the petition." Bankruptcy Act (195o) § 6oa(2), 11
U. S. C. A. § 96a(2) (195o).
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the four months period. A repudiation of this doctrine means that the
original transfer is ineffective until reperfected by recordation or
seizure in the new locality, and that the transfer is then judged as of
the date of the ultimate perfection. This theory renders the question of
the actual occurrence of a revival irrelevant, since the date of ultimate
perfection, if it occurred, was within the four months period.
The court's conclusion that no revival had occurred in the principal
case because the mortgagee lacked the proper subjective intent in taking
possession seems dubious at best. Since the subjective intent of a
mortgagee who seizes property under the terms of a chattel mortgage
certainly cannot affect the obvious warning to third persons afforded
by seizure and subsequent possession, it seems most unlikely that the
legislature would have the validity of the mortgage as to third parties
controlled by that intent. Clearly a more reasonble interpretation
would have been that the mortgage, never having lapsed as between
parties, was revived as to general creditors by the mortgagee's gaining
possession. Under this interpretation the court would have been faced
squarely by the question of whether or not to apply the doctrine of
relation back.
Since the England case opinion is largely concerned with the
question of whether the mortgage had been revived, a reasonable inference can be drawn that if the court had concluded that the mortgage was revived, it would have applied the theory of relation back.
Despite the general repudiation of the theory in cases where no completed transaction has occurred, 13 its applicability in the circumstances
of the instant case is highly desirable. If the courts refuse to apply it
to valid transfers which have once "lapsed," but which have been reperfected within four months of bankruptcy, the security interest of
a creditor in property which has been removed to another county for
over a statutory period, or which has been removed for even a short
time to a state where a lien creditor could have prevailed over the
"protected" mortgagee at home, 14 will be defeated. In such cases a
mortgagee might be unaware of the removal, might be unable to pre"Corn Exchange National Bank v. Klauder, 318 U. S. 434, 63 S. Ct. 679, 87 L.
ed. 884 (1943); Tyler State Bank and Trust Co. v. Bullington, 179 F. (2d) 755
(C.A. 5 th, 195o); Bridgewater v. Shaefcr, 164 F. (2d) 447 (C. C. A. 5 th, 1947).

"4A few states continue to deny protection to the valid interests of out of state

mortgagees in property which has been imported and subjected to the supervening
interests of creditors or purchasers in the jurisdiction of the forum. Castle v. Com-

mercial Invest. Trust Corp., ioo Colo. 191, 66 P. (2d) 804 (1937); Universal Credit
Co. v. Marks, 164 Md. 13o, 163 At. 81o (1933); First Nat. Bank of Jamestown v.

Sheldon, 161 Pa. Super. 265, 54 A. (2d) 61 (1947); Note (1950) 7 Wash & Lee L. Rev.
45, 47.
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vent the removal of the property to another jurisdiction, or might
justifiably require more than the statutory time to locate the property
after removal. In any event such a construction would require an
unusually close and burdensome supervision by the mortgagee if he
is to protect his security interests. These hazards would be imposed on
the secured creditor for the benefit of general creditors who had not
been sufficiently astute to acquire security, and who might not have
relied on the apparent dear title of the mortgagor to the property involved.15
On the other hand, it is apparent that a literal reading of the Act 16
does not support the application of the doctrine of relation back in
such cases. Also, it must be realized that the intent of Congress in adopting Section 6o in its present form into the Bankruptcy Act has been to
guard against secret liens and to arm innocent creditors with a process for avoiding them.'7 Once mortgaged property is brought into a
jurisdiction in which there is no record of a charge upon it, a secret
lien exists so far as the creditors and purchasers in the new location are
concerned. That a measure of protection should be afforded even
general creditors in that location in their reliance on the apparent unencumbered ownership of the mortgagor does not seem unreasonable.
Nor does the fact that the mortgagee might be less culpable where he
has once made a completed transaction in the original locality, than
where he never made such a perfected transfer, detract from the position of subsequent good faith creditors whom the Act seeks to protect against secret liens.
It would afford a solution to the problem at hand for all jurisdictions to provide protection to security interests in property which has
Also, the secured creditor who had not been able, as a practical matter, to
locate the property for the purpose of recording his lien in the new location,
might be worthy of favorable consideration even though bankruptcy ensued while
his lien had never been reperfected. He would inevitably lose his security interest
in the event of the debtor's bankruptcy after removal unless his transfer could be
judged as of the date of its original perfection. That circumstances might exist
which would justify such a ruling is readily understandable.
'"For the purposes of subdivisions (a) and (b) of this section, a transfer of
property.., shall be deemed to have been made or suffered at the time when it
became so far perfected that no subsequent lien upon such property obtainable by
legal or equitable proceedings on a simple contract could become superior to the
rights of the transferee." Bankruptcy Act (1950) § 6oa(2), 11 U. S. C. A. § 96a(2) (95go).
17
Justice Jackson for the majority of the United States Supreme Court has
stated that "for thirty-five years Congress has consistently reached out to strike
down secret transfers, and the courts have with equal consistency found its efforts
faulty or insufficient to that end." Corn Exchange National Bank v. Klauder, 318
U. S. 434, 438, 63 S. Ct. 679, 682, 87 L. ed. 884, 887 (1943).
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been imported without knowledge or consent of the mortgagee from
the jurisdiction or recordation, and to allow a reasonable time after
such notice or consent for perfection in the new locality. What constitutes a reasonable time should depend on the circumstances of each
case.' 8 If this reform could be accomplished, there would be no need
for the fiction of relation back. Since no supervening rights could defeat the mortgage until a reasonable time had lapsed after notice or
consent, a mortgagee would be protected against the trustee in bankruptcy where he either had never rerecorded and bankruptcy had ensued before the lapse of a reasonable time, or had rerecorded within
a reasonable time followed by bankruptcy within four months. The
situations of all the parties would be considered in determining the
time element, thus allowing thorough balancing of the equities of all
concerned.
The closest approach to this ideal situation immediately available
is the application of the doctrine of relation back in cases where a
completed transaction has once been perfected, and where the equities
of the parties would best be protected thereby. Although it has been
said that "the doctrine of relation back with respect to chattel mortgages. . . has received its death blow,"' 19 as a result of the notable case
of Corn Exchange National Bank v. Klauder,20 it seems to be an unnecessarily broad extension of that decision to say it governed situations
such as that included in the England case. In the Klauder case the
trustee in bankruptcy was allowed to avoid the assignment of certain
claims where no notice of the assignments had been given to the
obligor by the assignees. There had never been a complete transaction. 21 Consequently from the time of the original transfer to the filing
of the petition in bankruptcy there was a possibility of intervening
rights prevailing over the interests of the assignees.
The significance of the question involved in the England case is
SUnder the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, 2 U. L. A. § 14 (1922) a vendormortgagee is required to refile his lien in the new location within ten days after
notice of the filing district to which the property has been renewed. The greater
equity in starting the time running from the date of notice rather than from the
date of removal is apparent, but the arbitrary stipulation of ten days could no
doubt result in inequitable results in some cases.
"'Snedeker, Security Devices and Sec. 6oA of the Chandler Act (1943) 22 Ore. L.
Rev. 307, 317.
'0318 U. S.434, 63 S. Ct. 679, 87 L. ed. 884 (1943).
21The requisite notice to preclude possible superior rights in subsequent bona
fide purchasers of the accounts had not been given. Thus, the court found that
the transfer had not been perfected within § 6oa of the Bankruptcy Act. Corn Exchange National Bank v. Klauder, 318 U. S. 434, 63 S. Ct. 679, 87 L. ed. 884 (1943).

.1951]

CASE COMMENTS

not to be minimized. So long as there are state laws which deny protection to valid security interests of mortgagees in property imported from
the state of recordation, and which invalidate liens on property removed
from one county to another for an arbitrarily appointed period of
time, and without inquiry as to the knowledge or consent of the lienor,
there is need for the doctrine of relation back. A consideration of Section 6oa of the Bankruptcy Act which will allow investigation and
protection of the equities of the parties is essential to the continued
usefulness of a chattel mortgage as a practical security device.
THOmAS

R.

McNAMARA

CONFLICT OF LAWS--BASIS FOR DETERMINING VALIDITY OF REMARRIAGE
IN VIOLATION OF DIVORCE DECREE OF ANOTHER JURISDICTION.

[New

York]
When a party who has been granted a divorce to which a statutory
prohibition attaches against remarriage within a specified time goes to
another state and remarries in violation of that prohibition, the courts
are in disagreement not only as to the validity of the marriage but also
as to what is the proper basis for determining its validity.' If the decree is a clearly designated interlocutory decree of divorce, the remarriage is unanimously conceded to be invalid, for the parties to the2
divorce have not yet had the bonds of matrimony completely severed.
But when the decree is absolute in form and the disability to remarry
immediately is imposed by local statute, a perplexing problem in conflict of laws is presented.
The recent New York decision of In re Peart's Estate8 illustrates
the difficulty in acute form, for consideration had to be given to the
varying rules of law in the states of the divorce, of the remarriage and
of the marital domicile. The case arose from a contest between the
petitioner-husband and the objectant over the administration of the
estate of the deceased wife. Petitioner had been married previously
in New York but had separated from his wife and had gone to Virginia
and had there established a bona fide residence. A few years later petitioner obtained a divorce a vinculo in Virginia and the decree, con'If the remarriage occurs within the prohibiting state there is no question about
the marriage being treated as invalid. 27 C. J. S., Divorce § 182 and cases cited
therein.
'Stumberg, Conflict of Laws (2d ed. 1951) 287; Goodrich, Conflict of Laws (3d
ed. 1949) 3593277 App. Div. 61, 97 N. Y. S. (2d) 879 (1950).
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forming to a statute,4 provided that neither party should marry another within four months of the decree. However, within four months
petitioner married decedent, a New York resident, in Maryland, and
they moved to and lived in New York until the latter's death. On an
appeal from a holding in favor of petitioner 5 the argument was raised
that the Virginia divorce was, in effect, a decree nisi for a period of four
months, that the Maryland marriage was void and should be treated so
in every state and, therefore, that the petitioner was not the husband of
the decedent.
In a three-to-two decision the New York Supreme Court Appellate
Division held that the Virginia decree of divorce was absolute and that
the second marriage in Maryland was valid. The majority opinion
pointed out that there was no provision in Virginia for an interlocutory
decree, that the absolute decree merely contained a prohibition against
remarriage and that such a prohibition "by the weight of authority in
this country would have no extra-territorial effect." 6 The opinion
stressed the public policy of New York to protect the marital status of
its residents and to recognize that a marriage contracted in a state
other than the state of prohibition is valid in New York if valid in
the state where contracted.
The dissent was based on the theory that petitioner did not have
capacity to marry in Maryland because the Virginia decree was the
equivalent of an interlocutory decree and the statute does not merely
prohibit remarriage but actually suspends the finality of the decree
in regard to remarrying. It was argued that the rule that a prohibition
has no extraterritorial effect was of no consequence here since the rule
only applied where there has been a final decree.
The majority of the court acknowledged the significance of the
law of the state of remarriage by purporting to be willing to be controlled by any rule of the Maryland court as to the validity of a marriage in Maryland in defiance of the Virginia statute. A considerable
number of jurisdictions have recognized the law of the state of re'V.a. Code Ann. (Michie, 1950) § 20-118. At the time of divorce it was Va. Code
(1919) § 5113.
5
James Peart was petitioning for letters of administration of the decedent's estate. In the Surrogate court the issue raised was that the petitioner's divorce from
his first wife was invalid for lack of jurisdiction, but that objection was resolved
in favor of petitioner. The issue of the statutory prohibition was first raised on
this appeal.
6
1n re Peart's Estate, 277 App. Div. 61, 97 N. Y. S. (2d) 879, 882 (1950).
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marriage as the basis of determining the validity of such marriages, 7
thereby adhering to the general rule that a marriage valid where contracted is valid everywhere. 8 New York is probably the leading proponent of this doctrine, having initiated the policy in the case of Van
Voorhis v. Brintnall9 where it appeared that, though the New York
statute prohibited the guilty party in an action for divorce for adultry
from remarrying during the life of the innocent party, the guilty party
had gone to Connecticut and had married and returned the same day
to live in New York. The court held that the validity of the marriage
was determined by the place where contracted and that the action of
the New York statute did not extend beyond territorial authority.
Other states have similarly ruled that the policy of recognizing such a
marriage because valid where contracted is so strong as to override
their own prohibition statutes. These states in effect declare that their
statutes are to have no extraterritorial effect. 10
However, in the Peart case the court, after stating its readiness to
follow Maryland law, decided that there were no cases directly in point
and that in such absence of a Maryland decision the case would be
treated as if the marriage had occurred in New York. It then mentioned
the Maryland case of Dimpfel v. Wilson" evidently as indicating that if
such a marriage were ruled on in Maryland it would be held valid; and
it is true that the Maryland court there held that a marriage was valid
when a party suffering under the prohibition in New York remarried
in the District of Columbia. What the New York court seemed to overlook was that the Maryland court stressed the fact that "what should
properly govern us in this case is the law of the District, when the marriage took place, and the construction placed upon the statute of New
'Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U. S. 216, 54 S. Ct. 684, 78 L. ed. 1219 (1934); Griswold v. Griswold, 23 Colo. App. 365, 129 Pac. 56o (1913); In re Ommang's Estate, 183
Minn. 92, 235 N. W. 529 (1931); Van Voorhis v. Brintnall, 86 N. Y. 18, 4o Am. Rep.
5o5 (1881); State v. Shattuck, 69 Vt. 403, 38 Ad. 81 (1897); Hoagland v. Hoagland,
27 Wyo. 178, 193 Pac. 843 (1920).
'Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U. S. 216, 54 S. Ct. 684, 78 L. ed. 1219 (1934); 2
Beale, The Conflict of Laws (1st ed. 1935) 669; Goodrich, Conflict of Law (3d ed.
1949) 36o.

986 N. Y. i8, 4o Am. Rep. 505 (1881). It should be noted that New York's statute
prohibits only the guilty party from remarrying and is considered penal in nature,
but the Peart case and the cases cited in note 7, supra, show that this doctrine of
looking to the law of the state of remarriage is used as well when both parties are
prohibited.
"Crouse v. Wheeler, 62 Colo. 51, 158 Pac. 1oo (1916); Farrell v. Farrell, 19o
Iowa 919, 181 N. W. 12 (1921); State v. Shattuck, 69 Vt. 403, 38 Ad. 81 (1897).
21107 Md. 329, 68 Ad. 561 (19o8).
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York, where the decree was passed."' 12 This language would seem to
imply that in such a situation as the principal case, Maryland would be
inclined to follow the construction of the Virginia statute and declare
the marriage invalid.'3
Thus, it would seem that Maryland actually may be aligned with
the decisions that recognize the law of the state where the prohibition
decree is issued as the basis for determining the validity of the remarriage in another state.' 4 The states using this theory contravene what
appears still to be the general rule that prohibition statutes have no
extraterritorial effect.' 5 They consider that the best policy is to let the
state of divorce determine the status of the parties for all marital purposes. In such cases the court of the forum will accede to either an express legislative provision or a judicial construction by the prohibiting
state giving extraterritorial effect. This view would seem to be based
on the vested rights theory, 16 since these courts look to the rights of
the parties acquired under the law of the state granting the divorce.
The court in the Peart case recognized the validity of the holding
in the leading Virginia case of Heflinger v. Heflinger'7 as to the effect
to be given to such a remarriage when a subsequent suit is brought in
Virginia by Virginia residents, but it refused to be bound by what it
considered dictum as to the extraterritorial effect that the Virginia
"Dimpfel v. Wilson, 107 Md. 329, 68 At. 561, 563 (i9o8). Though using the
double basis of the law of the state of remarriage and the law of the prohibiting
state worked out well in this case, the Maryland court is likely to encounter trouble
if a case arises in which there is a conflict between the two state's rules of law.
2"The court also referred to Bannister v. Bannister, 181 Md. 177, 29 A. (2d) 287
(1942) which was a case involving the validity of a marriage entered into in California
by a person who had not had an interlocutory decree declared final, although entitled to do so. At a later date the California court, by statutory authority, entered
a nunc pro tunc order making the decree final at a date previous to the marriage.
The Maryland court held this marriage valid and said: "It is now the settled law
that marriages are valid everywhere if the requirements of the marriage laws of the
state where the contract [of marriage] takes place are compiled with; and one of
the elements of a marriage relation is the capacity of the parties to enter into the
marriage contract." 29 A. (2d) 287, 288.
"Means v. Means, 40 Cal. App. 469, io4 P. (2d) io66 (1940); Johnson v. State
Compensation Com'r, 116 W. Va. 232, 179 S. E. 814 (1935).
"27 C. J. S. 842.
"The vested rights theory is one of the three principal theoretical bases of the
the Conflict of Laws in this country. Under this theory the rights or obligations
arising in the foreign state are said to be enforced by the forum. This is deemed to
be different from the foreign law operating in the forum at the will of the forum as
it does under the comity theory. Under the third, or local law, theory the forum is
said to create rights and obligations by its own law, but fashioning them by the law
of the foreign state. See Goodrich, Conflict of Laws (3 d ed. 1949)9.
Va. 289, 118 S. E. 316 (1923).
17136
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court had declared should be given by the courts of any other state.
In the Heflinger case the prohibited party had married another Virginia resident in Maryland and they had returned to Virginia to live.
The court held that the second marriage was void, under an exception
to the general rule that a marriage valid where contracted is valid everywhere;' 8 the controlling factor here was that the statute went further
than a mere prohibition, instead declaring that the bond of matrimony
is not deemed to be dissolved as to any marriage within a six month
period (now four) subsequent to the decree. The New York court
argued that the Virginia court went to unnecessary length in pronouncing that the marriage was invalid even in Maryland and declaring that
the Maryland court would be under a duty to so hold if the question
should come before it.19
The different results that can be reached from similar facts when
one court uses the state of remarriage basis of validity and the other
uses the state of prohibition is graphically illustrated by comparing
the West Virginia case of Johnson v. State Compensation Comr 20 and
the principal New York case. Both cases involved the Virginia statute
of prohibition and its interpretation in the Heflinger case. The West
Virginia court held that a marriage entered into in West Virginia by a
""The court said, "Undoubtedly, the general rule is that a marriage valid where
performed is valid everywhere, but there are exceptions to the rule as well established as the rule itself. These exceptions are generally embraced in two classes:
ist, Marriages deemed contrary to the laws of nature as generally recognized in
Christian countries, and include only those which are void for polygamy or incest; 2nd, Marriages forbidden by statute because contrary to the public policy of the
state .... The marriage in the case in judgment was declared void by the trial court
under the second class above, as contrary to the public policy of the state." Heflinger
v. Heflinger, 136 Va. 289, 3o3, 118 S. E. 316, 320 (1923).
"0 Here the Virginia court said: "If this question had been raised in Maryland,
instead of Virginia ... it would have been the duty of the Maryland court to have
given effect to the [Virginia] statute .... Such would seem to be proper application
of the full faith and credit clause of the federal Constitution." Heflinger v. Heflinger, 136 Va. 289,
9og,i18 S. E. 316, 322 (1923). Perhaps the New York court
could have emphasized its point by indicating that the Virginia court in the Heflinger case relied upon Kinney v. Commonwealth, 3o Gratt. (71 Va.) 858, 32 Am.
Rep. 690 (1878) and quoted the rule there laid down that "the essentials of the marriage contract depend upon the lex domicilii, the law of the country in which the
parties are domiciled at the time of the marriage and in which the matrimonial
residence is contemplated." Heflinger v. Heflinger, 136 Va. 289, 3o6, 118 S. E. 316,
320 (1923). Under the facts of the principal case, although James Peart might have
still been a domiciliary of Virginia at the time of the marriage in Maryland, it is
clearly shown that there was no intention to make Virginia the matrimonial residence and thus there would seem to be less reason for the Virginia law to have the
extraterritorial effect that the Virginia court proclaimed.
'116 W. Va. 232, 179 S. E. 814 (1935).

188

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. VIII

party prohibited by a Virginia divorce decree was void because that
court would give full effect to the Virginia statute. It was stated that
"Such is the Virginia law, and William's [the prohibited party] status
must be measured thereby." 21 But the Peart case reached exactly the
opposite result and declared a similar marriage valid in spite of the
fact that the Virginia court had said that there was in effect only an
interlocutory decree for four months in regard to a subsequent
marriage.
A third basis used in determining the validity of such marriages is
the law of the domicile of the prohibited party at the time of the marriage. 22 The states using this approach evidently feel that the state of
the party's domicile has such an interest in its citizen that it should
determine his status. Thus, it has been held in Oregon that a party
domiciled in Washington and prohibited by its statute could not contract a valid marriage in British Columbia, because the law of his
domicile followed him there.23 The Washington court upheld the
validity of a marriage where the evidence showed that the prohibited
party married another Washington resident in Vancouver where both
had gone with the intention of establishing a new domicile, even
24
though shortly afterwards they returned and lived in Washington.
At least one state even has a specific statute invalidating a marriage
in that jurisdiction of a non-resident suffering under a prohibition in
25
his resident state.
It might seem reasonable to assume that the interpretation as to
extraterritorial effect with a state gives its own prohibition statute
would be an indication of the effect it will give another state's statute.
For example, New York does not give its own statute extraterritorial
effect, and in the principal case it refused to recognize the extraterritorial effect of the Virginia statute. On the other hand, the West Virginia court gave its statute extraterritorial effect by declaring that a
marriage contracted in Ohio by a West Virginia resident suffering
under its prohibition was void. 26 Subsequently the West Virginia court
gave the Virginia statute extraterritorial effect by declaring that a
marriage contracted in West Virginia by a party prohibited by a
"Johnson v. State Compensation Com'r, 1i6 W. Va. 232, 179 S. E. 814, 815 (1935).
2Goodrich, Conflict of Laws (3d ed. 1949) 358.
23Huard v. McTeigh, 113 Ore. 279, 232 Pac. 658 (1925).
"4Pierce v. Pierce, 58 Wash. 622, 1o9 Pac. 45 (1910).
' Wis. Stat. (1947) § 245.04. See Hall v. Industrial Commission, 165 Wis. 364, 162
N. W. 312, 313 (1917).

"McManus v. State Compensation Com'r, 113 W. Va. 566, 169 S. E.

172

(1933).
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Virginia divorce decree was void.27 Thus, though opposite results
were readied, the two courts were consistent in treating their own prohibition statutes and those of another state alike. However, further
examination shows that such a consistent treatment is not always used,
for the California court sustained the validity of a marriage contracted
in Nevada by a party suffering under a California prohibition, 28 thereby giving no extraterritorial effect to its own statute, but subsequently
allowed the Wisconsin statute to govern by declaring void a marriage
entered into in Arizona by a party prohibited by a Wisconsin decree
29
who thereafter resided in California.
That there is confusion in this field of law in determining if and
in what manner a remarriage will be considered valid or invalid is
quite evident. There seems to be conflict as to which policy should prevail: that of resolving all doubts in favor of a valid marriage so as to
avoid the many unfair results (such as bastardizing issue or making
the parties adulterers) which may ensue from adjudging a marriage
to be void, or that of preventing parties from intentionally evading
prohibition statutes that are supposedly passed for the worthy purposes
of preventing hasty divorces and of aiding reconciliations. Perhaps one
solution would be for the legislatures to provide for an interlocutory
decree-not merely a statute to be construed as the equivalent of one
merely prohibiting a remarriage, as in the principal case-and not
give a final decree until the state intends the parties really to be free
agents. One objection to this move might be that the marital rights or
obligations of the respective parties would continue during this period
against the wishes of either party. However, many modem statutes
granting divorces a mensa make provisions for the fair adjustment of
such obligations, 30 and it would seem that this could be done with this
type of statute also. If this were done then it would seem that all other
states would have to give the desired effect to the decree by complying
with the universal rule that a valid interlocutory decree does have an
extraterritorial effect; thus, a second marriage would have to be
considered invalid. In this way much of the present confusion could
be eliminated.
JACK E. GREER

"Johnson v. State Compensation Com'r, 116 W. Va. 232, 179 S. E. 814 (1935).
Bin re Wood's Estate, 137 Cal. 129, 69 Pac. 9oo (1902).
nMeans v. Means, 40 Cal. App. (2d) 469, 104 P. (2d) io66 (1940).
nNote (1924) 3 Yale L. J. 426, 427.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-APPLICATION OF POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE

To ENJOIN DISCRIMINATORY
[United States Supreme Court]
IN SUIT

STATE ELECTION

PROCEDURE.

The highly publicized controversy over the validity of the County
Unit System of voting in Georgia, culminating with the recent refusal
of the Supreme Court to interfere with the practice,' gives new emphasis to the doctrine that the judiciary will not interfere with the legislative or executive branch in the determination of questions political in
their nature. Though this is a familiar principle of constitutional law,
much dispute still centers around the question of what basis or test is to
be applied by the courts to determine whether a given question is a
political one. 2 One view has been expressed that the basis is simply the
Court's policy to avoid deciding certain questions at a given time, because it is deemed impolitic or inexpedient due to the vastness of the
consequences of a decision upon the merits, to a feeling of incompetency due to lack of power, or to a conviction that the matter involved is
too delicate for a court to decide. 3 Others contend that the basis is of a
more judicial nature, involving primarily an interpretation of the separation of powers doctrine.4 Neither'argument appears to explain all
cases; but whatever the criteria, certain important questions are consistently classed as political and therefore non-justiciable. 5
The political question doctrine has not deterred the Supreme Court
from protecting the exercise of the voting privilege in numerous instances. Through a strong line of cases dating from Nixon v. Herndon6
in 1927 there has been no hesitancy in striking down discrimination
against the Negro in primary elections where the discrimination was
found to result from an act of a state or its instrumentality. Each de'South v. Peters, 339 U. S. 276, 70 S. Ct. 641, 94 L. ed. 834 (1950).
2Dodd, Judicially Non-Enforceable Provisions of Constitutions (1931) 8o U. of
Pa. L. Rev. 54; Field, The Doctrine of Political Questions in the Federal Courts
(1924) 8 Minn. L. Rev. 485.

3Finklestein, Judicial Self-Limitation (1924) 37 Harv. L. Rev. 338.
'Weston, Political Questions (1925) 38 Harv. L. Rev. 296.
5Coleman v. Miller, 307 U. S. 433, 59 S. Ct. 972, 83 L. ed. 1385 (1939) (amending

process); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 43 S. Ct. 597, 67 L. ed. 1078 (1923)
(whether mere passage into law of a federal statute invades reserved powers of a
state); Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon, 223 U. S. 118, 32 S. Ct.
224, 56 L. ed. 377 (1912) (guarantee of a Republican form of government); Chae Chan
Ping v. United States, 130 U. S. 581, 9 S. Ct. 623, 32 L. ed. 1068 (1889) (power to
admit or exclude aliens); Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1, 12 L. ed. 581 (U. S. 1849)
(which of two governments is legal). Also see New York Life Ins. Co. v. Durham, 166
F. (2d) 874 (C. C. A. ioth, 1948) (initiation and termination of a state of war).
0273 U. S. 536, 47 S. Ct. 446, 71 L. ed. 759 (1927).
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cision has been met with attempts to evade its force by inventing new
devices for the purpose of securing a "white primary" election. In the
Herndon case it was held that a Texas statute, expressly denying Negroes eligibility to vote in a primary election, was obviously violative
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This
approach rendered a consideration of the Fifteenth Amendment unnecessary.7 The Texas legislature then granted power to the State
Executive Committee of the Democratic Party to prescribe the voting
qualifications of its members, and the committee adopted a resolution that white persons only might participate in the party primary.
The same plaintiff again sued for damages, and the Supreme Court
held that the committee action constituted state action invalid under
the Fourteenth Amendment. 8 Proponents of the white primary, however, were persistent, and they temporarily achieved the desired goal
when the Court refused, in Grovey v. Townsend,9 to label discrimination by a private political party an act of the state, deeming such a
group to be a "voluntary association" with power to determine its
membership as it chose. United States v. Classic,'0 decided six years
later, concerned a criminal indictment, under a federal statute, of
state election officials for altering and manipulating ballots in a primary election. The question as to whether Congress' power over "elections"'" extended to primary as well as general elections was resolved
in the affirmative. By deciding that the plaintiff had the right to vote
and have the vote counted without interference where the primary is
by law an integral part of the election process, the Classic case set the
7Had the Fifteenth Amendment been considered, the Court would have had to
pass upon the question whether a primary election was an "election" within the
meaning of the word as used in the Constitution, thus determining whether Congress
had power to punish frauds or discrimination in primary elections. The question
was finally passed upon fourteen years later in United States v. Classic, 313 U. S.299,
61 S. Ct. 1o31, 85 L. ed. 1368 (1941) (within the power of Congress).
sNixon v. Condon, 286 U. S. 73, 52 S. Ct. 484, 76 L. ed. 984 (1932). "Delegates of
the State's power have discharged their official functions in such a way as to discriminate invidiously between white citizens and black." 286 U. S. 73, 89, 52 S.Ct.
484, 487, 76 L. ed. 984, 99o (1932).
0295 U. S. 45, 55 S. Ct. 622, 79 L. ed. 1292 (1935). In the Condon case, the question whether a political party unaided by statute could determine its membership
was expressly reserved. In the Grovey case such power was upheld. Action in state
convention by a political party was said to be a private act upon which no constitutional ban exists.
10313 U. S.299, 61 S. Ct. 1o31, 85 L. ed. 1368 (1941).
"Article 1, § 4 of the Federal Constitution provides that Congress may make
or alter regulations by states as to time, places and manner of holding elections, except as to places of choosing senators.
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stage for Smith v Allwright,12 which overruled the voluntary association principle of the Grovey case. It was decided in the Allwright case
that if the state prescribes a ballot and general procedure of election
which, in fact, limits the choice to persons elected in the primary, it
adopts and endorses the discriminatory action of the political party
which held the primary. A resolution by the party excluding Negroes,
then, came within the ban of the Fifteenth Amendment, which prohibits a state from denying a citizen the right to vote. The ingenious
South Carolina plan to avoid the language 13 and decision of the
Allwright case by excising all mention of primary elections from the
state constitution and statutes was summarily struck down by the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit as constituting state action.1 4 The
injunctive relief prayed for in the plaintiff's class suit was granted
upon the theory that the State's pointed action constituted an implied
authority to political parties to carry out a state policy of excluding
the Negro from the primary election. From the decisions it would seem
clear that the right to vote in a primary election and to have that
vote counted for full value is a justiciable issue in the strictest sense
of the term.
However, the political question doctrine in conjunction with a refusal to exercise the discretionary injunctive power of equity operated
as a conclusive barrier to the giving of relief from a discriminatory
voting restriction in the recent decision of South v. Peters. 5 Plaintiff
and another, qualified resident voters of Fulton County, Georgia, sued
in a federal court to enjoin the chairman of the Georgia State Democratic Executive Committee and others from adhering to a Georgia
statute' 6 providing that a county unit vote shall determine the out321 U. S. 649, 64 S. Ct. 757, 88 L. ed. 987 (944). The Court changed its mind
about the Grovey case because, "When Grovey v. Townsend was written, the Court
looked upon the denial of a vote in a primary as a mere refusal by a party of party
membership." 321 U. S. 649, 66o, 64 S. Ct. 757, 763, 88 L. ed. 987, 995 (1944). The
Classic case, by holding that a primary was such an "election," drew the Grovey
decision into question, and its ruling was re-examined in the Allwright case. The
right to vote in a primary was thereafter a constitutional right of franchise under
a possible double restriction of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
"The Allwright case involved general statutory regulation, and the language
of that opinion suggested that in the absense of such regulation by a state, the voluntary association principal of the overruled Grovey case might apply and an immunity from the prohibitions of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments would
ensue.
"'Rice v. Elmore, 165 F. (2d) 387 (C. C. A. 4th, 1947), cert. denied 333 U. S. 875,
68 S. Ct. 905, 92 L. ed. 1151 (1948).
"339 U. S. 276, 70 S. Ct. 641, 94 L. ed. 834 (1950).
"Ga. Code (1933) § 34-3212. The system in original form appeared in the first
constitution of Georgia in 1777.
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come of primary elections.' 7 Plaintiff contended that the statute was
violative of the Fourteenth and Seventeenth Amendments in that unit
votes were allocated without due regard to relative population with
the result that a vote in any other county was worth, on an average,
eleven times the value of a vote in Fulton County, the most populous
in Georgia.' s The Supreme Court, in a Per Curiam opinion, affirmed
dismissal of the action, declaring that "Federal courts consistently
refuse to exercise their equity powers in cases posing political issues
arising from a state's geographical distribution of electoral strength
among its political subdivisions."' 9
The discrimination in the South case may be distinguished on the
facts from that present in the primary cases discussed earlier, 20 but
there seems to be no distinction in principle. In the primary cases the
discrimination involved a denial of the right to vote on the basis of
race. In the South case the discrimination does not concern race, but
designedly strikes at the accident of residence; the quantitative value
of a vote depends on where it is cast. The further distinction exists
that whereas in the primary cases the discrimination prevented the
casting of the ballot, here it occurs after the votes have been cast and
counted. But the principle would seem to be the same as that of the
Classic case, wherein corrupt election officials falsely counted votes, or
of a case where an official simply destroys a ballot after it has been
voted. In each instance the result is the same, for plaintiff is deprived
of his proper voice in the government whether it be by the exclusion
of the entire vote or roughly ten-elevenths of the vote as in the prin1
7The candidate receiving the plurality of votes within the county is awarded the
total number of unit votes to which the county is entitled by statute. The county
is entitled to two unit votes for each Representative it has in the lower house of
the General Assembly of Georgia. The apportionment of Representatives, however,
is as follows: to the eight most populous counties, 3 representatives each or six unit
votes; to the thirty counties having the next largest, two each and four unit votes;
and, one representative or two unit votes to each of the remaining counties. Ga. Code
(1930) § 2-1401. The unit vote, then, is only nominally based upon population. Thus,
it was possible for Eugene Talmadge to gain the governorship in 1946 with only
297,245 popular votes, which gave him 1o5 unit votes, defeating James V. Carmichael who had 313,389 popular votes which represented only 44 unit votes. The
illustration is revealing. See Ogg & Ray, Introduction to American Government (9th
ed. 1948) 252.
2sAs pointed out by the dissenting opinion, a vote in 45 counties is worth twenty
times that of plaintiff, and in one county the disparity results in a rural vote worth
120 times the value of an urban vote in Fulton County. South v. Peters, 339 U. S.
276, 278, 7o S. Ct. 641, 643, 94 L. ed. 834, 837 (1950).
"South v. Peters, 339 U. S. 276, 277, 70 S. Ct. 641, 642, 94 L. ed. 834, 837 (1950).
"OUnited States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299, 61 S. Ct. io31, 85 L. ed. 1368 (1941);
Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536, 47 S.Ct. 446, 7W L. ed. 759 (1927).
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cipal case. Yet discrimination as found in the South case is not, at
present, within the justiciable arena. Such a result was not tenable in
the view of Justice Douglas, with whom Justice Black concurred. They
dissented on the ground that the discrimination in the present case,
though admittedly not complete disfranchisement, infringed for. practical purposes the right to have a vote counted for full value. The form
which the discrimination assumed and the time at which it occurred
seemed to them immaterial. It was pointed out that state action which
attempted directly what the Georgia statute accomplishes indirectly,
would be immediately struck down. 21 The dissent would construe the
Fourteenth, Fifteenth and Seventeenth Amendments to mean that
"there shall be no inequality in voting power by reason of race, creed,
22
or color or other invidious discrimination."
Although the present holding is consistent with the Court's earlier
decisions where the Georgia Vote System was in issue 23 and with the
24
it
Court's reluctance to intervene in similar electoral controversies,
is felt that a more exhaustive opinion at a later date must be awaited
before the precise position of the Supreme Court can be known. The
26
25
decisions in Colegrove v. Green and MacDougall v. Green, upon
which the South case relies, are somewhat ambiguous as to the exact
grounds for the results reached.
In the Colegrove case, plaintiff and two others brought suit under
the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act for a decree declaring invalid
the Illinois Congressional Districting Act because the districts were
not approximately equal in population. A decree for plaintiff would
have resulted in restraining the holding of an election. Relief was denied on the basis of the political question doctrine. 27 The ambiguity
"The illustration used was a law expressly reducing the Negro or Catholic vote.
In the South case it was said that only in the urban areas have the Negroes been
able to vote in important numbers. South v. Peters, 339 U. S.276, 277, 70 S. Ct. 641,
642, 94 L. ed. 834, 837 (1950).
"South v. Peters, 339 U. S. 276, 281, 70 St. Ct. 641, 644, 94 L. ed. 834, 839 (1950)
[italics supplied].
"Cook v. Fortson, 68 F. Supp. 624 (N. D. Ga. 1946), aff'd 329 U. S. 675, 67 S.
Ct. 21, 91 L. ed. 596 (1946); Turman v. Duckworth, 68 F. Supp. 744 (N. D. Ga. 1946),
aff'd 329 U. S.675, 67 S.Ct. 21, 91 L. ed. 596 (1946). In both cases, it should be
noted that the granting of injunctive relief prayed for would have invalidated elections which had already been held. This was not true in the principal case, for
there was still time to prevent the holding of the election.
"MacDougall v. Green, 335 U. S.281, 69 S.Ct. 1, 93 L. ed. 1 (1948); Colegrove
v. Green, 328 U. S.549, 66 S.Ct. i198, 90 L. ed. 1432 (1946).
"328 U. S.549, 66 S.Ct. 1198, 90 L. ed. 1432 (1946).
2335 U. S.281, 69 S.Ct. 1,93 L. ed. 1 (1948).
"Justice Holmes has said: "The objection that the subject matter of the suit is
political is little more than a play upon words. Of course the petition concerns
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as to the precise rationale of the decision results from examining the
three separate opinions filed by the seven justices who participated
in the case. Justice Frankfurter, with Justices Reed and Burton concurring, decided that the question was a political one. Justice Rutledge
concurred in denying relief but decided that the question was justiciable. Justices Black, Douglas and Murphy dissented, arguing that relief should granted on the merits. Thus, a majority of the justices sitting regarded the question as a justiciable one; but a differently composed majority decided relief should be denied. Inasmuch as the
controlling opinion, which designated the question political and
non-justiciable, was a minority view on that issue, the case cannot
stand as strong authority for identifying the nature of a political question. It was said in the controlling opinion that plaintiff had another remedy in exerting force at the polls by electing those who
would correct what the Court said was an admitted inequality; but
the possibilities of successfully invoking such a remedy seem remote, to
say the least. The decision could have been made to rest upon an
earlier holding 2s discussed in the Colegrove case and cited in the majority opinion of the South case, or upon the ground advanced by
Justice Rutledge that even though the question was justiciable, the
relief requested was within the discretionary power of equity to
grant or deny, and that it should be denied in this case because of
29
practical difficulties.
In the MacDougall case plaintiff and others sued for an injunction
to restrain the Governor of Illinois from enforcing an Illinois statute
which requires that a petition to form, and nominate candidates for, a
new political party be signed by at least twenty-five thousand voters and
political action but it alleges and seeks to recover for private damage." Nixon v.
Herndon, 273 U. S. 536, 540, 47 S. Ct. 446, 11 L. ed. 759, 761 (1927). This suggests
that the difficulty may be procedural only and that a suit for damages might have
been successful in the Colegrove case.
2slVood v. Broom, 287 U. S. 1, 53 S. Ct. 1, 77 L. ed. 131 (1932). Justice Frankfurter said in the Colegrove case: "The legal merits of this controversy were settled
in that [Wood v. Broom] case...." 328 U. S. 549, 551, 66 S. Ct. 1198, 1199, 90 L.
ed. 1432, 1433 (1946). The Wood case held that the Federal Apportionment Act of
1929 had no requirements as to equality of population, contiguity or compactness
of districts in providing for the election of Representatives.
:"Among other reasons the following were given: possible involvement of the
judiciary in the politics of the people; invasion of the power of Congress to regulate apportionment; the fact that glaring disparities have always existed in apportionment throughout history; and the possibility that invalidation would require supervision of electoral processes by the Supreme Court. Colegrove v. Green,
328 U. S. 549, 564, 66 St. Ct. l198, 1208, 90 L. ed. 1432, 1442 (1946) (concurring
opinion).
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contain two hundred signatures from each of at least fifty counties
within the state. Plaintiff contended that the great disparity of population among the counties enable voters of the less populous counties
to block the nomination of candidates whose support is confined to
a limited geographical area. The Court denied relief on the ground
that a state has the right to require that support of a candidate be
diffused throughout the state. Justice Rutledge concurred in denying
relief, but upon the same grounds he had taken in the Colegrove case.
Here, issuance of the injunction would have invalidated millions of
existing ballots on the eve of a presidential election, with insufficient
time remaining to print new forms.
In considering the circumstances out of which the principal case
arose, Justice Douglas was of the opinion that no such difficulties in
granting relief were presented. No new ballots were needed; time was
not a vital factor since election day was more than two months away;
the decree sought by plaintiff involved no encroachment by the Court
upon the province of Congress to see that apportionment is fairly
made, as did the relief sought in the MacDougall case; and the decree
would affect only the selection of names to be placed on the general
election ticket. 30 Plaintiff could be given the full value of his vote
without the practical difficulties presented in the Colegrove and MacDougall cases.
It cannot be logically argued that invalidation of the present system
in Georgia would necessarily disparage the Electoral College method
used in selecting the President of the United States.3 1 While the
Electoral College provides for unit voting and makes it possible for
a candidate to be elected without acquiring a plurality of votes nationwide, there is no discrimination in allocating electoral votes to a state,
for that distribution is based directly upon population. Therefore, the
ratio of unit votes to total number of people is approximately the same
for all states. In the Georgia system the discrimination exists because the
unit votes are allocated to the counties without giving due regard to
population, so that the ratio of unit votes to number of people varies
greatly between the different counties.
Opponents of the County Unit System of voting may yet hope for
vindication at a future date.32 The observation has often been made
3839 U. S. 276, 277, 70 S. Ct. 641, 642, 94 L. ed. 834, 837 (1950) (dissent).
"'See Note (1947) 47 Col. L. Rev. 284 (critical appraisal of Georgia County Unit
Vote System).

"Tennessee has struck down a similar unit vote system as a violation of the
equal protection clause of the Tennessee Constitution. Gates v. Long,

471, 113 S. W. (2d) 388 (1938).
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that the Supreme Court is not hesitant to reverse itself where the
true merits later appear.33 Until such time the present decision, like
the Colgrove and MacDougall cases, points to a loophole which
may be used to dilute the franchise of large numbers of American
citizens.
EamNsrr E. TUCKER, JR.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RIGHT TO ASSISTANCE OF OUT-OF-STATE COUNSEL
IN CRIMINAL CASES AS ELEMENT OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

[Federal]

Under Supreme Court decisions, the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment brings within its protection as against state
action, only such of the guarantees of the federal Bill of Rights as
involve fundamental principles "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty."' The determination of whether a specific guarantee in the
Bill of Rights is so fundamental as to be included within the scope of
the Fourteenth Amendment has been left to case by case determina2
tion.
In Cooper v. Hutchinson,3 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit was recently presented with the question whether
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees
to a defendant in a capital proceeding in a state court the right to
the assistance of out-of-state counsel. The accused parties had been
represented by court-appointed counsel in a trial for murder, wherein an appeal from a conviction and death sentence resulted in a
remand for a new trial.4 While this appeal was pending, certain outof-state counsel were admitted pro hac vice in accordance with a longrecognized custom5 that an attorney in good standing from any other
state of the United States may, in the discretion of the New Jersey
See Smith v. Allvright, 321 U. S. 649, 665, 64 S. Ct. 757, 765, 88 L. ed. 987, 998
(1944).

1

Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325, 58 S. Ct. 149, 152, 82 L. ed. 288, 292
(1937). Also, Buchalter v. New York, 319 U. S. 427, 63 S. Ct. 1129, 87 L. ed. 1492

(1943).
'The case of Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 69 S. Ct. 1359, 93 L. ed. 1782 (1949),
noted (1950) 7 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 51, pointed out that courts have refused to lay
down any strict rule as to what will constitute due process, but have made their
determinations on a basis of judicial inclusion and exclusion, as the cases have
been presented.
S184 F. (2d) 119 (C. A. 3 d, 195o).

'State v. Cooper, 2 N. J. 540, 67 A. (2d) 298 (1949).
'This custom was recognized as early as 1629 by English judges of Common Pleas.
Thursby v. Warren, 4 Car. 1, 79 Eng. Rep. 738 (1629).
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court in which any cause is pending, be admitted to speak in such
cause in the same manner as an attorney of that state. 6 After remand
of the case for a new trial, these lawyers proceeded with various
motions and other preliminary matters prior to the retrial, but thereafter the trial judge, without a hearing or any charge of misconduct
against the lawyers, entered an order depriving them of further authority to appear in the case. The Cooper case was a suit in a federal
district court by the accused to enjoin the state trial judge from proceeding with the retrial of the murder case until the out-of-state counsel
were admitted. Plaintiff's contention was that, in view of the decision
in United States v. Bergamo holding that the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment guarantees a defendant in a federal court the
right to have the assistance of out-of-state counsel if he so desires, 7 the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in like manner
guarantees such a right to a defendant in a capital case before a state
court. It was argued that the request for relief from the federal court
was justified under the Civil Rights Act,8 which gives these tribunals
the power to enjoin a state court proceeding before the available
state remedies have been exhausted, as well as the right to take direct
action against the state officer whose official act has invaded the constitutional rights of the petitioners. The district court dismissed the
complaint and denied plaintiff's motion for an injunction.
Although the Court of Appeals refused a specific answer to plaintiff's contention that he had a constitutional right to out-of-state counsel, it did hold that since counsel had been admitted in pursuance
of the state rule on admission pro hac vice and were to be treated the
same as local counsel, their arbitrary removal was violative of constitutional due process, and that plaintiff had a right to have them serve
for the entire cause. 9 Although agreeing that an injunction should not
issue, the Court of Appeals vacated the judgment dismissing the acON. J. Rule i:8-io(b). This was a rule promulgated by the Supreme Court of

New Jersey to govern practice and procedure in the courts of that state.
7154 F. (2d) 31 (C. C. A. 3d, 1946). It is well settled that the Fifth Amendment
constitutes a restriction on the federal government, but not upon the states. See

cases cited, 16 C. J. S. 1146.

817 Stat.

i3

(1871), 8 U. S. C. A. § 43

(1942).

'Here the court referred to instances where a person, through voluntary action
by another, acquires rights which he did not have before. Black v. New York, N. H.

& H. R. Co., 193 Mass. 448, 79 N. E. 797 (19o7); Restatement, Torts (1934) §§ 323-325;

Restatement, Torts (1934) § 342. Thus, though the accused may not initially have had
a constitutional right to use out-of-state counsel, once they have been granted that
privilege and those counsel have taken over the defense, the court cannot revoke the

privilege without cause.
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tion and remanded the case with instructions to retain jurisdiction
to give the New Jersey courts an opportunity to rectify the deprivation of the constitutional right.' 0
In order to obtain relief in a federal court against prosecution in
a state court, the plaintiff must show a great and immediate need to
prevent irreparable loss or an infraction of some constitutional right.11
While the plaintiff in the Cooper case has met the latter requirement,
it would seem that the court was correct in refusing to issue an injunction until the state remedies had been utilized. Although the Civil
Rights Act empowers a federal court to stay proceedings in a state
court 1 2 before the state remedies have been exhausted 13 and permits
a direct action against the state official whose act deprives accused of
his constitutional right,14 the courts have apparently been extremely
reluctant to exercise that authority. 15 Such an attitude is certainly in
0
" Judge Kalodner, dissenting in
the federal court implied that the
was not the function of the federal
Hutchinson, 184 F. (2d) 119, 125 (C.

part, said that the retention of jurisdiction by
state courts might act improperly and that it
courts to police the state judiciary. Cooper v.
A. 3d, 195o).

"Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U. S. 240, 46 S. Ct. 492, 70 L. ed. 927 (1926); Terrace v.
Thompson, 263 U. S. 197, 44 S. Ct. 15, 68 L. ed. 255 (1923). Chief Justice Stone, in

Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U. S. 157, 16o, 63 S. Ct. 877, 88o, 87 L. ed. 1324,
1329 (1943), seemed to sum up the attitude of the federal courts toward this question
of enjoining state proceedings when he said "the power reserved to the states under
the Constitution to provide for the determination of controversies in their courts
may be restricted by federal district courts only in obedience to Congressional legislation ....

Congress ... has adopted the policy ... of leaving generally to the state

courts the trial of criminal cases arising under state laws, subject to review by this
Court of any federal question involved. Hence, courts of equity in the exercise of
their discretionary powers should conform to this policy by refusing to interfere
with or embarrass threatened proceedings in state courts save in those exceptional
cases which call for the interposition of a court of equity to prevent irreparable injury which is clear and imminent...."
"62 Stat. 968 (1947), 28 U. S. C. A. § 2283 (1950) provides: "A court of the United
States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as ex17 Stat. 13 (1871), 8 U. S. C. A. § 43 (1942)
pressly authorized by Act of Congress .
provides: "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress."
IsLane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268, 59 S. Ct. 872, 83 L. ed. 1281 (1939).
'Picking v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 151 F. (2d) 240, 250 (C. C. A. 3 d, 1945).

IsAn injunction was issued in International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union v. Acherman, 82 F. Supp. 65 (D. C. Hawaii 1949), the court saying that
in connection with the exercise of discretion of a district court of the United States
to restrain criminal actions, good faith in prosecution is material under the Civil
Rights Act. This is the only case found in which a federal court has enjoined
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harmony with the general policies of the courts in their efforts to maintain that balance between the state and federal judiciary which is essential to a system of dual sovereignty. 16
The rules of procedure for the state of New Jersey provide that
"Any attorney or counsellor from any other of the United States, of
good standing there, may, at the discretion of the court in which any
cause is pending, be admitted, pro hac vice, to speak in such cause
in the same manner as an attorney or counsellor of this state,"'17 and
a state statute provides for an appeal to the Supreme Court of New
Jersey when necessary to preserve and maintain the status quo pending
final judgment in a case and to prevent irreparable injury.18 Since there
is every indication that the appellants can successfully require the trial
judge to admit the out-of-state lawyers for their defense, or, failing
in this, can appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States on due
process grounds, and in view of the well-founded reluctance of federal
courts to enjoin state criminal proceedings, issuance of the injunction
sought by the plaintiffs would have constituted an unjustifiable interference with the state judiciary.
On the broader issue raised by the contention that the accused in
a state criminal proceeding has a constitutional right to be represented
by out-of-state counsel, the courts have not yet taken a positive stand.
The Sixth Amendment, controlling federal court proceedings, provides that "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right ... to have the assistance of counsel for his defense,"' 9 and in
1932 the Supreme Court in Powell v. Alabama,20 established that the
criminal proceedings on the basis of the Civil Rights Act. In Keegan v. New Jersey, 42 F. Supp. 922 (D. C. N. J. 1941), it was said that a federal court could enjoin a
trial proceeding in a state court where such trial would invade constitutional rights.
"6The general rule that a federal court will seldom issue an injunction to stay proceedings in a state court has long been established, Covell v. Heyman, 111 U. S. 176,
4 S. Ct. 355, 28 L. ed. 390 (1884), and followed upon the principle of comity, and the
policy of avoiding unnecessary friction between two systems of courts sometimes
having concurrent jurisdiction. Hale v. Bimco Trading, Inc., 306 U. S. 375, 59 S.
Ct. 526, 83 L. ed. 77, (1939); Wells Fargo and Co. v. Taylor, 254 U. S. 175, 41 S. Ct.

93, 65 L. ed. 205 (1920). See Lockwood, Maw, Rosenberry, The Use of The Federal
Injunction (1930) 43 Harv. L. Rev. 426, 428, wherein it is said "The tendency of
federal injunctions to arouse the antagonism of the states... gains added signifance from the fact that, ex hypothesi, the subject matter in dispute involves the
distribution of power between the nation and the states. The task of setting the
limits of these powers is at best one of great delicacy, conducive to the excitement
of ill-feeling even without the added provocation of an injunction."
27N. J. Rule 1:8-io(b).
18N. J. Rule 4:2-2.
"1U. S. Const. Amend. VI.
'0287 U. S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55, 73 L. ed. 158 (1932). Since the defendants were young,
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right to counsel in criminal cases is one of the fundamental rights
protected also in state proceedings by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. However, Betts v. Brady2' limited the federal constitutional right in this respect to capital cases. Subsequently,
the same federal court which decided the principal case held that the
Sixth Amendment gives a defendant the right to counsel of his own
choosing, even if they are not residents of the state wherein the federal
court is located and have not been admitted to practice there.22 The
question now arises whether a defendant in a capital case in a state
court can choose out-of-state counsel as he can in a case before a federal court. The few federal decisions mentioning the question may be
thought to indicate an affirmative answer, by asserting that a defendant
has a right to counsel of his own choice.2 3 Further support for this
view is provided by the Supreme Court's declaration in Glasser v.
United States, that "the right to the assistance of counsel is so fundamental that the denial by a state court of a reasonable time to allow
the selection of counsel of one's own choosing... may so offend our
concept of the basic requirements of a fair hearing as to amount to a
denial of due process of law contrary to the Fourteenth Amend"24
ment ....
It is submitted, however, that these assertions that the defendant
has a right to counsel of his own choice mean only that he can insist
on employing his choice of counsel from those admitted to practice
before the courts of the state in which he is being tried, and that
the Bergamo case rule that a defendant in a criminal action before
a federal court can demand out-of-state counsel is the result of federal
procedure and is not binding upon the state courts, as no fundamental
rights of due process are involved. The demand for use of out-of-state
counsel obviously goes beyond the recognized principal that the
Federal Constitution guarantees a defendant in a capital case before
a state court the right to assistance of counsel 25 as part of the due
ignorant, away from home, and were tried in emotionally charged surroundings, the
Court felt that adequate representation by counsel was necessary to insure the
basic elements of fairness.
'1316 U. S. 455, 62 S. Ct. 1252, 86 L. ed. 1595 (1942). The Court declared that in
the majority of the states it was the considered judgment of the people, their representatives, and their courts that appointment of counsel was not a fundamental
right, and that the Due Process Clause does not obligate the states to furnish
counsel in every criminal case where accused is unable to obtain counsel.
-United States v. Bergamo, 154 F. (2d) 31 (C. C. A. 3d, 1946).
3Andrews v. Robertson, 145 F. (2d) 1o (C. C. A. 5 th, 1944); Yung v. Coleman,
5 F. Supp. 702 (S. D. Idaho x934).
'315 U. S. 60, 7o, 62 S. Ct. 457, 464, 86 L. ed. 68o, 699 (1942).
'Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S.45, 53 S. Ct. 55, 77 L. ed. 158 (1932).
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process requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment. Even when courts
appoint counsel for a destitute defendant, due process requires only
26
that he have effective counsel, not the best available.
In view of the fact that the licensing and regulation of attorneysat-law fall within the powers of the states, 27 the plaintiff's assertion
that he has a constitutional right to bring any lawyer he chooses into
a state court is rather surprising. The right to practice law is not a
privilege or immunity within the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, 28 nor is there any rule of comity requiring one state to admit
to its courts attorneys qualified to practice in other states. 29 A decision sustaining the plaintiff's contention in the principal case
would seriously interfere with and diminish the control of the states
over the persons they would admit to practice before their courts.
ANDREW D. OWENS

CONSTITUTIONAL
REGULATIONS

LAW-STANDARDS
AFFECTING

FOR

TESTING

INTERSTATE

VALIDITY

COMMERCE.

OF

STATE

[United States

Supreme Court]
In the recent case of Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison' the Supreme
Court has again employed the Commerce Clause 2 to invalidate a state
regulation of commerce in the absence of congressional legislation. The
function, and even the very power, of the Court in this type of case
has been the subject of much dispute in American constitutional
history.3 The subject was thought to have been laid to rest when, sev"Conley v. Cox, 138 F. (2d) 786 (C. C. A. 8th, 1943); United States v. Thompson,
56 F. Supp. 683 (S. D. N. Y. 1944). The Constitution does not require that counsel
appointed for an accused shall measure up to his notions of ability, and it is
enough if a qualified counsel is appointed to represent the accused and that the
attorney appear, advise with and represents the interests of his dent.
'In re Day, 181 Ill. 73, 54 N. E. 646 (1899); In re Co-operative Law Co., 198 N.
Y. 479, 92 N. E. 15 (igio); Application of Christy, 362 Pa. 347, 67 A. (2d) 85 (1949).
'Ex parte Lockwood, 154 U. S. 116, 14 S. Ct. 1082, 38 L. Ed. 929 (1894).
"State v. Perkins, 138 Kan. 899, 28 P. (2d) 765 (1934). The license or permission
to practice law in one state is not extraterritorial.
95 L. ed. 228 (1951).
'U. S. Const. Art. I § 8, cl. 3.
3
in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 2o9, 6 L. ed. 23, 73 (U. S. 1824), Chief Justice Marshall, in reply to the argument of counsel that the congressional power
over commerce was exclusive, said, "There is great force in this argument, and
the Court is not satisfied that it has been refuted." Cf. Willson v. Black Bird Creek
Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 245, 7 L. ed. 412 (U. S. 1829), and the interpretation given to these
two cases by Chief Justice Taney in the License Cases, 5 How. 504, 584, 12 L. ed. 256,
'71 S. Ct. 295,
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eral times in the past decade, the Court reaffirmed the principle of
Cooley v. Board of Wardens4 that the validity of state regulation is
to be determined by balancing national and local interests; but in 1949
the tenor of the opinion by Justice Jackson in H. P. Hood & Sons v.
Du Mond 5 again put the issue in doubt.6 The contribution of the Dean
case lies in the light it reflects upon the true standard applied by the
Court to test the validity of state regulations affecting commerce.
Under attack in the Dean case was a provision of the Madison, Wisconsin milk ordinance that no milk should be sold within the city as
pasteurized milk, unless pasteurized and bottled within five miles of
the central portion of the city.7 The Dean Company operates pasteur292 (U. S. 1847) to justify his theory of a concurrent power in the states to regulate

commerce until congressional legislation displaces that power. A compromise between these conflicting views was accomplished in Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12
How. 299, 319, 13 L. ed. 996, ioo5 (U. S. 1851), whereby subjects national in character
imperatively demanding one uniform rule were beyond state regulation, while in
subjects local in character admitting of diversity the states might regulate in absence
of congressional legislation. Although the court often obscured this principle by
stating conclusions in terms of "direct" and "indirect" burdens, it was evident that
the Cooley case was still the guiding doctrine, with "direct" designating the national
interest and "indirect," the local. See Simpson v. Shepard, 230 U. S. 352, 399, 33 S.
Ct. 729, 740, 57 L. ed. 1511, 1541 (1912). In a dissent in Di Santo v. Pennsylvania,
273 U. S. 34, 43, 47 S. Ct. 267, 271, 71 L. ed. 524, 530 (1927), Justice Stone attacked
the use of the "burden" terminology, contending that it was a deviation from the
Cooley principle. He asserted that the Cooley doctrine was correctly applied only
when the court "balanced" the conflicting local and national interests involved to
determine the validity of state laws affecting interstate commerce. The views of this
dissent were adopted by the Court in California v. Thompson, 313 U. S. log, 61 S.
Ct. 930, 85 L. ed. 1319 (1941). See Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power
(1940) 27 Va. L. Rev. i; and Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power-Revised Version (1947) 47 Col. L. Rev. 547412 How. 299, 13 L. ed. 996 (U. S. 1851). Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325
U. S. 761, 65 S. Ct. 1515, 89 L. ed. 1915 (1945); Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341, 63
S. Ct. 307, 87 L. ed. 315 (1943); Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U. S. 39o, 62 S. Ct. 311,
86 L. ed. 294 (1941); South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303
U. S. 177, 58 S. Ct. 510, 82 L. ed. 734 (1938).
1336 U. S. 525, 69 S. Ct. 657, 93 L. ed. 865 (1949). By a five to four decision the
Court held invalid a New York law under which an interstate shipper was denied
a license to construct a milk cooling plant, from which he planned to ship milk to
Massachusetts, on the ground the supply was low in New York.
6
See 336 U. S. 525, 545, 69 S. Ct. 657, 679, 93 L. ed. 865, 882 (1949), where Justice
Black, in dissent, charges that the Court abandoned the Cooley principle in favor
of a "mechanistic formula" which in effect held that the states had no power to
regulate commerce. Several writers adopted a similar interpretation. See Mendelson,
Recent Developments in State Power to Regulate and Tax Interstate Commerce
(1949) 98 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 57, 62; Notes (1950) 3o B. U. L. Rev. 113; (1949) 34 Minn
L. Rev. 6o.
771 S. Ct. 295 at 296, 95 L. ed. 228 at 229 (1951) note i. Another section of the
ordinance provided that all farms producing milk for sale in Madison should be
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izing and bottling plants in Illinois, 65 and 85 miles from Madison,
to process milk collected from a great number of farms in northern
Illinois and southern Wisconsin and sells through local distributors
in that area. 8 Dean was denied a license to sell milk in Madison, whereupon a suit for declaratory judgment was brought in a state court to
test the constitutionality of the denial. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
upheld the "five mile" provision on the reasoning that it was a permissible method of protecting public health within the discretion
of a municipal corporation. 9
On appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States the decision
of the Wisconsin court was reversed on the ground that the ordinance
was in contravention of the Commerce Clause. Justice Clark, writing
the opinion for the Court, declared that the section in question "in
practical effect excludes from distribution in Madison wholesome milk
produced and pasteurized in Illinois."'10 Moreover, the regulation was
described as a discriminatory burden" upon interstate commerce, because it erected an economic barrier protecting local industry.12 The
protection of public health was held not to be a justification for obstructing the flow of commerce, when reasonable and adequate alternainspected, but the city would assume no obligation to inspect farms beyond 25 miles.
The Supreme Court did not consider the validity of this section, since it was not
passed on by the Wisconsin courts. There it was held that Dean was not a proper
party to raise the constitutional question, as the company owned no farms affected
by the provision. 257 Wis. 3o8, 43 N. W. (2d) 480, 483 (195o); cause remanded, 71
S. Ct. 295, 299, 95 L. ed. 228, 232 (1951).
'Dean Milk Company had previously experienced difficulty in expanding its
market due to ordinances in other cities. Dean Milk Co. v. City of Elgin, 405 Ill.
204, go N. E. (2d) 112 (1950); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Aurora, 404 Ill. 331, 88 N. E.
(2d)827 (1949); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Waukegan, 402 Ill. 597, 87 N. E. (2d) 751
(1949); see Note (195o) Ill. L. Forum 142. These cases were disposed of favorably to
Dean on the ground that the extra-territorial effect of the ordinances contravened
Illinois law. In Dyer v. City of Beloit, 250 Wis. 613, 27 N. W. (2d) 733 (1947), a local
distributor of Dean's milk challenged an ordinance similar to Madison's, which
was sustained by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. The question was mooted when the
ordinance was repealed, and the United States Supreme Court dismissed an appeal.
333 U. S. 825, 68 S.Ct. 45o , 92 L. ed. 1111 (1948).
0257 Wis. 308, 43 N. W. (2d) 480 (ig5o).
"7 1 S. Ct. 295, 298, 95 L. ed. 228, 230 (1951). Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc.,
294 U. S. 511 at 521, 55 S. Ct. 497 at 5oo, 79 L. ed. 1032 at 1037 (1935).
"Justice Black, in a dissent, adduced that such a characterization was merely
a statement of result. 71 S. Ct. 295, 299, 95 L. ed. 228, 232 (1951). Cf. Minnesota v.
Barber, 136 U. S.313, so S. Ct. 862, 34 L. ed. 455 (189o).
"-The city sought to justify the ordinance on the ground that Dane County, in
which Madison is located, produces ten times the amount of milk consumed within
the city. 71 S.Ct. 295, 296, 95 L. ed. 228, 229 (1951).
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tive methods of assuring a pure milk supply to the city were available.' 3
Justice Black, joined by Justices Douglas and Minton in dissent, 14
argued that the ordinance did not exclude wholesome milk coming
from Illinois, but merely required that milk from all points be pasteurized within the prescribed limits. "Dean's personal preference to
pasteurize in Illinois, not the ordinance, keeps Dean's milk out of
Madison."' 5 Justice Black particularly disapproved of the Court's
using the "reasonable alternative" device in invalidating the ordinance.
He asserted that no case involving the Commerce Clause had ever used
such a concept for the purpose of invalidating a health law, and further
contended that even if the propriety of using the available alternatives
as a limitation upon state action were conceded, still the proof was
insufficient to show that the alternatives would assure as healthful a
quality of milk as provided by the law being invalidated.
Regardless of the apparent lack of explicit precedents for employing the "reasonable alternative" concept, a majority of the Court saw
fit to extend the balance of local and national interests to include an
inquiry into the necessity for such a drastic health measure, and to invalidate it upon finding that other means, less burdensome to interstate
commerce, were available.
The traditional inquiry made by the courts has been thus stated by
Justice Stone in South CarolinaState Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros.:
"In the absence of such [congressional] legislation the judicial
function, under the commerce clause as well as the Fourteenth
' 3 The Court suggested two such alternatives: (i) The city could adopt U. S.
Public Health Service Model Milk Ordinance, Sec. ii, cited at 71 S. Ct. 295, 298,
95 L. ed. 228, 231 (1951) note 5,which in effect would amount to reliance by Madison
upon inspections made by Chicago officials and spot checks made by U. S. officials.
(2) The Madison officials could have inspected these distant plants personally,
charging the actual and reasonable cost of the inspection to Dean.
A letter received from Mr. Jacob Geffs, attorney for the Dean Milk Co., indicates that pursuant to the decision of the Supreme Court the city repealed the
two contested sections of the milk ordinance and enacted Sec. ii of the Model Milk
Ordinance. According to Mr. Geffs, the city officials set the inspection fees at an
absolute minimum, and issued a license to Dean. Mr. Geffs estimated that the cost
of having the Madison officials conduct their own inspections would be so great as
to make it unprofitable for Dean to sell in the city. The cooperation of the city
officials in adopting the "alternative" least burdensome to the importer has possibly saved the Court the embarrassment of having its own dictum employed to
keep Illinois milk out of Madison, the very evil that the dictum sought to alleviate.
"See 71 S.Ct. 295, 299, 95 L. ed. 228, 232 (1951).
'71 S. Ct. 295, 299, 95 L. ed. 228, 232 (1951). If Dean had any preference under
the "5 mile" provision, it was obviated by the "25 mile" provision. Dean could not
comply with this provision and still sell Illinois milk in Madison, since only Wisconsin farms are located within that 25 mile radius.
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Amendment, stops with the inquiry whether the state legislature in adopting regulations such as the present has acted within
its province, and whether the means of6a regulation chosen are
reasonably adapted to the end sought."'
Applying this principle in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona 7 the
Supreme Court found that the state was not acting within its province,
inasmuch as the national interest predominates with respect to the
length of trains necessary to an adequate transportation system. Moreover, even though the state's purpose was to promote safety, a valid
police power objective, the means chosen were not reasonably adapted
to the end sought, in view of the finding that shorter trains would
tend to increase rather than diminish the number of injuries. Earlier
the Court had held that a state was not acting within its province when
it excluded additional interstate buses from operating within the state
on the ground of present adequacy of interstate service.' 8 The same
result was reached in the holding that a state was acting beyond its
power when it endeavored to erect an economic barrier to the importation of wholesome, but less expensive, extra-state milk,' 9 and when
it obstructed the exportation of milk for the purpose of curbing an
2°
increasing shortage.
On the other hand, a state was found to have acted within its
sphere when it excluded additional interstate buses from overcrowded
highways to protect the safety of those already using the roads, 21 or
when it forbade interstate trucks with excessive loads from using the
highways of the state to prevent undue destruction of the road sur"303 U. S. 177, 190, 58 S. Ct. 510, 516, 82 L. ed. 734, 742 (1938) (italics supplied).
17325 U. S. 761, 65 S. Ct. 1515, 89 L. ed. 1915 (1945).

"Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U. S. 307, 45 S. Ct. 324, 69 L. ed. 623, 38 A. L. R. 286
(1925).

"Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U. S. 511, 55 S. Ct. 497, 79 L. ed. 1032
(1935).
"0H. P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U. S. 525, 69 S. Ct. 657, 93 L. ed. 865
(1949). Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553, 43 S. Ct. 658, 67 L. ed. 1117
(1923), held invalid a state statute requiring that the demands of natural gas consumers within the state be met before shipment of gas could be made out of state.
Cf. Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U. S. 52, 35 S. Ct. 5O,

59 L. ed. 835 (1915), upholding

a state law prohibiting the exportation of green citrus fruit to protect the reputation
of local industry; Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U. S. 349, 28 S. Ct. 529, 52 L.
ed. 828 (1go8), sustaining a state law prohibiting the piping of water to other
states; Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U. S. 519, 16 S. Ct. 6oo, 40 L. ed. 793 (1896), upholding a state prohibition against the exportation of wild game.
"Bradley v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, 289 U. S. 92, 53 S. Ct. 577, 77 L.
ed. 1053 (1933)-
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faces. 22 Prohibitions against the importation of diseased cattle 23 and

impure foods24 are within the province of the state to protect public
health.
In the foregoing cases the Court has balanced the national and
the local interests in determining under the Cooley principle whether
the state regulation could stand as against a Commerce Clause objection. This balance was also struck in the Dean case. The avowed purpose of the Madison ordinance was to protect health, a matter conceded
to be "within the sphere of state regulation even though interstate commerce may be affected." 25 On the other hand the practical effect of
the ordinance was to keep Illinois milk out of Madison. This, the
Court held, is beyond the state's power, even to protect the health and
safety of its people, when reasonable and adequate alternative methods
of protecting health, which are less obstructive to the free flow of
commerce, are available.
In these cases in which the Court sustained state regulations concerning the use of highways, there was no discussion of the existence
of reasonable and less drastic alternatives.20 However, in an earlier
quarantine case the Court asserted that in the absence of congressional
legislation the question still arises "whether the police power of the
state has been exerted beyond its province ....exerted to exclude
without discrimination, the good and the bad, the healthy and the
diseased, and to an extent beyondwhat is necessary for any properquarantine."'27 In Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, Chief Justice Stone stated
that the train-limit law "passes beyond what is plainly essential for
safety." 28 The existence of reasonable alternative methods is but a factor
Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U. S. 177, 58 S. Ct.
82 L. ed. 734 (1938).
"Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U. S. 346, 53 S.Ct. 611, 77 L. ed. 1245 (1933).
2
Price v. Illinois, 238 U. S. 446, 35 S. Ct. 892, 59 L. ed. 1400 (1915); Crossman
v. Lurman, 192 U. S. 189, 24 S. Ct. 234, 48 L. ed. 4o (19o4).
"Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 71 S. Ct. 295, 297, 95 L. ed. 228, 230 (1951).
2South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U. S.177, 58
S. Ct. 51o, 82 L. ed. 734 (1938) and Bradley v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio,
289 U. S.92, 53 S.Ct. 577, 77 L. ed. 1053 (1933). In both of these cases the prohibitions struck directly at the evils-trucks too heavy for the roads and buses too
numerous for safety. Therefore, these regulations were probably the most reasonable
available. In contrast, the Madison ordinance aimed at the evil-impure milk-indirectly, by prohibiting all milk beyond 25 miles, which was not the most reasonable
2South

510,

method.
"Smith v. St. Louis & S. IV. Ry., 181 U. S.2.48, 255, 21 S. Ct. 6o3, 6o5, 45 L. ed.
847, 850 (19o).
28325 U. S. 761, 781, 65 S. Ct. 1515, 1526, 89 L. ed. 1915, 1931 (1945) (italics supplied).

20o8

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. VIII

bearing on whether the present regulation goes beyond what is "necessary" or "plainly essential" to achieve the end sought. This was implicit
in Minnesota v. Barber,29 where it was decided that a state could insure
a pure meat supply by less drastic means than requiring meat to be
inspected by a Minnesota inspector within 24 hours after slaughter.
On the other hand, the existence of the reasonable and less drastic
alternative of sterilization was explicitly made the basis for holding
invalid under the Due Process Clause 30 a state law forbidding all use
31
of shoddy in comfortables.
The Dean case appears, therefore, not to depart from the Cooley
doctrine of balancing the national against the local interests in determining the validity of state regulations under the Commerce Clause,
but to reaffirm that ancient principle. 32 In considering the existence
of reasonable and less drastic alternatives to the means adopted by
the state, the Dean case adds a factor to the traditional "balance" which
may tip the scales in favor of the national interest in free interstate
trade in the same way that this factor has heretofore weighted the balance in favor of the individual interest in free production.
RAYMOND

W.

HAMAN

'136 U. S. 313, lo S. Ct. 862, 34 L. ed. 455 (i8go). Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U. S. 1, 18 S. Ct. 757, 43 L. ed. 49 (1898) held a state law prohibiting the
sale of oleomargarine to be an unreasonable means of protecting health; Brimmer
v. Rebman, 138 U. S. 78, ii S. Ct. 213, 34 L. ed. 862 (18gi) held unreasonable a
health measure prohibiting the sale of meat more than soo miles from the place
of slaughter.
31U. S. Const. Amend. XIV.

nWeaver v. Palmer Bros. Co., 270 U. S. 402, 46 S. Ct. 320, 70 L. ed. 654 (1926).

See the dissenting Opinion by Justice Holmes, in which Justices Brandeis and Stone
concurred, 270 U. S. 402, 415, 46 S. Ct. 320, 323, 70 L. ed. 654, 658 (1926). Because

these justices dissented from the use of the "reasonable alternative" concept under
the Due Process Clause, does not necessarily indicate that they would object to its
use in the Dean case, for the interests being balanced are not the same. Under the
Due Process Clause individual interests are weighed against state interests, while
under the Commerce Clause the Court must consider the interests of an entire nation. See Ribble, State and National Power Over Commerce (1937) at 98 and 126,
for discussions of the relationships between these two clauses.
3Nor does H. P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U. S. 525, 69 S. Ct. 657, 93 L. ed.
865 (1949), depart from the Cooley doctrine, notwithstanding the contrary interpretation cited in note 6, supra. The misconception is rooted in Justice Jackson's refusal to "balance" in Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U. S. 390, 397, 62 S. Ct. 311, 314,

86 L. ed. 294, 298 (1941); but he concurred in a "balancing of the interests" in Cities
Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 71 S. Ct. 215, 95 L. ed. 156 (195o), and in
Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U. S. 761, 65 S. Ct. 1515, 89 L. ed. 1915 (1945).

Regardless of the construction given to the Hood case, the more recent decisions
reaffirm the authority of the Cooley principle.
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DAMAGES-REcOVERY FOR Loss OF USE OF DAMAGED AUTOMOBILE DURING ABNORMAL PERIOD REQUIRED FOR REPAIR. [Mississippi]

When an automobile has been damaged short of complete destruction by a wrongful act creating liability in the tortfeasor, all courts are

agreed that the owner's recoverable damages should include a sum to
compensate him for the injury to the car. This sum is measured either
by the difference in the value of the car immediately before and after

the infliction of the injury1 or by the cost of repairing it to as good a
condition as before the injury. 2 Loss of use is a second item of damages
recognized by most courts.3 There is no exact formula for measuring
value of lost use, and typical instructions to the jury are to the effect
that plaintiff is "entitled to recover the rental value of an automobile
similar to the one injured during the period of detention and loss of
use ....-4Some courts draw a distinction between the terms "rental
value" and "usable value," ruling that a plaintiff cannot recover
rental value because it includes allowance for depreciation, to which
plaintiff's car is not subjected while being repaired.5
The jury must set sums on the basis of whatever relevant evidence
parties can bring in,6 such as cost of hiring a substitute vehicle, rental
value of a like vehicle for like use, perhaps necessary curtailment of
business, and so on.7 Most courts agree that damages cover loss of po"Hawkins v. Garford Trucking Co., Inc., 96 Conn. 337, 114 Ad. 94 (1921);
Southern Ry. Co. in Kentucky v. Kentucky Grocery Co., 166 Ky. 94, 178 S. W. 1162
(1915); Union City Transfer Co. v. Texas & N. 0. Ry. Co., 55 S. W. (2d) 637 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1933); 17-18 Huddy Automobiles (gth ed. 1931) § 252.
-Carruthers v. Campbell, 195 Iowa 39o, 192 N. W. 138, 28 A. L. R. 949 (1923);
Hooper, McGaw & Co. v. Kelly, 145 Md. 161, 125 At. 779 (1924); Bauer v. Fahr, 282
S. W. 150 (Mo. App. 1926); 17-18 Huddy, Automobiles (9th ed. 1931) § 253.
3McCormick, Damages (1935) § 124.
However loss of use is not allowed if the automobile is completely destroyed,
the measure of damages in such a case being the reasonable market value of the
automobile before it was destroyed. Langham v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 2ol
Iowa 897, 2o8 N. W. 356 (1926). Some courts deny recovery for loss of use where
the automobile can be repaired but will not be as good as its pre-injury condition. Here the measure of damages is said to be the difference in value immediately
before and after the injury. Helin v. Egger, 121 Neb. 727, 238 N. W. 364 (1931).
Just why loss of use is not allowed in such a situation as this is not explained. A
possible theory is that the time required for repair is taken into consideration when
the post-injury value is decided.
'Perkins v. Brown, 132 Tenn. 294, 177 S. W. 1158 (1915).
o
5
Cook v. Packard Motor Car Co., 88 Conn. 59 , 92 Atl. 413 (1914).
6"To make out a prima facie case, plaintiff should bring himself, by his allegation and proof, within the recognized measure of damages that is applicable to
the facts." 17-18 Huddy, Automobiles ( 9 th ed. 1931) § 262.
.Loss of profits may be considered. 17-18 Huddy, Atitomobiles (9th ed. 1931) §
256; McCormick, Damages (1935) § 124.
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tential use that the car could have been put to, not merely actual use
that probably would have been made of it.8 Included is loss of pleasure9 as well as business use. The basic objective is to compensate plaintiff fully for being deprived of any reasonable use of the car for the
time it was out of operation due to defendant's wrongdoing.
The recent case of Parsons v. Lambert' o presents the question of
whether the fulfillment of this objective requires that defendant pay
damages to plaintiff for loss of use which extended for an abnormally
long period through the fault of neither party. Plaintiff, owner of a
1931 Model-A Ford, brought an action against the defendant for the
negligent injury of the car. Plaintiff sought to recover for the damages
done to the car plus loss of use for a period of one hundred and twentyfive days, during which time the car could not be repaired because
parts were not readily available for that particular model. The trial
court allowed such recovery, but on appeal the Supreme Court of
Mississippi reversed the decision as far as it pertained to damages
for loss of use, declaring that since the defendant was not responsible
for the long delay in getting the car repaired, he should not be liable
for plaintiff's loss of use during the abnormally long period. The
rule laid down as the proper guide for this item of recovery was that
plaintiff is entitled to "such reasonable damages as he may have sustained in the loss of the use of his automobile for such time as would
have been required for its repair under normal conditions."',The only primary authority cited in the opinion is a California
case' 2 which clearly appears to be contra to the principle the Mississippi
court adopts. There plaintiff's car could not be repaired for a period
of twenty-three days because parts had to be shipped from the East.
The court allowed plaintiff to recover damages for loss of use for the
entire period, even granting recovery for the amount of the salary she
paid her driver for this period, since she was under contract to pay
regardless of whether any services were rendered. The court reasoned
that she was "entitled to damages for deprivation of its use during the
time necessarily consumed in making the proper repairs. It was due
SiSedgwick, Damages (9th ed. 1920) § 243a.
"Cook v. Packard Motor Car Co., 88 Conn. 590, 92 At. 413 (1914); Perkins v.
Brown, 132 Tenn. 294, 177 S. W. 1158 (1915); 1 Sedg-wick, Damages (gth ed. ig2o)
§ 243 b 1048 S. (2d) 143 (Miss. 1950).
"Parsons v. Lambert, 48 S. (2d) 143, 144 (Miss. 195o).
12Lyle v. Seller, 70 Cal. App. 30, 233 Pac. 345 (1924). The only secondary

authority cited in the Parsons case was two sections from C. J. S. which contain
only general statements not authority for proposition for which cited.
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to no fault of hers that the collision occurred, and she was not responsible for the delay made necessary by reason of the fact that the parts were
1
not immediately available."'
The several courts which have passed specifically on this point
have been in agreement that plaintiff's damages should be determined
on the basis of the actual period during which use of the car was lost
without fault of the plaintiff. 14 Thus, where the delay in making repairs was due to a scarcity of parts, 15 to the necessity of ordering parts
from a long distance, 16 and to a shortage of painters, 17 recovery for deprivation of use for the entire period was allowed, provided the period
8
was reasonable. In a case closely resembling the principal decision,'
the court pointed out that recovery would be allowed in the absence of
any evidence to show that the time consumed in making repairs was an
unreasonable or unusual length of time, considering all the circumstances. The factor that distinguishes this decision from the Parsons
case is that the Mississippi court took into consideration reasonableness under normal conditions and necessarily implied that inability to
secure parts promptly was not a normal condition.
In one instance, an allowance of damages for an extended loss of
use was approved where the chattel was completely destroyed, and the
failure to obtain a replacement promptly was due to plaintiff's financial inability to buy a new car.1 9 Though this is contrary to the general
view that no loss of use damages can be recovered where total destruction has been caused, 20 the Kentucky court saw no reason why the
"Lyle v. Seller, 70 Cal. App.

300,

233 Pac. 345, 346 (1924).

"4Brooks Transp. Co. v. McCutcheon, 154 F. (2d) 841 (App. D. C. 1946); Lyle
v. Seller, 70 Cal. App. 300, 233 Pac. 345 (1924); Allen v. Hooper, 126 Fla. 458, 171 So.
513 (1936); Independent Oil Refining Co. v. Lueders, 17 La. App. 154, 134 So. 418
(1931); Town v. State, 49 N. Y. S. (2d) 924 (1944).
",Brooks Transp. Co. v. McCutcheon, 154 F. (2d) 84, (App. D. C. 1946).
"Lyle v. Seller, 70 Cal. App. 300, 233 Pac. 345 (1924).
7Independent Oil Refining Co. v. Lueders, 17 La. App. 154, 134 So. 418 (1931).
"Brooks Transp. Co. v. McCutcheon, 154 F. (2d) 841 (App. D. C. 1946).
"Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v. Boren, 202 Ky. 348, 259 S. W. 71, (1924). In Lucas
v. Andress, 136 So. 207 (La. App. 1931), the court pointed out that a thing could not
ordinarily be damaged beyond its true value, but damages to an automobile is an
exception to this rule.
2"Langham v. Chicago R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 201 Iowa 897, 2o8 N. W. 356 (1926);
Helin v. Egger, 121 Neb. 727, 238 N. W. 364 (1931). Two considerations support
this position: First, the plaintiff is under a duty to use any reasonable means of
minimizing his damages, and it is ordinarily reasonable for him to prevent loss of
use damages by replacing the destroyed car with a new one. Of course, if he is
financially unable to do so, either with his own resources or by borrowing, he does
not fail to act reasonably by failing to get a replacement. Second, the total award
for plaintiff's losses-damage to car plus loss of use-is not allowed to exceed the
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injured party should not be permitted to recoup her whole loss, including damages for loss of use, when her personal property is completely destroyed, as well as when it is injured.
Not only is the principal case against the weight of authority, but it
is also clearly, not consistent with the fundamental purpose of tort
damages to put the plaintiff in as good a position as he would have
been had the wrong never occurred. 21 If the plaintiff cannot recover
for loss of use and damages up to the value of the chattel before it was
injured, then the plaintiff has not been put back in a position comparable to his pre-injury position. It is not disputed that the defendant
did not cause the delay, yet it was his negligence which gave the condition significance, and it seems more just to make the defendant bear
the burden than to put it on the plaintiff who neither caused the delay
nor brought the condition into play.
The only possible justification which can be deduced for the
Mississippi decision lies in the general limitation imposed by most
courts that the combined awards for damage to the car and loss of use
must not exceed the total value of the car before the accident.2 2 In
the principal case the jury awarded S3oo for damages to a car which
was a nineteen year old Ford, and the addition of a substantial sum for
loss of use might well have placed the total recovery in excess of the
pre-accident value. In such a situation, the position is taken-not always reasonably-that the owner should have replaced the wrecked
automobile with another car rather than having attempted to have it
repaired at such an expenditure of time and money. However, that
view assumes that the owner can always determine in advance how
much the car has been damaged and what the monetary loss of use
during the repair period will be, and so will know whether he is
legally justified in having the repairs made. The principal case is a
full value of the car immediately before defendant's wrong. This limitation is
again based on the idea that if those damages are so extensive and difficult to re-

pair as to amount to such a large sum, the plaintiff should abandon the car and replace it with another one.

"Compensation is the fundamental and all pervasive principle governing
the award of damages. Compensation, not restitution, value, not cost, is the measure of relief.., the end in view is the same,-that plaintiff be made whole." Hale,
Damages (1896) § 2. One wonders whether the Mississippi court would hold that
a defendant who injures a person whose earning capacity is one hundred thousand
dollars per year, could plead that since such an income is not a normal one, he need
not compensate the plaintiff for full amount of lost earning capacity.
'Southern Ry. Co. in Kentucky v. Kentucky Grocery Co., 166 Ky. 94, 178 S. W.
1162 (1915); Helin v. Egger, 121 Neb. 727, 238 N. W. 364 (1931); McCormick, Damages (1935) § 124.
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good demonstration of the fallacy of such an assumption, inasmuch
as it is probable that no one could foretell how long a time would be
required for securing the needed parts. Therefore, if the overall award
limitation was the unexpressed basis for the Mississippi court's refusal
of full loss of use damages, an unfortunate application of a general rule
was made to a fact situation not appropriate for its operation.
S. MAYNARD TuRK

EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY IN NEGLIGENCE ACTION OF EVIDENCE OF PRIOR
ACTs OF NEGLIGENCE IN SIMILAR SITUATION. [Texas]

It is a settled rule in most jurisdictions that evidence of prior acts
of negligence in a similar situation is not admissible in a suit based on
a particular act of negligence attributed to the defendant.' One of the
most obvious reasons for the rule is the fact that each case is concerned
solely with the specific act, and hence evidence of prior acts is highly
irrelevant, for even the most prudent of men will be negligent at one
time or another. Additional reasons are that the evidence presents undesirable collateral issues that are likely to confuse the jury, and often
works an unfair surprise upon the opposing party. 2 Nevertheless, experience often dictates that the fact that the defendant was negligent
under similar circumstances in the past is strong evidence tending to
show the particular act of negligence charged to him. This furnishes
a fourth reason for the rule: that such evidence is unduly prejudicial
in that it may be given too much weight by the jury in reaching the
verdict.3
This latter justification also forms the basis for an exception to the
rule, that when the evidence of the past acts has some element, besides mere similarity in events, which gives it a stronger relevancy as to
2Pugsley v. Tyler, i3o Ark. 491, 197 S. W. 1177 (1917); City & County of Denver
v. Brubaker, 97 Cal. 501, 51 P. (2d) 352 (1935); Gannon v. Sisk, 95 Conn. 639, 112
At. 697 (1921); Cox v. Norris, 7o Ga. App. 580, 28 S. E. (2d) 888 (1944); Park Circuit & Realty Co. v. Coulter, 233 Ky. 1, 24 S. W. (2d) 942 (1930); Johnson v. Maine
Central Ry. Co., 141 Me. 38, 38 A. (2d) 884 (1944); Moore v. American Stores Co.,
169 Md. 541, 182 Atl. 436 (1936); Cook v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 2.56 Mass. 27,
152 N. E. 58 (1926); Parsonnet v. Keil's Newark Bakery, 119 N. J. L. 301, 196 At.
661 (1938); Raybum v. Day, 126 Ore. 135, 268 Pac. 1002, 59 A. L. R. 1o62 (1928);
Klein v. Weissberg, 114 Pa. Super. 569, 174 Ad. 636 (1934); Texas & N. 0. R. Co. v.
McNeill, 270 S. W. 1038 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
21 Wigmore, Evidence (3 d ed. 194o) 678.
3See Calcaterra v. Iovaldi, 123 Mo. App. 347, 1oo S. W. 675 (19o6) which emphasizes this reason under its facts.
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the issues in the case, it is admissible. 4 Where common sense shows that
the past actions are a strong indication of future acts, the element of
stronger relevance is present, and the evidence is allowed. Illustrations
of this situation are the numerous cases in which the defendant is
charged with negligently maintaining a dangerous physical condition,
or a dangerous mechanical instrumentality. Evidence that under similar circumstances in the past, mishaps had occurred at this place, 5 or
that the machine had demonstrated a dangerous tendency 6 is universally admitted. Both logic and experience justify the obvious inference
that once a dangerous condition in these inanimate objects is shown to
exist, it will continue to exist until human intervention corrects it.7
When the human actor alone is concerned, however, this reasoning
loses its force. Man is possessed of a free will and is presumably able to
exercise a certain amount of self-control; hence, the inference that his
past acts indicate what his future ones will be is not permissible. The
general rule is therefore almost universally applied in cases involving
evidence of a negligent or careless character.8 In many jurisdictions,
however, evidence of the past acts is admitted if this pattern of conduct
has become so fixed and invariable as to amount to habitual carelessness in a certain situation. 9 Experience and reason would seem to sustain these holdings, for the argument that even the most prudent of
'Calcaterra v. Iovaldi, 123 Mo. App. 347, ioo S. W. 675 (19o6) contains an excellent discussion of the general rule, and an exposition of the type situation in
which the exception can be applied.
5
Meyers v. Capital Transit Co., 75 App. D. C. 256, 126 F. (2d) 231 (1942); Robins
v. Pitcairn, 124 F. (2d) 734 (C. C. A. 7 th, 1942); City of Birmingham v. Levens, 241
Ala. 47, 200 So. 888 (1941); Moses v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 188 S. W. (2d)
538 (Mo. App. 1945). It is always necessary, of course, that the circumstances under
which the prior accidents occurred be similar to those under which the particular
event occurred. Thompson v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 48 Cal. App. (2d) 723, 120 P. (2d)
693 (1941). The converse seems also true-i.e., that evidence of no prior accidents
is admissible to show that the condition was not dangerous. Lewis v. Washington
Ry. & Electric Co., 52 App. D. C. 243, 285 Fed. 977 (1923).
OWight v. H. G. Christman Co., 224 Mich. 208, 221 N.W. 314 (1928); Aspind v.
Pearce, 175 Minn. 445, 221 N. W. 679 (1928); Perry v. Branning Mfg. Co., 176 N. C.
68, 97 S. E. 162 (1918).
'Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Copeland, l1o F. (2d) 947 (C. C. A. 4th, 1940).
81 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) 481. The so-called "eye-witness rule," by
which evidence of a negligent character is admissible where there are no eyewitnesses to the mishap, is stated by Professor Wigmore to have a limited following.
9
Witney v. Gross, 140 Mass. 232, 5 N. E. 61g (1885); Stenson v. Payne, 231 Mich.
'58, 2o3 N. W. 831 (1925); Allman v. Gulf & S. I. R. Co., 149 Miss. 489, 115 So. 594
(1928); Hodges v. Hill, 175 Mo. App. 441, 161 S. W. 633 (1913); State v. Manchester
& Laurence Railroad, 52 N. H. 528 (1873).
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men may occasionally be negligent presents no 'opposition when the
course of conduct in a particular situation has become unvarying.
When the evidence falls short of establishing habitual negligence, a
more difficult problem is presented. The question was resolved in the
recent Texas case of Dallas Railway 6- Terminal Co. v. Farnsworth °
in favor of admitting the evidence, and although common experience
may offer some support for the decision, both authority and logic seem
strongly opposed to it. The plaintiff, an elderly lady, was a passenger on
one of defendant's street cars one busy afternoon in Dallas. After a ride
of several blocks, she was the last passenger to alight at a place from
which the car tracks turned to the left. Two eyewitnesses corroborated
the testimony of plaintiff that before she had time to remove herself to
a place of safety, the operator of the car started it around the curve,
and in doing so, caused her to be struck by the rear of the car, which
extended beyond the tracks when taking a curve. Thus, there was
ample evidence to support the finding of the jury that the operator was
negligent in not giving plaintiff a reasonable time to find safety before
starting the car. On appeal from a judgment for plaintiff, defendant
assigned as error that the plaintiff had been allowed to testify that at
three stops preceding the one at which she was injured, the operator
of the car had started so quickly that the then alighting passengers had
scarcely had time to get off before the car was moving again. It was
urged that this was contrary to the general rule with regard to evidence
of prior negligent acts.
While the court admitted the existence of the general rule, it held
that this case presented a proper situation for the application of the
exception, because this evidence was of a higher degree of relevance
in that "it tended to prove the state of his [the operator's] mind or the
condition of his nerves, that is, that he was in a hurry, and so was
relevant and of some probative value on the issue as to whether he
failed to give respondent an opportunity to get beyond the overhang
of the car before starting it."1
Before the case can be correctly interpreted, it is necessary to determine what was meant by "state of mind." Obviously the court did
not have reference to this mental state as being an ingredient of a
cause of action based upon negligence, for the law regards negligence
as conduct, and not a mental condition. 12 And although one of the
" 2 2 7 S. W. (2d) 1017 (Tex. 1950).

"iDallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Farnsworth, 227 S. W. (2d) 1Ol7 , 1020 (Tex. 1950).
"See Terry, Negligence (1915) 29 Harv. L. Rev. 4o .

216

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. VIII

two cases cited by the court was an assault and battery case,'8 and thus
involved the element of intent, the principle on which evidence was
admitted in that case is not applicable to the instant situation because,
by definition, negligence is an unintentional wrong. When speaking
of this mental element, therefore, the court must have had reference to a sort of subjective "mood"-that is, that the operator was in a
careless or negligent mood on that afternoon. Thus, the court felt
that evidence showing the existence of this mood was relevant because
a person in this state is more likely to be negligent. It is difficult to
support this reasoning, however, for the law is not interested in subjective tendencies, but rather in the overt act; there is no different
standard of care for one who is in a negligent mood as distinguished
from one who is not. Hence, this evidence would appear to be irrelevant.
It is equally difficult to substantiate the ruling of the court on the
basis of authority. A close examination of Cunningham v. Austin & N.
W. Rd. Co.,1 4 an earlier Texas case upon which the Court relied
heavily, shows that it furnishes no real support for this decision. There
the plaintiff was an employee of defendant railway company, and was
injured in a wreck caused by the breaking of one of the wheels on a
railway car. The defense was that an inspection of the car on the morning of the accident had disclosed no defect in the wheel, but plaintiff
denied that any inspection had been made and charged defendant with
negligence in employing an incompetent car inspector. In this manner
the competency of defendant's car inspector was put into issue. At the
trial the inspector testified that he had inspected the car on the morning
of the accident, and had found no defects; that he knew that he had
inspected on that particular morning because it was his duty to make
such inspections, and he always performed his duty. Plaintiff then offered to show that on some six mornings subsequent to the morning of
the accident, the inspector had not performed his duty, but the evidence
was excluded. On appeal, the Supreme Court thought that the evidence
should have been received, saying that some people are "by nature
inattentive or thoughtless, and, as a result thereof, frequently neglect
the performance of important duties without any intention so to do.
This mental quality can only be evidenced by the outward acts of a
person, and, where its existence or nonexistence is in issue, evidence
of such acts is admissible."' 5 The court insisted that this did not refer

"Harshbarger v. Murphy, 22 Idaho 261, 125 Pac. i8o, 44 L. R. A. [N.s.] 1173
(1912).
"188 Tex. 534, 31 S. W. 629 (1895).
"nCunningham v. Austin & N. W. Rd. Co., 88 Tex. 534, 31 S. W. 629, 630 (1895).
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to a character for negligence, but only to a careless disposition in a
particular job or duty when that disposition itself is an issue in the
case. So interpreted, 16 the Cunningham case offers no support for the
holding of the principal case, because in the latter case the competency
of the operator of the street car was not in issue. Furthermore, though
no attempt will be made to weigh the comparative relevancies, there
is the distinction between the transitory, irregular "mood," and the
more enduring, continuous "disposition."
In one of the rare cases in which the issue has been passed on in
other jurisdictions, the Missouri court in Moss v. Wells1 7 admitted the

evidence on facts quite similar to those of the present case. There
plaintiff had been allowed to testify that she had had to ring the bell
at three different stops before the operator of the street car would stop
and let her off. She was then injured when the car started while she
was still in the process of alighting. The Missouri court decided that her
testimony was proper, since "it tended to prove that the conductor was
heedless of his business that morning because he was in a hurry, or
for some other reason, and therefore it was evidence tending to prove
he negligently started the car forward without giving plaintiff a reasonable time to alight....,18 The reasoning of the two cases seems
identical.
Practically all of the other cases in which such evidence was allowed
can be explained on the basis that the evidence tended to prove
habitual negligence in a particular situation, 19 or on some other basis
14This is the interpretation given the case in i Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.
1940) 701.
'*249 S. W. 411 (Mo. App. 1923).
"Moss v. Wells, 249 S.W. 411, 413 (Mo. App. 1923).
1
" Illustration is given by two close cases. See also i Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.
1940) 53o for a collection of cases explicable on the basis of habit. In Brouillette v.
Conn. River Ry. Co., 162 Mass. 198, 38 N. E. 507 (1894) plaintiff, an employee of defendant, was injured in an accident caused by a misplaced wire in defendant's electric
signal system. Plaintiff's injury occurred while he was enroute to work through a
part of the yards known to him to be dangerous. The court admitted evidence, as
bearing on the issue of contributory negligence, that plaintiff had boasted on many
prior occasions that he had great ability to keep out of the way of trains and not
get hurt. This had a "bearing upon the question of his carelessness, or readiness
to take risks." 162 Mass. 198, 38 N. E. 507, 508 (1894). Although upon the basis
of the short opinion alone it might be concluded that the evidence went to character
rather than habit (as indicated in i Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) 531), it certainly did not go to a "mood." In Allard v. Northwestern Contract Co., 64 Wash. 14,
116 Pac. 457 (911), plaintiff was an employee of defendant working in defendant's
rock quarry. The injury occurred when plaintiff was struck by a rock hurled by a
blast. Plaintiff claimed that he was given no warning, but defendant offered evi-
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not related with the issues herein presented. 20 Perhaps the scarcity of
these decisions is accounted for by the fact that the prior acts offered in
evidence to show the existence of the careless frame of mind at the
time of the accident would of necessity have to have occurred in a similar situation and within a short time before the specific act for which
liability is alleged. This factor of close relation to the particular act
in time and space was mentioned in a collateral manner by both the
Texas and Missouri courts, the former saying in the present decision
that the prior acts testified to by plaintiff "were not so far removed
either in place or in time as to be considered 'conduct on other occasions,' but were so closely related to the occurrence on which this suit
is based that they may be considered, as in effect, part of the conduct
of the operator that caused respondent's injury." 21 Apparently the
court had in mind those cases in which evidence of the prior acts is admissible if they are but a part of one continuing transaction.2 2 But it
is arguable that the three stops alluded to in plaintiff's testimony made
each stop and start a separate and distinct transaction, and not a
part of a chain of continuous events leading up to the injury. The
court apparently was aware of this, for it said that the acts could be
"considered" as a part of the same occurence, thereby implying that
they were separate acts. However, there is no magic to the fact that
dence, which was allowed, that on prior occassions plaintiff had failed to take cover
when a blast was imminent. The court, in admitting the evidence, felt that it related to the issue of contributory negligence and upon the issue of whether or not
warning was actually given. The opinion contains a habit approach.
'OAn interesting case of this nature is Rowe v. Bregenzer, 161 Mich. 684, 126
N. W. 7o6 (gio) which involved a fire that destroyed plaintiff's timber. It appeared that plaintiff had his timber stacked in defendant's slashing; that the fire
occurred on Tuesday or Wednesday; that on the Saturday preceeding the day of
the fire, a fire had been seen in the slashing by the witness. The witness was allowed to testify that defendant had come out of the slashing and had said something to the effect that it would be a good time to burn out the slashing. A few
minutes later the fire was discovered. The witness testified further that the fire
he saw on Saturday had gone out by Monday. The court felt that the evidence of
the statements of defendant with regard to the Saturday fire were admissible because they tended to show that he either started a fire on Saturday with full knowledge that the wood was there and would burn, or had started the fire a day or
two later, if the Saturday fire had indeed gone out. Hence, it would appear that the
court held the evidence admissible because it showed that defendant was in the
mood to start a fire in his slashing whether plaintiff's timber was there or not.
Actually, however, plaintiff had charged intentional as well as negligent setting of
the fire, and this fact considerably weakens the case from the standIfoint of the
relevance of a negligent mood.
"Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Farnsworth, 227 S. W. (2d) 1017, 1o2o (Tex.
1950).
2E.g., Wilson v. Fleming, 89 W. Va. 553, iog S. E. 8io (1921); 1 Wigmore, Evidence (3 d ed. 1940) 532.
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distinct acts are related closely to each other in time and/or space, for
that does not detract from the fact that they are separate acts, nor
does it overcome the objections of irrelevancy, collateral issues, and
23
so forth.
Conparison of the two cases shows that the Moss case can be supported on this basis of a close connection in time and space, for in that
case the failure to stop when signalled (which was the substance of the
admitted testimony) blended the prior acts with the particular one
into a continuous single event. It being all one transaction, the objections are not present. 24 Since the Texas court in the principal case cited
no authority and made no further discussion of this proposition, it is not
believed that it formed a basis for the decision, but rather was simply
referred to as being additional support for the ruling.
It appears, therefore, that the decision in the instant case is difficult
to support, unless on the basis that common experience teaches that
negligence is more likely when the actor is in a careless mood. If the
rationale of the decision was that experience shows that a negligent
mood is an accurate indicator of a negligent act, thus giving the evidence of the prior negligence a higher degree of relevance, the evidence
would not be limited to prior acts in a similar situation, but could in"See Steinberger v. California Electric Garage Co., 176 Cal. 386, x68 Pac. 570
(1917). Defendant was towing a gasoline car with an electric car by means of a rope

from twelve to twenty feet in length. It was dusk, and plaintiff was injured when she
attempted to walk between the cars and tripped on the rope. Evidence that four
other persons had almost done the same thing during the same trip was not admitted. In Greer v. Richard's Adm'r, 273 Ky. 91, 115 S. W. (2d) 568 (1938), defendant, a cab driver, had stopped his cab at the scene of an accident. He put the
owner of the wrecked automobile and its passengers in his cab to take them home.
While in the process of doing this, he had a collision with another vehicle, in
which plaintiff's decedent was killed. Evidence that after defendant had picked up
these extra passengers at the scene of the first accident, he had turned his vehicle
around in a careless and reckless manner, almost striking bystanders, was not admitted. These acts had occurred but a short time before the fatal accident, and at
a place not far distant from the scene of that wreck. Cf., however, Kelty v. Fisher, loi
Ore. iio, 199 Pac. 188 (1921). Defendant, a physician, had treated two patients, who
were in the same room, for influenza. Both later died, and evidence that defendant
had negligently administered morphine to one of the patients was admitted in a
suit brought by the personal representative of the other patient. The court clearly
based its decision on the closeness in time, place and circumstance of the other act
to the particular one. The circumstances of the case, however, show that defendant
was treating the two patients as if they were one, for they both fell ill at about
the same time, were both in the same room and when making his calls to one, he
treated both. These factors give the case an extraordinary tendency to blend into
one act the treatment of both patients, and this is undoubtedly what the court
had in mind.
2
iWigmore, Evidence ( 3d ed. 1946) 532.
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dude any prior acts of negligence that would show the existence of
this mood. Obviously, such a rule would open the door to multitudinous collateral issues that would present a tremendous obstacle to
orderly justice. It is impossible to determine whether the Texas court
consciously gave way to what it felt the weight of common experience
to be, or whether it merely decided that the contested evidence actually
played a small part in the case (in view of the ample evidence to uphold the jury's verdict without it), and hence simply found a way to
prevent a unnecessary new trial. Nevertheless, on the basis of authority
and logic, it appears that the court has promulgated an unsound doctrine, and one which may, in the future, give rise to unsatisfactory
decisions.
HARRY

EVIDENCE-APPLICATION OF OPINION RULE

To

A.

BERRY, JR.

EXCLUDE OPINION

DENCE OF SANITY OF ACCUSED IN HOMOCIDE CASE.

EVI-

[Nevada]

The opinion rule, though branded as a "most annoying rule in
its application,"' is simple of statement: "Where the data observed
can be exactly and fully reproduced by the witness so that the jury
can equally well draw any inference from them, the witness' opinion
is not wanted, and will be excluded. ' 2 Conversely, if a witness can
offer an inference or opinion which the jury itself could not accurately
ascertain from so-called "facts" presented, then such testimony is of
value and hence admissible within the scope of the rule. Uncertainties
arise s from the fact that conflicting policies must be reconciled or
compromised in any given application of the rule. From an affirmative
point of view it is most desirable that all relevant evidence be made
available to the jury to enable it to reach a fair decision on the issues
entrusted to its judgment. On the other hand, the jury should not be
influenced by testimony the reliability of which is highly questionable.
The recent Nevada decision of State v. Butner4 is illustrative of the
'See Judge Learned Hand, Lectures on Legal Topics (N. Y. C. Bar Ass'n, 1926)
97: "No rule is subject to greater abuse. It is frequently an obstacle to any intelligible account of what happens .... I know of none more baffling to a witness ....
Whatever its logical justification, it is the most annoying rule in its application
that I know."
-Wigmore, Evidence (Students' ed. 1935) § 127.
3
Apparently these uncertainties are a result of purely American controversy; the
English courts do not experience the same degree of difficulty. See Note (1942) 7

Mo. L. Rev. 60.
466 Nev. 127, 206 P. (2d) 253 (1949), petition for rehearing denied, 220 P. (2d)
631 (Nev. 1950).
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difficulty of balancing these policies where the primary issue is the sanity of an accused in a homocide case. On the night of the crime the defendant, who had consumed a considerable quantity of intoxicants, 5
entered the house in which his wife resided. Shortly thereafter the
wife arrived in a taxi and insisted that the driver, Watkins, accompany her into the house. After a brief exchange of words, the wife
indicated her intention to return to town with the taxi driver. In the
course of her attempted departure the defendant shot his wife three
times, then pointed the gun at Watkins and directed him to turn
over the body and see if she was dead. Watkins assured him of this
fact and managed to execute a hasty withdrawal. At the trial defendant pleaded insanity, and considerable testimony, both expert and
non-expert, was introduced on that issue, opinion being rather evenly
divided. Though Watkins had never known the defendant before the
homocide and his observation in this instance lasted only from three
to eight minutes, he was permitted to testify that: "I noted at the
time of the occurrence that when he pointed the gun at me and told
me to roll her over and see if she was dead, that he wasn't drunk,
or he wasn't crazy. I mean, he was deliberate and cold." 6 On appeal
from the conviction, it was contended that the admission of that testimony tipped the scales in favor of the prosecution.
The Supreme Court of Nevada cited the rule that "in this state...
opinion evidence of a layman or nonexpert as to the sanity or insanity
of an accused... may properly be received in evidence, provided the
witness possesses adequate knowledge, based on an opportunity to
7
observe the conduct of the one whose mental condition is in issue."
The court took cognizance of the temporal limitation of Watkins' observation, but emphasized that the witness was present immediately
before, during, and after the shooting, and argued that the precariousness of his position during the entire situation rendered his perceptive faculties more acute.8 Since no abuse of discretion by the trial court
'"The defendant, on that day, December 3o, 1947, had drunk, as appeared
from the evidence, 'a pint of whiskey, followed by several drinks at the Golden
Gulch Bar and a drink or two at Dougherty's Bar, and that he drank the contents
from a bottle of Cheracol, containing one grain of codeine and two grains of chloroform, within 2o minutes prior to the homocide'." State v. Butner, 22o P. (2d) 631,
649 (Nev. 1950).
OState v. Butner, 66 Nev. 127, 206 P. (2d) 253, 255 (1949).
7State v. Butner, 66 Nev. 127, 206 P. (2d) 253, 255 (1949). This rule was cited
as having been established in Nevada by State v. Lewis, 2o Nev. 333, 22 Pac. 241
(1889).
"An assertion that a state of excitement and fear produces accurate analytical
powers would certainly seem contestable. Furthermore, having one's life placed
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was disclosed, the court unanimously affirmed the judgment, 9 but on a
later petition for rehearing Chief Justice Horsey, who had been absent during all previous proceedings, ° vigorously dissented. His entire
argument presupposes the necessity for an acquaintance or association
by the witness with the person whose conduct is in issue sufficient to
constitute a basis for comparison of usual and specific conduct. Such
acquaintance was asserted to be essential to the formation of an opinion
worthy of admission as testimony.
Such cases present two legal issues upon which American courts
are in disagreement: First, whether lay opinion should be admitted on
the issue of the sanity of an accused felon, when the witness manifestly
has sufficient knowledge on which to base an opinion; and second,
whether, if the witness is allowed to express his opinion, he must
also state the facts on which the opinion is based.
Both factions of the court in the principal case agreed that on
the first point the policy in Nevada is in conformity with the practice
of an overwhelming majority of states to admit lay opinion."' In support of this view, it is contended that a witness who has had an opportunity to observe the behavior and mannerisms of another individual cannot in many instances lay before the jury distinct facts which
would enable it to pronounce a decision thereon with any reasonable
assurance of truth.12 The jury is not equipped to derive as accurate an
inference as is the witness. Further, it must be recognized that any
in jeopardy by another could certainly give rise to a feeling of vindictiveness which
might color the testimony of one in the capacity of a witness.
GState v. Butner, 66 Nev. 127, 206 P. (2d) 253 (1949).
"The Chief Justice had been ill when the case first came up on appeal. When
the first petition for rehearing arose he had returned to the bench, but deemed
it appropriate that those who decided the appeal should hear the petition. His
convictions were so strong on the subject that he gave vent to his feelings on the
second petition. Considerable disagreement was evidenced among the court as to the
propriety of entertaining a second petition grounded on the same arguments as
the first.
"State v. Madena, 165 La. 474, 15 So. 661 (1928); Watts v. State, 99 Md. 30,
57 At. 542 (19o4); Genz v. State, 58 N. J. L. 482, 34 At. 816 (1896); State v. Schneider,
158 Wash. 504, 291 Pac. 1093 (1930); Note (1931) 72 A. L. R. 579.
12".. the restriction of the evidence to a simple narration of facts having or
supposed to have a bearing on the question of capacity would, if practicable, shut
out the ordinary means of obtaining truth...." Clary v. Clary, 24 N. C. 58, 60
(1841); "From the nature of the subject, it cannot generally be so described by witnesses as to enable others to form an accurate judgment in regard to it." Dissent
in Boardman v. Woodman, 47 N. H.

120, 144 (1866); "... but few persons, without

giving an opinion, could so describe the pathological condition of his mind, as to
communicate to a jury a distinct idea of his true condition." Norris v. State, 16
Ala. 776, 779 (1849).
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attempt to elicit pure "facts" from an observer of mental phenomena
is a practical impossibility. If the witness' impressions are bound to
color his "factual testimony," a frank acceptance of opinion, as such,
would seem the better approach. As the Alabama court has pointed
out, if the witness is required to limit his assertions to facts which cannot be readily stated in words, the value of his testimony may depend,
not on what he may know, but on his ability to pantomime or imitate.13
Although the minority view on the subject has a relatively small
following, its support stems from the important states of Massachusetts and New York. The Massachusetts case of Pool v. Richardson'4
was one of the first American decisions to reject a layman's opinion
on the subject of sanity, and it has been asserted that the holding in
this case contributed to a misconception of the context of the term
"opinion," in that "the phrase 'mere opinion' (opinion not resting on
observed data) 'is not evidence' came to be distorted into the phrase
'opinion is not evidence'."' 5
The later case of Commonwealth v. Brayman' 6 suggests a practical
criticism of the rule favoring admission. The court stated that it saw
no reason to admit testimony other than that of experts unless "all
persons who have had opportunities for observation of the mental
state of the individual in question are allowed to give opinions upon
the subject....",17 This inference that the introduction of many witnesses' testimony would tend to prolong the trial unnecessarily, and
that the end result might indicate a fairly even split of opinion is borne
out by reference to the principal case. Chief Justice Horsey's condemnatory dissent in the second Butner rehearing emphasizes the fact that the
trial judge's allegedly erroneous discretion in admitting Watkins'
testimony was especially regrettable because of the impact it had
upon a jury weary from the monotony of a long trial. Undeniably, administrative convenience is served by the minority rule, for it relieves
trial judges from the difficult task of passing on the qualifications of
lay witnesses to express opinions and makes unnecessary a decision on
""Must the prisoner lose the benefit of such testimony altogether, or shall
the witness be required to furnish as well as he may, a pantomimic delineation of
the wild look .... Were such the law, the force of the testimony would be made to
depend upon the powers of the witness for imitation." Norris v. State, 16 Ala. 776,
780 (1849).
21 Tyng 3o (Mass. 18o7).
"7 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 194o) § 1933.
"136 Mass. 438 (1884).
x1Commonwealth v. Brayman, 136 Mass. 438, 44o (1884) [italics supplied].
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the controversial question of whether the witness must support his
opinion with a statement of facts sufficient to sustain the conclusion
drawn.
The New York decisions on the subject have been inconsistent in
the past, and the current view' s represents a compromise: a witness
may characterize the acts of an individual whose sanity is in question
as being rational or irrational, but is not permitted to offer an opinion as to an individual's general state of mind. This view represents
no more than a token adherence to the minority position and fails even
to reflect any unanimity of opinion within the state.' 9
While majority and dissenting judges in the Butner case agreed
that as a general proposition lay opinions as to sanity are admissible,
they differed sharply in regard to the conditions under which such
opinions could be admitted, and this disagreement reflects the conflicting decisions in the several states. A substantial majority of states
refuse to allow a witness to state an opinion independent of the facts
within his own knowledge, but demand that he detail those facts
prior to submitting the conclusion that he has derived therefrom. 20
These facts of course must indicate that the witness has had "an
acquaintance.., of such intimacy and duration as to clearly indicate
that he was well enough acquainted with such person to render his
testimony of value." 2' Other courts have imposed similar tests requiring that the witness must have had an "ample opportunity for
observation" of the accused, 22 or an opportunity to observe defendant
23
and form an "opinion satisfactory to himself."
This restriction is worthwhile to the extent that it is intended
to insure introduction of only reliable testimony before the jury. If
the witness knows that his opinion must be justified, then he will be
"People v. Spencer, 179 N. Y. 408, 72 N. E. 461 (19o4). Also see Note (1931) 72
A. L. R. 586.
"See 7 Wigmore, Evidence ( 3 d ed. 1940) § 1929: "In 1939 the Judicial Council
of the State of New York formulated the following provision for proposal as a new
§ 345-a in the Civil Practice Act: 'Statement of inference or opinion permitted.
Testimony of a non-expert witness shall not be excluded from evidence on the
ground that it is in the nature of an inference or opinion, provided that the facts
upon which such inference or opinion is based have been personally observed by the
witness and are stated by him, if, in the opinion of the court, they are capable of
being stated'."
'Russell v. State, 17 Ala. App. 436, 87 So. 221 (1920); People v. Delhantie, 163
Cal. 461, 125 Pac. io66 (1912); Armstrong v. State, 3o Fla. 170, 11 So. 6M8 (1892);
People v. Phipps, 268 Ill. 21o, 1o9 N. E. 25 (1915); Note (1931) 72 A. L. R. 579.
"State v. Schneider, 158 Wash. 5o4, 291 Pac. 1093, 1o96 (1930).

'Voice v. Commonwealth, 284 Ky. 416, 145 S. W. (2d) 45, 48 (1940).
'State v. Nail, 211 N. C. 61, 188 S. E. 637, 638 (1936).
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more inclined carefully to evaluate his thoughts and impressions before offering them in court. Further, requiring the witness to submit
a basis for his opinion serves to aid both the trial judge in deciding
whether the witness is qualified by knowledge to state an opinion and
the jury in determining the weight that should be accorded such opinion testimony as is admitted.
Despite the apparent logic of this reasoning, the courts of several
jurisdictions, 24 including Nevada, have determined that the right of
the witness to state his opinion on the sanity of an accused is not conditioned on his first reciting facts supporting the opinion. This
minority view, which is advocated by Dean Wigmore, 25 seems consistent with the argument for admission of lay opinions generally. In
the first place it is readily believable that the witness' first impression,
absent a retrospective evaluation of its validity, would be the most accurate representation of his thoughts. Secondly, since the testimony to
be offered deals with description of an intangible, it may be that the
very lack of capacity of a witness for expression makes impossible an
26
adequate explanation of the facts which support his conclusions.
Furthermore, the necessity of a preliminary statement of facts as a condition precedent to the acceptability of a conclusion drawn therefrom,
would seem of technical importance only; by cross-examination the
opposing counsel should be able to impeach inferences drawn from
27
data found to be inadequate to support the witness' opinion.
2

1State v. Rumble, 81 Kan. 16, 1o5 Pac. 1 (19o9); State v. Lewis, 20 Nev. 333,
Pac. 241 (1889). See Wood v. State, 58 Miss. 741, 743 (1881); Garrison v. Blanton,
48 Tex. 299, 303 (1877).
27 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) § 1935.
2"There are many things which the mind may clearly apprehend, and yet
the mental process cannot be explained, so as to be understood by others. A witness may state, with much certainty, that one, with whom he was associated daily
for years, has become insane; and yet he cannot clearly explain to others, how it
is, that he knows the individual in question to be insane .... In all these cases,
the opinion of the witness is received, because the facts which constitute the cause,
from which the opinion proceeds, as an effect, cannot themselves be presented
or communicated to the mind of a jury, so as to impart to them knowledge which
the witness actually possesses ... the true reason, why the opinions of witnesses
may be given to a jury, upon questions not involving skill and science.., is, because witnesses have a knowledge of the thing about which they speak, and have
acquired that knowledge in a manner which cannot be communicated, or from
facts incapable, in their very nature, of being explained to others, that they may
state what they know, in the best way they can. This best way is ... in the form
of an opinion...." Cooper v. State, 23 Tex. 331, 337, 338 (1859).
a,.., the qualification that the opinion of the non-expert must be accompanied by a statement of the facts upon which it is based, is not very important,
since, whether the witness be an expert or non-expert, the grounds of his belief and
22
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In light of the nearly universal view that qualified lay opinions
should be admitted on the issue of the sanity of an accused criminal, it
appears that the desire to make all relevant evidence available to the
jury has prevailed in America over the fear that the jury may be unduly influenced by unreliable testimony. It is submitted that the minority view that preliminary factual support is unnecessary is the only
approach consistent with the general admission of such lay opinion,
inasmuch as the nature of the issue of sanity makes it extremely difficult to detail the facts which produce the opinion. The danger of
decisions being swayed by testimony of ill-founded opinion is minimized by the trial judge's discretion to deny admission of an opinion
of a witness who is not sufficiently qualified by knowledge, and by opposing counsel's opportunity to discredit the opinion through crossexamination of an unqualified witness. The basic weakness of this
stand is that it presumes existence of a trial judge whose discretion is
unerring, or of counsel adept at cross-examination, and the principal
case suggests that this presumption may not always be safely indulged.
However, an occasional lapse by court or counsel is not enough to
condemn a salutary rule of law. In most instances it would seem that
by allowing the witness to offer his testimony in the manner he thinks
best, the most accurate result will be achieved and the ends of justice
thereby furthered.
JAMES A. ANDERSON, III

LABOR LAw-DENIAL OF UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION TO WORKERS
MADE IDLE BY STRIKE IN ANOTHER PLANT.

[Georgia]

State unemployment compensation statutes generally disqualify
from the benefits of the act an employee whose unemployment "is due
to a stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dispute at the
factory, establishment, or other premises at which he is or was last employed."' This limitation as to the area of the labor dispute has made
his opportunities of observation may always be elicited; and whether the witness be of the one class or the other, his testimony should be rejected by the
court where it consists of a mere naked declaration of opinion, with neither learning, observation, nor acquaintance to support it." Wood v. State, 58 Miss. 741,
743 (1881).
'Social Security Board, Draft Bills for State Unemployment Compensation of
Pooled Fund and Employer Reserve Account Types (1937) § 5 (d). This limitation
as to the area of the dispute is not only contained in those acts which have been
patterned after the Draft Bill of the Social Security Board but is also in the statutes of the nine states which have adopted more stringent labor dispute qualifica-
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it necessary for the courts of several states2 to determine what constitutes a "factory or establishment." The problem of interpretation
is important because often a strike at one plant may force unemployment upon non-striking persons employed at another plant dependent
upon the striking plant for materials, and if the plants be considered
as one unit the non-strikers will be barred from unemployment benefits.
In such situations where the plants are under different ownership there
has been general agreement that separate establishments exist, 3 but
where different plants of the same employer are involved, the decisions
4
have not been unanimous.
The first courts to handle the problem of single ownership of two
or more plants construed the term "establishment" to include all plants
integrated into one production unit, and workers in non-struck plants
closed by a strike elsewhere were thus excluded from unemployment
benefits. To reach this conclusion the Wisconsin court in Spielmann v.
Industrial Commission5 and the Michigan court in Chrysler Corporation v. Smith 6 looked at the " 'physical proximity, functional integrality and general unity' of the plants involved." 7 The Connecticut court,
in General Motors Corporation v. Mulquin,8 distinguished these decisions on the basis of statutory difference and refused to find that the
two plants concerned by its decision constituted a single unit.9 While
tions than those suggested by the Board. The fact that some of these states merely
use "in the establishment," rather than "factory, establishment, or other premises,"
does not alter the problem. On this latter point see Note (1949) 33 Minn. L. Rev.
758, 764.
'Alabama, Connecticut, Georgia, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey,
Wisconsin, and Virginia. See cases cited in following notes.
3See Chrysler Corporation v. Smith, 297 Mich. 438, 298 N. W. 87, 93, 98 (1941);
Nordling v. Ford Motor Co., 42 N. W. (2d) 516, 586 (Minn. 195o); Fierst and Spector,
Unemployment Compensation in Labor Disputes (1940) 49 Yale L. J. 461, 488; Note
(1949) 33 Minn. L. Rev. 758, 764.
'See Note (1949) 33 Minn. L. Rev. 758, 764.
5236 Wis. 240, 295 N. W. 1 (1940).
'297 Mich. 438, 298 N. W. 87 (1941).

7Spielmann v. Industrial Commission, 236 Wis. 240, 295 N. W. 1, 5(1940). The

two plants were owned by an automobile manufacturer, one being a body plant
located at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and the other being an assembly plant located
forty miles away in the same state. The production in each plant was so highly
synchronized and integrated that a body built in the Milwaukee plant against a
given car order would meet the chassis at the assembly plant according to a preestablished schedule. The court found that the two plants "were just as much a
single establishment for the manufacture of automobiles as they would have been
had they been in two buildings adjacent to each other, or in separate parts of the
same building." 236 Wis. 240, 295 N. W. 1, 4 (1940).
8134 Conn. 118, 55 A. (2d) 732 (1947).
'The Connecticut statute contained the phrase "factory, establishment or
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that court admitted that physical proximity was important, it also
insisted that such factors as the source of authority in hiring, paying
and discharging employees, the methods of handling accounts, and
whether or not one plant was under the immediate, control of the other
were equally significant in determining plant autonomy. 10 The courts
of Alabama and Maryland applied the test used in the Spielmann and
Chrysler cases but failed to find that physically separated plants constituted one establishment."
This was the confused state of the law when in May, 1949, the employees of the Ford Motor Company's Dearborn, Michigan, automobile assembly plant struck in protest against a company attempt to
speed up production. The parts plant workers at the same location
then struck in sympathy with the assembly line workers. As a result,
various Ford assembly plants in Georgia, Minnesota, New Jersey, and
Virginia were forced to close for lack of parts, and workers there were
laid off. This strike was called by two local unions of the United Automobile Workers and was subsequently sanctioned by the International
Union of United Automobile Workers of which the two locals were
members. All of Ford's employees within the United States were members of the International and subject to a master labor employment
contract existing between Ford and the International, but the locals
in the various states were separate and distinct from the striking locals
in Michigan. Furthermore, the locals outside of Michigan did not take
a strike vote, did not join in the strike, remained at work until laid
off by the company, and returned immediately when called back to
work.
While unemployed, the workers in Georgia, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Virginia applied for unemployment compensation. Ford protested these payments in each of the four state courts on the ground that
the strike in Michigan was the same as a strike in the other plants because the Michigan plant and each of the local plants were, in contemplation of the unemployment compensation laws, to be considered
other premises" while the Wisconsin statute interpreted in the Spielmann case used
the phrase "in the establishment." The Connecticut court thought that this difference in statutes was a ground for distinction. However, as was pointed out in
Note (1949) 33 Minn. L. Rev. 758, 764, this difference in words does not alter the

basic problem. Also on this point see Ford Motor Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 63 S. E. (2d) 28, 32 (Va. 1951).
"General Motors Corporation v. Mulquin, 134 Conn. 118, 55 A. (2d) 732, 738

('947)"Tennessee Coal, Iron and R. Co. v. Martin, 33 Ala. App. 5o2, 36 S. (2d) 535
(1948), aff'd 251 Ala. 153, 36 S. (2d) 547 (1948); Tucker v. American Smelting and
Refining Co., 189 Md. 25o, 55 A. (2d) 692 (1947).
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as one. 12 Although there was some divergence between the Minnesota
statute and the identical statutes of New Jersey and Virginia, 13 the
Minnesota court in Nordling v. Ford Motor Co.,' 4 the New Jersey

court in Ford Motor Co. v. New Jersey Department of Labor and Industry,15 and the Virginia Court in Ford Motor Co. v. Unemployment
Compensation Commission,' 6 decided against the contention of the
automobile manufacturer. However, the Georgia court in Ford Motor
Co. v. Abercrombie,'7 construing a statute 8 identical to those of New
Jersey and Virginia reached a contrary result by determining the
Georgia plant and the Michigan plant to be "inseparable and indispensable parts of one and the same 'factory establishment, or other
premises'."'9
In defining what constitutes "a factory, establishment, or other
premises," the Georgia court relied heavily on the Spielmann and
Chrysler cases as precedents, and yet it completely ignored two of the
three parts of the test advanced in those cases. The court seemed to
think that the presence of functional integration between the two production units was conclusive, and that therefore it was not necessary
to consider whether physical proximity and general unity were also
present. Nevertheless, as the Minnesota court in the Nordling case
points out, many factories which are separately owned are functionally
integrated, but no one would contend in such a circumstance that the
20
integrated plants are one.
The Georgia court ignored contrary decisions from other jurisdictions, dismissing them without discussion by simply saying "we
must construe our own law by applicable controlling rules of construction and apply the facts as shown by the record to the law as thus
22Ford Motor Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 63 S. E. (2d)
28, 32

(Va.

1951).

1'The Minnesota statute uses the words "at the establishment." Minn. Laws
(1943) c. 65o, § 5. The New Jersey and Virginia statutes use "at the factory, establishment, or other premises." N. J. S. A. (West, 1950) 43 :21-5(d); Va. Code Ann.
(Michie, 195o) § 6o-47. The Virginia court has determined that the effect of the
language in each Act is the same. Ford Motor Co. v. Unemployment Compensation
Commission, 63 S. E. (2d) 28, 33 (Va. 195).
1442 N. W. (2d) 576 (Minn. 195o).
"5 N. J. 494, 76 A. (2d) 256 (1950).
1163 S. E. (2d) 28 (Va. 1951).
"7207 Ga. 464, 62 S. E. (2d) 209 (1950).
"Ga. Laws (1937) 8o6, 813.
"Fivrd Motor Co. v. Abercrombie, 207 Ga. 464, 62 S. E. (2d) 20 9 , 215 (1950).
'Ncrdling v. Ford Motor Co., 42 N. W. (2d) 576 a. 586 (Minn. 195o) .
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construed." 21 Consequently, the court did apply its own rules of construction of the law and reached the conclusion that the legislature
had intended that unemployment benefits should be paid only to those
workers whose unemployment was involuntary. Strangely enough, this
determination of legislative intent was identical to the intent findings
22
announced in some of the conflicting cases which the court ignored.
However, the Georgia court disagreed with those cases in the interpretation of what constitutes involuntary unemployment, and found that
unemployment in the Ford incident was voluntary. It is apparent that
the court feared that a labor union might bring about a stoppage of
work elsewhere through a strained construction of a labor contract and
thus force employers to pay for idleness of colluding workers at the non23
striking plant through tax contributions to the unemployment fund.
Evidence supporting this interpretation of the court's opinion can be
found in the detailed effort on the part of the court to show that the local Georgia union sanctioned the strike because it was a member of the
same International as the Michigan local and might benefit indirectly
24
from any gains made by the actual strikers.
"Ford Motor Co. v. Abercrombie, 207 Ga. 464, 62 S. E. (2d) 209, 213 (1950). The

Nordling case had been decided several months before the Georgia court rendered its
decision in the Abercrombie case. The court also insisted, without explaining why,
that Tucker v. American Smelting and Refining Co., 189 Md. 250, 55 A. (2d) 692
(1947) was irrelevant, and yet admitted that the Maryland court had been correct in ruling that a Baltimore refinery and a Utah copper smelter which supplied blister copper to the refinery were not one establishment although both plants
were owned by the same company. It would seem from this that the court was unwilling or unable to meet the logic of the Tucker case.
2Tennessee Coal, Iron and R. Co. v. Martin, 33 Ala. App. 502, 36 S. (2d) 535
(1948), aff'd 36 S. (2d) 547 (Ala. 1948); Tucker v. American Smelting and Refining
Co., 189 Md. 250, 55 A. (2d) 692 (1947); Nordling v. Ford Motor Co., 42 N. W. (2d)
576 (Minn. 1950).

23"The funds from which benefits are paid under the state unemployment
compensation systems are obtained almost uniformly from payroll taxes levied on
employers. In most states the tax is a differential tax. Rates are varied with relation
in some degree to the past employment experience of each employer, in accordance
with widely differing methods. The variation of employers' tax rates by these
methods is known today as experience rating." Arnold, Experience Rating (1945)
55 Yale L. J. 218.
24
The Georgia Supreme Court reasoned that since the same collective bargaining agreement applied to all Ford employees, any liberalization in the interpretation of the agreement to favor the strikes would inure to the benefit of the
non-strikers. Thus when the International sanctioned the Dearborn strike it acted
as agent for all the employees at assembly plants closed because of lack of parts and
therefore made all of Ford's non-striking employees a party to the strike. The fallacy
of this argument may be seen when it is realized that the union constitution
did not give the Georgia workers any power to interfere in the Michigan strike.
According to the Georgia Court of Appeals, which the Supreme Court reversed,
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just a week before the Georgia decision against the claims of the
employees of the Georgia assembly plant was handed down, the New
Jersey Supreme Court's decision flatly rejected the standard of functional integration. That court refused to engage in metaphysical
ponderings and straightforwardly insisted that in the absence of a
special legislative identification, the words of the phrase "factory, establishment, or other premises" should be given their common usage.
Thus the court depended on the normal usages of business and applied
the dictionary definitions to the respective words in the phrase, saying:
"In its primary sense the word 'factory' has reference to a place
where goods are fabricated, while 'establishment' and 'other
premises' comprehend places for the transaction of business
and other pursuits not in the category of a manufactory. The
phrase '" factory, establishment or other premises" takes color,
not from "establishment" as the plaintiff would have it, but
rather from the word "factory." In common parlance the latter ordinarily means a single industrial plant'. 2 5
Once the New Jersey court had defined the terms of the statute in
this manner, it had only to say that geographical separation of the
plants prevented them from being one.2 6 Although this would have
been sufficient to substantiate its decision, the New Jersey court went
further and adopted the view of the Nordling case. There, the Minnesota court developed an attitude similar to that of the earlier Connecticut case of General Motors Corp. v. Mulquin27 in holding that, while
the test of the Spielmann case might be considered, the really determinative element is the employment practices of the organization
involved in the dispute. Under this approach, hiring and firing policies,
seniority rights systems, and local union activity should be scrutinized
the International "was not the agent except to do certain things as set out in the
constitution and the contract. In connection with the labor dispute, it was acting
solely as agent for the members of the union in Michigan. It so happened that what
it did for them was in conflict with the wishes and desires of the members of the
union in Georgia, the undisputed evidence showing that both employers and employees wanted to continue work and were satisfied therewith. Where there is
such a conflict between the interests of principals, the rule is that the principal is
not bound unless he has assented to or ratified the act." Abercrombie v. Ford Motor
Co., 81 Ga. App. 690, 59 S. E. (2d) 664, 670 (1950).
2Ford Motor Co. v. New Jersey Department of Labor and Industry, 5 N. J. 494,
76 A. (2d) 256, 261 (1950).
2This in actuality was an application of the physical proximity test. Because
the two plants were at such a great distance from each other it was impossible
that they could be one in terms of common parlance.
V134 Conn. 118, 55 A. (2d) 72 (1947).
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to determine whether or not the units under consideration are separate
entities.
In the most recent of the cases growing out of Ford's Dearborn,
Michigan, labor dispute, the Virginia court in Ford Motor Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Commission28 adopted substantially the
same test. It was found that the words "factory," "establishment," and
"premises" characterize the place at which work is carried on and
not the manner of its operation. "The circumstances of employment,"
the court reasoned, "rather than those of management and operation,
are of primary importance in determining the unity and integration,
29
or the lack of unity and integration, of the plants."
The result reached by the Minnesota, New Jersey, and Virginia
cases appears to be further sustained by the announced policy of the
unemployment compensation laws. Fundamentally the laws were
passed to relieve workmen from the effects of the periodic involuntary
unemployment that is a concomitant of modern industrialism.30 Protection against that hazard is afforded by taxing employers and setting aside the revenue as reserves to be paid to persons becoming unemployed through no fault of their own. The acts, however, are limited
in scope by labor dispute qualification clauses because the legislatures
want the states to remain neutral in employer-employee controversies
in so far as unemployment compensation is concerned; 3 ' but it must
63 S. E. (2d) 28 (Va. 1951).
36S. E. (2d) 28, 34 (Va. 1951).

"'Declaration of State Public Policy. Section 2. As a guide to the interpretation and application of this Act, the public policy of this State is declared to be as
follows: Economic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious menace to the
health, morals, and welfare of the people of this State. Involuntary unemployment
is therefore a subject of general interest and concern, which requires appropriate
action by the Legislature to prevent its spread and to lighten its burden which now
so often falls with crushing force upon the unemployed worker or his family. The
achievement of social security requires protection against this greatest hazard of
our economic life. This can be provided by encouraging employers to provide more
stable employment and by the systematic accumulation of funds during periods of
employment to provide benefits for periods of unemployment, thus maintaining
purchasing power and limiting the serious social consequences of poor relief assistance. The legislature, therefore, declares that in its considered judgment the
public good, and the general welfare of the citizens of this State require the enactment of this measure, under the police powers of the State, for the compulsory
setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own." Ga. Laws (1937) 8o6, 807. N. J. S. A. (West,
1950) 43:21-2 is substantially the same. For a general discussion of the social aims of
unemployment compensation legislation see Burns, Unemployment Compensation
and Socio-Economic Objectives (1945) 55 Yale L. J. i.
'See Chrysler Corporation v. Smith, 297 Mich. 438, 298 N. W. 87, 90 (1941);
Ford Motor Co. v. Abercrombie, 207 Ga. 464, 62 S. E. (2d) 209, 215 (1950). "The labor
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be pointed out that this policy of neutrality appears to have been confined to that limited situations where benefits are denied to actual
strikers and their direct supporters. In that circumstance it would be
manifestly unneutral to pay benefits so as to support the strikers, while
the denial of benefits would merely leave the strikers in the same position as they would have been in had there been no unemployment
compensation act. If the clause is extended to secondary situations so
as to exclude persons becoming unemployed at plants dependent on the
struck plant for materials, here again the state can keep the status of
the parties as it was before the passage of the unemployment compensation act only by denying benefits. However, if the state denies the benefits, the non-striking workers will bring pressure against the strikers to
resume work, while if it grants the benefits it destroys the status quo by
depriving the employer of the advantage of this pressure that the unemployed non-strikers might exert. Nevertheless, as was pointed out
above, where the non-striking plant is owned by a company other than
the one which owns the struck plant there has been general agreement
that the non-striking employees should receive unemployment benefits.
Therefore, it becomes obvious that the neutrality policy of the legislatures has not been carried beyond the actual strike situation, and it
is apparent that that policy is to be restricted in favor of of the fundamental purpose of relieving wage earners from the ravages of unemployment.
The Minnesota, New Jersey, and Virginia cases looked to the policy
of providing temporary financial assistance to workmen who become
unemployed involuntarily, pointing out that since the unemployment
32
statutes are remedial in nature they should be liberally construed.
dispute disqualification is based on the theory that so far as unemployment compensation is concerned, the state should remain neutral in employer-employee controversies, i.e., the compensation funds, which are accumulated through taxes
imposed on employer, should not be used to aid employees whose work stoppage
results from a labor dispute with the employer." Note (1949) 33 Minn. L. Rev.
758, 759. The soundness of the neutrality theory is questioned in Schindler, Collective Bargaining and Unemployment Insurance Legislation (1938) 38 Col. L. Rev.
858, 869. There the author states: "Specifically in respect of our labor relations,
the American government has never adopted any hands-off policy. Beginning with
the very earliest criminal prosecutions more than a century ago, the federal government and the states have interfered with (= been unneutral in connection with)
the disputes between labor and capital. The interference (= unneutrality) may not
have been consistent, it can be granted, to any striking degree. But the background is one of interference; of traditional neutrality there is none."
2"Our unemployment compensation law is remedial in nature and therefore
should be liberally construed." Ford Motor Co. v. New Jersey Department of Labor
and Industry, 7 N. J. Super. 30, 71 A. (2d) 727, 732 (1950). "The statute as a whole,
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Therefore, the words of the legislature were given their ordinary
lay connotations, and the legislative policy behind the acts was shown
great deference. The Georgia court, although recognizing this general
policy, attempted to base its view specifically on the legislative policy
of neutrality in labor disputes. Consequently, that court fell into error
by overlooking the fact that it was faced with one of those secondary
situations where the legislature has not intended that the neutrality
policy should be applied, and thus it approached the labor dispute
qualification provision of the act in a spirit of mutilating narrowness33
which neither served the ultimate purpose of safe-guarding against
unemployment nor the legislative policy of neutrality.3 4 However, in
light of the conflicting attitude of the Georgia court, it appears that
legislative clarification may be needed in some states to prevent further
judicial constriction of the remedial effects of the unemployment

compensation laws.
WLIAm

LABOR LAA-LEGALITY

C.

BATrY

OF EXPULSION FROM UNION MEMBERSHIP OF

WORKERS SEEKING CHANGE OF BARGAINING AGENTS UNDER CLOSED

SHOP CONTRACT. [Virginia]

The emergence of the labor union as a dominant influence in the
political and economic life of the nation has produced an acute social
and legal problem in the form of a conflict between the constitutionally guaranteed right to work and statutory or judicial recognition of the
validity of the closed-shop contract. As a corollary to the valid closed
as well as the particular sections here involved, should be so interpreted as to effectuate that remedial purpose implicit in its enactment." Ford Motor Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 63 S. E. (2d) 28, 34 (Va. 1951). Also see A. H.
Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U. S. 490, 493, 65 S. Ct. 807, 8o8, 89 L. ed. 1o95, 1O98
(1945), wherein the Court emphasized that exemption from humanitarian and
remedial legislation must be narrowly construed.
n3It should be remembered that "Claimants who are unemployed because of a
labor dispute would, of course, still be subject to the regular waiting periods and
would receive benefits for less that their wages. Anyone foolhardy enough to provoke
a labor dispute in the hope of thriving on this meagre pittance would be subject
to disqualification if he subsequently refused suitable employment." Fierst and
Spector, Unemployment Compensation in Labor Disputes (1940) 49 Yale L. J. 461,
490.

"If Ford could have obtained parts to supply the non-striking assembly plants,
the facts make it clear that the employees of those plants would have been willing to
work (the Virginia plant did continue operation for six days after the strike was
called). Therefore, in effect, the decision of the Georgia court made the nonstrikers unwilling participants in a labor dispute in order to save the Ford Company's experience rating under the act.
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shop contract there arises the problem of refusal, to individual members of labor organizations, of any opportunity to change bargaining
agents while employed under such an agreement.'
One solution to this problem, as well as the effect of the Rutland
Court Doctrine, 2 has been brought into Virginia law, at least persuasviely on the trial court level, by the January, 1951 refusal of an appeal
in the case of Local Union 549, InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters v. Clark,3 decided in equity in the Corporation Court of the
City of Bristol in September, 1948. By rejecting the appeal the Supreme Court of Appeals also abstained from overruling an exception
4
to the general rule, announced in Virginia labor cases as dicta,
and accepted as the law, 5 that members of a labor union must, as
members of a voluntary association, exhaust their remedies within the
organization before going to the courts for relief. 6
The Rutland Court Doctrine, announced in 1942 as a policy by the
N. L. R. B., gave to individual members of labor unions operating under closed-shop contracts the right to engage in attempts to change
bargaining agents during a period before the expiration of closed shop
contracts. Since the typical closed-shop contract provides that union
"In Newman, the Closed Union and the Right to Work (1943) 43 Col. L. Rev.
the author points out that the conflict is between the individual's right to work
and the absolute control a union is allowed over its qualifications for membership. By exclusion from a union the worker is effectively left without a means of
livelihood.
Damned as he now is for espousal of the union as contrasted with the individual
member, President Roosevelt did recognize a need for a resolution of the conflict.
In January, 1942 he submitted to Congress a report from the National Resources
and Planning Board in which the first mentioned amplification of the Atlantic
Charter was "The right to work, usefully and creatively through the productive
years." 43 Col. L. Rev. 42.
2In the Matter of Rutland Court Owners, Inc., 46 N. L. R. B. 1040 (1943) (supplemental decision), 44 N. L. R. B. 587 (1942).
'Corporation Court of the City of Bristol, September, 1948 (not reported).
Opinion of the trial court per Cantwell, T. J. Other references to the Clark case
herein are from typewritten copy of the opinion of the court.
Petition for review was presented orally to one judge in vacation and was refused by the whole Supreme Court of Appeals in session in January, ig5i. This information was received from Stant and Roberts of Bristol, Va., counsel for plaintiff.
'See International Brotherhood v. Bridgeman, 179 Va. 533, 544, 19 S. E. (2d)
667, 671 (1942) (the union was held to be estopped to assert the defense that the
plaintiff had not exhausted his remedies within the union); Campbell v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 165 Va. 8, 15, 181 S. E. 444, 447 (1935) (the plaintiff
was held to have exhausted his remedies within the union).
'511 Mitchie's Jur., Labor § 4; Parker, Current Trends in Labor Law in Virginia
(1946) 32 Va. L. Rev. lO5O.
GiTeller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining (1940) § loo; Restatement,
Torts (1939) § 811; Note (1947) i68 A. L. R. 1462.
42,
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membership is prerequisite to employment, and since union constitutions generally provide expulsion for disloyalty or dual-unionism, 7 the
individual worker, though he may feel dissatisfied with his union, may
not compaign for another on pain of expulsion and resulting loss of
employment. This fact was recognized by the N. L. R. B. in the Rutland Court case when the board, ruling that an employer must reinstate employees discharged at the request of the union because of such
dual-unionism, announced the doctrine as follows:
"The employees right to select representatives to be meaningful must necessarily include the right at some appropriate time
to change representatives .... effectuation of the basic policies
of the Act requires, as the life of the collective contract draws
to a close, that the employees be able to advocate a change in
their affiliation without fear of discharge by an employer for
so doing.
"A contrary construction would in large part nullify the
statutory scheme by which questions concerning the representation of employees are to be determined by the Board, using the
machinery created for that very purpose under the act .... The
discharge of the very employees whose representation is in issue, because they have placed their representation in question, is
clearly inconsistent with the whole policy and general scheme of
the Act.
"The A. F. of L. Local, in its argument, recognizes that were
its view to prevail the strike would be the only weapon remaining to the employees who wished to transfer their affiliation to
the C. I. 0. Local immediately prior to the negotiation of a new
contract. That the Act was designed to avert industrial strife,
however, is clear beyond dispute .... The view advocated by
the respondent and the A. F. of L. Local is inconsistent with
basic policy .... The stability intended by the Act is not that involved in a perennial suppression of the employees' will."8
Although the doctrine was subsequently approved by several of the
United States Courts of Appeals, it was rejected by the Supreme Court
7

See 3 Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining 194o) Forms Nos. 49,

50, for typical union constitutions. C.1.0. Art. VII, § 5: "No person shall hold

membership or office in more than one local union ... or in any other labor union
having the same or similar jurisdiction." Art. XI, § i: "Members may be fined, suspended or expelled for any of the following acts... (A) Wilful violation ,of this
constitution ... (G) Working in the interest of any trade union organization other
than that of... [the local] which claims or exercises jurisdiction similar to that ...
[of] the International...." A. F. of L. § 88: "No member shall at any given time
belong to more than one local... or become a member of any dual organization...."
§ 271: "Any member...who violates any article or section of the constitution ...
shall be fined or expelled at the discretion of the local union."
844 N. L. R. B. 587, 596 (1942)-
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in 1949 in Colgate Co. v. Labor Board9 on the reasoning that Congress
had expressly approved closed-shop contracts in the Wagner Act,' 0 and
that the Board would not be allowed to undermine the statute by reading into the N. L. R. B. a policy which was not intended by Congress.
The Court pointed out that Congress had rejected the Tydings Amendment11 to the Act, which amendment would have freed employees from
coercion "from any source," necessarily including fellow employees
and unions as well as employers. Two justices dissented on the ground
that "The use of the closed-shop privilege to interfere with the free
exercise of the laborers' choice does not seem. .. to be within the pur12
pose of the Labor Act."'
In the Clark case, the employer, acting on request of the Teamsters
Local, under a closed-shop contract, discharged several employees who
had circulated a petition among fellow employees trying to secure an
election on union representation to be conducted by the N. L. R. B.
These employees, after being expelled or suspended by their local
union, went before union tribunals for a review of their punishment. Losing the appeal at each stage, they filed a bill in equity instead of taking their complaint to the highest tribunal of the organization, the union Convention. The Corporation Court of the City of
Bristol took jurisdiction and declared that the acts of the union were
1"We reject the application of the so called Rutland Court doctrine." 338 U. S.
355, 364, 70 S.Ct. 166, 171, 94 L. ed. 161, 170 (1949).
In the opinion, the Court listed the Second [Labor Board v. Geraldine Novelty
Co., 173 F. (2d) 14 (1949); Colonie Fibre v. Labor Board, 163 F. (2d) 65 (1947); Labor
Board v. American White Cross Laboratories, 16o F. (2d) 75 (1947], Third [Labor
Board v. Public Service Transport Co., 177 F. (2d) 119 (1949)], and Ninth [Labor
Board v. Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co., 171 F. (2d) 956 (1949); Local 2880 v. Labor
B.Pard, 158 F. (2d) 365 (1946)] Circuits approving the doctrine, and the Seventh
Circuit as disapproving [Aluminium Co. v. Labor Board, 159 F. (2d) 523 (1946);
Lewis Meier & Co. v. Labor Board, 21 L. R. R. M. 2093 (Nov. 1947)]. Colgate Co. v.
Labor Board, 338 U. S.355, 70 S.Ct. 166, 94 L. ed. 161 (1949) n. 6, 7, 8, 9.
On rehearing the case of N. L. R. B. v. Public Service Co-Ordinated Transport,
177 F. (2d) 119 (1949) the Third Circuit followed the Supreme Court and rejected
the Rutland Court doctrine. 177 F. (2d) 119, 125 (1950).
21§ 8 (3)of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 before Taft-Hartley Amendment.
""During consideration of the bill on the Senate floor Senator Tydings proposed to amend it by adding to § 7 the words, "free from coercion or intimidation
from any source." In the debate which followed it came clear that the amendment would deal with employee-against-employee relations, while the bill was designed to deal only with employee-employer relations, and the amendment was defeated. See 79 Cong. Rec. 7653-7658, 7675." Colgate Co. v. Labor Board, 338 U. S.
355, 363, 70 S. Ct. 166, 171, 94 L. ed 16i, 169 (1949), n. 16.
'-See Colgate Co. v. Labor Board, 338 U. S. 355, 365, 70 S.Ct. 166, 172, 94 L. ed.
161, 170 (1949).
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void, which necessarily required the reinstatement of the ousted employees, and awarded damages of wages lost during the time of discharge.'3
This decision was not rested on legislative policy, but rather on constitutional rights. The court observed that the word "liberty" as used in
the Virginia and Federal Constitutions had been interpreted to mean
the right to earn a livelihood by any lawful means, 14 and that the right
to work is fundamental:
"A man's right to work is not something to be lightly trifled
with. It is the backbone of our economic well being; it is the
source of all the storied examples of fabulous rise to fame and
wealth of men born in poverty; it is the essence of America. It is
one of the fundamental liberties honored and accorded full recognition in our organic law, both State and Federal."' 5
"These words are not 'sounding brass and tinkling cymbals,'
but are expressions of the vitality of phrases known to every
school child, and constituting the roots of our system of free men.
This philosophy must prevail so long as our institutions stand,
and any new concept must be so modified as to accord herewith."'

6

Stating that the validity of the closed shop contract was not in issue,
but that the grievance was exclusion from membership in the union,
the court held that a union operating under a closed-shop contract
"It is interesting to compare the similarity of relief received in the Clark and
the Rutland cases. The Clark case awarded damages to be computed "on the basis
of the rate paid each at the time of discharge, less the amount earned elsewhere
during the interval." Corporation Court of the City of Bristol, Sept. 1948, p. 17. In
the Rutland Court case the damages were "a sum of money equal to the amount
he normally would have earned as wages .. . less his net earnings ... ." 44 N. L. R. B.
587, 6o2 (1942). Note that both the Board and the Corporation Court awarded actual
loss of wages, instead of contract wages less amount the complainant ought to have
earned in mitigation. While the Corporation Court declared the acts of the union
to be void, thus necessarily re-instating the complainants, the N. L. R. B. commanded
the employer to "offer... immediate and full reinstatement to their former or
substantially equivalent positions...." 44 N. L. R. B. 587, 602 (1942).
"The court cited the Virginia cases of Moore v. Sutton, 185 Va. 481, 39 S. E.
(2d) 348 (1946); Goe v. Gifford, 1i68 Va. 497, 191 S. E. 783 (1937); and Young v.
Commonwealth, ioi Va. 853, 45 S. E. 327 (igo3) for the language used. A passage
from the Young case quoted by the court in turn cites Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165
U. S. 578, 17 S. Ct. 427, 41 L. ed. 832 (1897); Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678,
18 S. Ct. 992, 1257, 32 L. ed. 253 (1888); People v. Gillson, lo9 N. Y. 389, 17 N. E.
343 (1888); and State v. Dalton, 22 R. I. 77, 46 Atl. 234 (1900).
1
Local Union 549, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Clark, Corporation Court of the City of Bristol, Sept., 1948, p- 5"Local Union 549, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Clark, Corporation Court of the City of Bristol, Sept. 1948, p. 7-
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must admit all competent workers. The reasoning was that a union
can not be considered a voluntary association when a closed-shop
agreement is in effect, for when "the scope of an association is so
broad, and its power so great that it deprives individuals of rights unconnected with the incidents of membership, simply by depriving them
of membership... then public policy requires that it must lose the
right to control the selection of its membership, when such control,
in turn, deprives the individual of his fundamental constitutional
rights."17
Having thus bound the union to accept all such competent applicants,' 8 the court ruled that the complainants' circulation of a paper, attempting to obtain the views of other employees as to a proposed
N. L. R. B. election, was in the exercise of the right of free speech, and
that such right being inalienable, any action of the union attempting to
infringe upon it was void. Further, that since the attempt to infringe
17Local Union 549, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Clark, Corporation Court of the City of Bristol, Sept., 1948, p. H1.
28Action by a court of equity to compel acceptance of the excluded applicant
was the first solution offered by Newman, The Closed Union and the Right to Work
(1943) 43 Col. L. Rev. 42. He states that courts shy away from such forced admissions of members by the assimilation of a labor union to a voluntary association,
and apply the rule that "membership in a voluntary association is wholly a matter of agreement and cannot be judicially imposed." 43 Col. L. Rev. 42, 45. While
further saying that no court in a common law jurisdiction has regulated admission
requirements for new members to a closed-shop closed-union, the author cites as
the only direct authority for so doing four reported cases which regulated readmission requirements for old members; Spayd v. Ringing Rock Lodge, 270 Pa. 67,
113 At. 70 (1921) (readmitted a member expelled for petitioning the legislature in
violation of a union rule); Walsche v. Sherlock, iio N. J. Eq. 223, 159 Ad. 661 (1932)
(enjoined union discrimination in issuing work permits); Cameron v. InItlernational Alliance, 118 N. J. Eq. 11, 176 Ati. 692 (1935) (set aside seniority regulations of a union); Collins v. International Alliance, li9 N. J. Eq. 23o, 182 At. 37
(1935) (held that a practice of requireing juniors to do the work of seniors violates
the constitutional rights of the members). The Circuit Court of Milwaukee County,
Wisconsin in Wolter v. Ulick (July 24, 1940) (not reported) refused to enjoin prior
members of a union from continuing to work in violation of a contract between
them and plaintiff union; this court declared that the contract violated public
policy in restricting defendants' right to contract for their labor.
In the Clark case, the Corporation Court of Bristol considered the alternatives
of (i) invalidating the closed shop contract, or (2) upholding the right of labor unions
to exclude qualified members. Stating that the closed-shop contract was to be
considered only to the extent of its bearing on exclusion, and that the second alternative was "too ridiculous to contemplate," the court met the problem "head-on
and said:
"Therefore, this Court will adopt the course which requires labor unions, in
the situation at hand, to admit all competant workers...." Local Union 549, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Clark, Corporation Court of the City of
Bristol, Sept., 1948, p. 1o.

240

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. VIII

the right of free speech is void, "Any adjudication of defendant having the effect of abrogating such right is likewise void ....
The court denied the contention of the defendant that the ousted
members were not entitled to maintain the suit because they had not
exhausted their remidies within the union. It reasoned that "The action of the defendant herein is void for the reason... that it deprives
the complainants of basic constitutional rights, and cannot be allowed
to stand for any reason. Being so void, resort may be had directly to
20
this court."
The effect of this decision is to open to such ousted members the
closed unions which still maintain valid closed-shop contracts under the
Taft-Hartley Act 2 ' and the Virginia Right to Work Statute. 22 Since
the Supreme Court of the United States has upheld the validity of right
to work acts, 23 it does not seem probable that it would reverse such
a decision as the instant case. For to do so, it would be necessary to
decide that there is no constitutional right to work, and such a decision would appear to be extremely unlikely by a tribunal dedicated
upholding human rights. It also would seem necessary for the Court
to hold that individual workers do not have the same freedom of
speech accorded even to stranger pickets24 and employers 25 by court
decisions.
Even if the United States Supreme Court should decide that the
Taft-Hartley Act guarantees the right to a union shop in those
states with a right to work statute, and that the right of the unions to
"Local union 549, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Clark, Corporation Court of the City of Bristol, Sept., 1948, p. 15.

"Local Union 549, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Clark, Corporation Court of the City of Bristol, Sept., 1948, p. 16. The court based its ruling that

the union decision was void on lack of jurisdiction: "It is the view of this court
that no alleged cause for expulsion is within the 'jurisdiction of the tribunal of
the association' when the result is, by reason of a closed shop agreement, to de-

prive an individual of his inalienable right to work." Corporation Court of the
City of Bristol, Sept. 1948, p. 15 .
nSection 1o2 of the Labor-Management Relations Act as amended expressly
permits valid pre-evisting closed-shop contracts to remain in effect. 61 Stat.
(1947), 29 U. S. C. A. § 158, n. 9 (1949).
"Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1950) § 40-74.

152

"Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron and Metal Co., 335 U. S.
535, 69 S. Ct. 251, 93 L. ed. 212 (1949).
"Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 320 U. S. 293, 64 S. Ct. 126, 88 L. ed.
58 (1943); Baker and Pastry Drivers and Helpers v. Wohl, 315 U. S. 769, 62 S. Ct.
816, 86 L. ed. 1178 (1942).
2N.
L. R. B. v. Virginia Electric and Power Co., 314 U. S. 469, 62 S. Ct. 344,
86 L. ed. 348 (1941); N. L. R. B. v. American Tube Bending Co., 134 F. (2d) 993
(C. C. A. 2d, 1943).
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maintain membership requirements is superior to the right of the
worker not to be fired from a union shop at the request of the union
except for the non-payment of dues, this decision may be thought to
guarantee to the workers of Virginia the right to join a closed union.26
For the difference between a closed and a union shop is more in name
than in substance, and in view of the Clark case there is reason to believe that if fundamental rights were denied the worker by a union
shop, a court of equity would intervene to secure them for him.
EMORY WIDENER, JR.

LABOR LAW-VALIDITY OF STATUTE PROHIBITING PICKETING OF BUSINESS
BY NON-EMPLOYEES. [Virginia]

A marked reluctance to recognize the picket line as a legitimate
labor pressure device led many earlier American courts to look upon
such activity as a prima facie tort, necessitating proof of justification
to avoid liability.' Later some states refused to enjoin picketing if carried on in a peaceful manner and for a purpose deemed lawful by the
particular tribunal hearing the case. 2 As late as 1921 the Supreme Court
of the United States characterized picketing as "sinister" but consented
to its allowance under strict regulation.3 An important step toward a
more general acceptance of the picket line came in 1937 in Senn v. Tile
Layers Protective Union,4 wherein a sharply divided court determined
that a state could constitutionally permit peaceful picketing. 5 Only
-Section 8 (a) (3)of the Taft-Hartley Act specifically allows a union shop and
forbids discriminatory discharge for non-membership for any other ground than
non-payment of dues. Section 8 (b) (i) provides in part: "this paragraph shall not
impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to
the acquisition or retention of membership therein." And later in section 8 (b) (2):
"It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents... to discriminate against an employee with respect to whom membership in such organization has been denied or terminated on some ground other than his failure to render
the periodic dues...." 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U. S. C. A. § 158 (1949).
The apparent conflict in this section has not yet been resolved by the courts.
'Typical of the early cases are Pierce v. Stablemen's Union, 156 Cal. 7o, 103
Pac. 824 (19o9); Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N. E. 1077 (1896). For other
cases see I Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining (1940) §§ 38, 84-102,
117-20.

-See Gregory, Labor and the Law (ad ed. 1949) 334-341; Schlusselberg, The Free
Speech Safeguard for Labor Picketing (1945) 33 Ky. L. J. 257.
'American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U. S. 184,
42 S. Ct. 72, 66 L. ed. 189 (19i2).
5o1 U. S.468, 57 S. Ct. 857, 81 L. ed. 1229 (1987).
Speaking for the majority in a 5 to 4 decision, Justice Brandeis conceded
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three years were to pass before the Court in Thornhill v. Alabama,6
declared that a state could not prohibitpeaceful picketing. Specifically,
the case invalidated an Alabama statute which imposed a blanket prohibition on picketing in the vicinity of a labor dispute on the ground
that such an enactment violated the right of freedom of speech protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 7 Manifestly, this decision represented a fundamental change in judicial attitude toward
one of the most effective weapons in labor's arsenal.
The Virginia General Assembly apparently ignored the mandate of
the Thornhill case, at least as that mandate was originally interpreted,
as the third section of the state's so-called "Right-to-Work Act" outlawed any picketing of a business by non-employees. 8 In the recent case
of Edwards v. Commonwealth,9 the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals was called upon to determine the validity of this provision. The
defendant Edwards and another, while peacefully patrolling in front
of a Norfolk theatre in an effort to secure the employment of a Negro
manager, were arrested and charged with a violation of the Right-toWork Act. The employees of the theatre were not then out on strike
and neither defendant was nor had been employed there, or in the
motion picture industry. After being found guilty and fined in the
trial court, the defendants, on writ of error to the Supreme Court of
Appeals, asserted that the statute infringed their right of free speech.
This contention was upheld in an unanimous decision by the Virginia
court.
To arrive at this conclusion, however, it was necessary for the court
to examine not only the Thornhill case but also a series of Supreme
Court decisions which applied and, as a whole, tended greatly to restrict the scope of the new free speech doctrine. In Milk Wagon Drivers
that the picketing in question might annoy the petitioner and perhaps even prevent him from securing tile-laying jobs he hoped to get, but pointed out, nonetheless, that such annoyance was not an invasion of liberty guaranteed by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, nor was a hoped-for job a property
right within the meaning of that provision. For an interesting discussion of the Senn
case, see Gregory, Labor and the Law (2d ed. 1949) 337-341.
631o U. S. 88, 6o S. Ct. 736, 84 L. ed. 1093 (1940).

'A county ordinance which prohibited picketing if solely for the purpose of
interfering with another's business, was struck down for the same reason in the
companion case of Carlson v. California, 51o U. S. io6, 6o S. Ct. 746, 84 L. ed.
1104 (1940)-

sVa. Code Ann. (Michie, 1950) § 40-64: "No person who is not, or immediately
prior to the time of the commencement of any strike was not, a bona fide employee
of the business or industry being picketed shall participate in any picketing or any
picketing activity with respect to such strike or such business or industry."
'191 Va. 272, 6o S. E. (2d) 916 (1950).
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Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies,'0 it was held that a state could enjoin even peaceful picketing when such picketing was set against a
background of violence. But in a companion case, American Federation of Labor v. Swing," an attempt to limit the picketing of a business
establishment to employees of that business alone was struck down.
Later in Bakery and Pastry Drivers Local v. Wohl,' 2 the Court held

that an individual need not be in a "labor dispute" as defined by state
law to have a right to picket peacefully, but in Carpentersand Joiners
Union v. Ritter's Cafe,13 an injunction against the picketing of a business having "no industrial connection" with a labor dispute was allowed.' 4
Seven years after the Ritter decision the next limitation to the
Thornhill holding emerged in the form of a revival of the "unlawful
purpose doctrine." In Giboney v. Empire Storage and Ice Co.,15 the
Supreme Court upheld an injunction against picketing by a union
'0312 U. S. 287, 61 S. Ct. 552, 85 L. ed. 836 (1941).
11312 U. S. 321, 61 S. Ct. 568, 85 L. ed. 855 (1941).
3315 U. S. 769, 62 S. Ct. 816, 86 L. ed. 1178 (1942).
26315 U. S. 722, 62 S. Ct. 807, 86 L. ed. 1143 (1942).
"In Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 320 U. S. 293, 64 S. Ct. 126, 88
L. ed. 58 (1943), two restaurant proprietors had sought injunctions against the
peaceful picketing of their establishments by the cafeteria workers' union. Since
the proprietors had no employees, the New York courts found that no "labor dispute" existed within the meaning of the state's "Little Norris-LaGuardia Act" and
therefore issued the injunctions. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment, however, and relied upon the principles set forth in the Senn, Swing and Wohl cases
in holding the picketing to be constitutionally protected conduct.
By this time a spirited debate was beginning to develop among law review
writers regarding the fundamental soundness of the free speech doctrine. There
were those who contended that picketing was not an exercise of free speech at all
but a form of economic pressure designed primarily to impede the picketed person's access to a free and open market. It was argued that picketing derived its
effectiveness not from an appeal to reason but rather because of its tendency to
play upon the public's sympathy or sense of embarrassment, and from observance of
the unwritten rule among workers that picket lines are not to be crossed. See Teller,
Picketing and Free Speech (1942) 56 Harv. L. Rev. 18o; Teller, Picketing and Free
Speech: A Reply (1943) 56 Harv. L. Rev. 532; Gregory, Labor and the Law (2d ed.
1949) 341-363.
Other writers, however, maintained that picketing correctly was not excluded
from the area of free speech simply because it was not a "traditional" form of
speech. Moreover, they believed it was time that labor reaped some of the benefits of the Fourteenth Amendment which so ofter had been relied upon to protect
business interests. Any apparent inconsistency in the Thornhill and Ritter cases
could be explained on the ground that even the constitutional protection of a
civil liberty may be qualified. See Dodd, Picketing and Free Speech: A Dissent
(1943) 56 Harv. L. Rev. 513; Jaffe, In Defense of the Supreme Court's Picketing
Doctrine (1943) 41 Mich. L. Rev. 1037.
25336 U. S. 490, 69 S. Ct. 684, 93 L. ed. 834 (1949).
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of ice and coal drivers to compel an ice plant to agree not to sell its
product to non-union peddlers. Acceptance of the agreement proposed
by the union would, it was declared, be a violation of the state's antitrade restraint statute. The purpose of the picketing was unlawful,
then, not because it sought to accomplish an end which in the eyes of
the courts or legislature was broadly opposed to the best interests of
the state, but because the result it was intended to bring about would
require the violation of a specific law. Hence, it may be said the unlawful purpose concept was applied in its more narrow or restricted
sense.
The principles enunciated in the Giboney case apparently formed
the basis for Supreme Court decisions in the three most recent picketing cases, all decided May 8, 195o. An injunction against picketing was
issued and damages awarded in Building Service Employees International Union v. Gazzam' 6 against a union which sought to compel
an employer to sign a contract requiring his employees to become
union members against their expressed will. Since coercion by an employer of his employees' choice of a bargaining representative was
opposed to the public policy of the state of Washington as declared
by statute, the Supreme Court affirmed. 1 7 Here, as in the Giboney
case, the purpose of the picketing was regarded as unlawful in a narrow sense.
In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hanke,'s an injunction was upheld which prohibited the picketing of a combined
garage and used car lot in Seattle to secure an agreement for a union
shop. Because the business was operated by the owner himself without
employees, the Supreme Court of Washington decided that preservation of self-employer economic units was of greater importance than
the protection of the element of communication in picketing. To strike
such a balance as this, according to the federal Supreme Court, was not
to violate the Constitution. By agreeing to a union shop as the brotherhood demanded, Hanke would have violated no state law. If, then,
the purpose of the picketing was unlawful it was so only in the broad
sense-i.e., because of the adverse effect the curtailment of self-employer
business units might have on the state's social and economic well be1339 U. S. 532, 70 S. Ct. 784, 94 L. ed. 1045 (1950).
17The Gazzam case is similar to the Giboney decision in that the employer
would have violated the public policy of the state as expressed by statute if he had
submitted to the union's demand. The former decision, however, indicates that the
statute in question need not be a criminal one to justify equitable relief on behalf
of the employer.

1"339 U. S. 470, 70 S. Ct. 773, 94 L. ed. 995 (195o).
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ing. The majority opinion by Justice Frankfurter also reveals a fundamental change in approach toward the solution of the picketing problem. After the Thornhill case, restraints upon picketing, like purported abridgements of more conventional forms of speech, were subjected to the "clear and present danger" test, a standard which stripped
the state action of its usual presumption of validity and cast upon its
proponents the burden of showing the necessity for such action. 19 In
the Hanke case, however, the Court unquestionably shifts to the socalled "rational basis" test by scrutinizing the state's curtailment of
20
picketing as it would any regulation in the social or economic field.
In the third of the recent cases, Hughes v. Superior Court,2' the Supreme Court upheld a California court injunction against the picketing
of a business establishment to secure compliance with a demand that
its employees be selected in proportion to the racial origin of its
customers. The picketing in question, the Court felt, was to promote
discrimination, not to abolish it, and was, therefore, an appropriate
subject for state control. In the course of the opinion it was categorically stated that "Picketing is not beyond the control of a State if
the manner in which picketing is conducted or the purpose which it
seeks to effectuate gives ground for its disallowance. '22 Hardly a more
23
concise restatement of the unlawful purpose doctrine could be found.
"The "clear and present danger" test was enunciated by Justice Holmes as
follows: "The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that
they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent."
Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 52, 39 S. Ct. 247, 249, 63 L. ed. 470, 473 (1919).
This test was restated and applied by Justice Murphy in Thornhill v. Alabama, 31o U. S. 88, 6o S. Ct. 736, 84 L. ed. 1093 (1940), and by Justice Douglas
in a concurring opinion in Bakery and Pastry Drivers Local v. Wohl, 315 U. S.
769, 775, 62 S. Ct. 816, 8ig , 86 L. ed. 1178, 1184 (1942). Although the Court did not
always expressly spell out the "clear and present danger" test in the other picketing cases following Thornhill, a realization that such test was applied is implicit
from a reading of the opinions.
2"A State's judgment on striking such a balance [between the protection of the
speech element in picketing and the power to regulate the contest between capital
and labor] is of course subject to the limitations of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Embracing as such a judgment does, however, a State's social and economic policies,
which in turn depend on knowledge and appraisal of local social and economic
factors, such judgment on these matters comes to this Court bearing a weighty
title of respect." Justice Frankfurter in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U. S.470, 474, 70 S.Ct. 773, 776, 94 L. ed. 995, lool (1950).
'1339 U. S. 460, 70 S.Ct. 718, 94 L. ed. 985 (1950).
nHughes v. Superior Court, 339 U. S.460, 465, 70 S. Ct. 718, 721, 94 L. ed. 985,
992 (195o).
2'For a discussion of the Hughes, Hanke and Gazzam cases and their effect on
the Thornhill doctrine, see Howard, The Unlawful Purpose Doctrine in Peaceful
Picketing and its Application in the California Cases (1951) 24 So. Calif. L. Rev. 145.
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Thus, it would seem that after ten intermittently stormy years the
problem of picketing and free speech has at last achieved a state of
some repose. Although it is impossible to trace an unbroken thread of
doctrinal consistency through all the cases from Thornhill to Hughes,
the Virginia court could readily observe the Supreme Court's slow but
inexorable withdrawal from its original position and, with every withdrawal, a contraction of the area in which picketing finds constitutional
24
protection.
Despite the corrosive effect of these decisions on the concept of
peaceful picketing as a form of free speech, the Virginia court found
that the Supreme Court had not departed from its holding that "a
statute so broadly drawn as to prohibit picketing for a lawful purpose, unaccompanied by the threat or the fact of force, and limited to
truthful publication of the facts of a dispute, is invalid." 25
The section of the Right-to-Work Act under which the defendants
were convicted clearly fell within this prohibition. By restricting the
right to picket to employees of the picketed business alone, the statute
attempted to do what the Supreme Court in the Swing case said could
not be done by injunction. Even if it assumed on the basis of the
Hughes decision that the purpose of the picketing was unlawful, the
Virginia court still could not sustain the disputed statute, for to do so
would be to determine that it was "a valid enactment and free from
all constitutional objections." 2 6
In view of the holdings in the Hanke and Hughes cases, it would
seem that the theatre management could have obtained an injunction
against the picketing by convincing the court that the purpose of the
24Since Thornhill v. Alabama, 31o U. S. 88, 60 S. Ct. 736, 84 L. ed. 1093 (1940),
the Supreme Court has decided that a state may prohibit picketing when it is so
enmeshed in a background of violence that it loses its identification with free
speech, Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U. S. 287, 61 S.
Ct. 552, 85 L. ed. 836 (1941); when it is carried on in support of a secondary boycott in violation of statute, Carpenters and Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U. S.
722, 62 S. Ct. 8o7, 86 L. ed. 1143 (1942); when the immediate purpose of the picket-

ing is to compel the violation of a specific state law, Giboney v. Empire Storage and
Ice Co., 336 U. S. 49 o , 69 S. Ct. 684, 93 L. ed. 834 (1949); or valid order of a state
administrative agency, Hotel & Restaurant Employees' International Alliance v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315 U. S. 437, 62 S. Ct. 706, 86 L. ed. 946 (1942);
or when its purpose is to achieve a result which the state might reasonably conclude
was opposed to the best interests of its people, Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U. S.
460, 70 S. Ct. 718, 94 L. ed. 985 (1950). Furthermore, to justify a restriction on
picketing a state now need only show that it acted upon a reasonable basis in the
circumstances of the case, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339
U. S. 470, 70 S. Ct. 773, 94 L. ed. 995 (1950).
nEdwards v. Commonwealth, 191 Va. 272, 284, 6o S. E. (2d) 916, 922 (1950).
26Edwards v. Commonwealth, 191 Va. 272, 285, 60 S. E. (2d) 916, 922 (1950).
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picketing was unlawful and, of course, by satisfying the requirements
for equitable relief. And if there was a reasonable basis for holding
the purpose to be unlawful, there could be no constitutional objection
to the issuance of the injunction. If the picketing was to compel the
employment of a new manager on the basis of his race alone, then its
purpose might be deemed unlawful as an effort to promote discriminatory hiring which, according to the Hughes case, might validly be enjoined by a state court. On the other hand, if the pickets could have
proved that their efforts were directed solely toward the elimination
of an existing policy of discrimination practiced against Negroes by the
theatre management, it would have been difficult to label such conduct
as unlawful.
The Supreme Court of Appeals would appear to be clearly correct
in holding unconstitutional such an all-inclusive restriction on picketing as the third section of the Right-to-Work Act. With the reappearance of the unlawful purpose doctrine, however, this decision may be
representative of all that remains of the identification of peaceful
picketing with the right of free speech.
WILLIS M. ANDERSON

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-PRooF OF PECUNIARY LOSS AS CONDITION TO
TAXPAYERS' SUIT To ANNUL TRANSACTION IN WHICH PUBLIC OFFICIAL HAS PERSONAL INTEREST. [Arizona]

Recognition of the possibilities of waste, squandering, and abuse
of public funds and property by public officers early led to the establishment at common law of the rule that a public official could not
have any direct or indirect personal interest in a contract made by the
governing body of which he was a member.' Enforcement of this rule,
however, was left primarily to designated officers, and the protection
of public rights was, of course, entirely thwarted when these officials
were the very ones guilty of the illegal acts. The apparent need for
additional remedies has been met in practically all states by statutory
"This law was based primarily upon the principles of agency, Smith v. City of
Albany, 61 N. Y. 444 (1875); and public policy, Trainer v. City of Covington, 183
Ga. 759, 189 S. E. 842 (1957); Montgomery v. Atlanta, 162 Ga. 534, 134 S. E. 152,
47 A. L. R. 233 (1926); Bay v. Davidson, 133 Iowa 688, 111 N. W. 25, 9 L. R. A. (N.S.)
1014 (1907). See also City of Concordia v. Hagaman, i Kan. App. 35, 41 Pac. 13
(1895); 2 Dillon, Municipal Corporations (5 th ed. 1911) 1140-1142. For a good discussion of the philosophy behind the taxpayer's action, see opinion of Chief Justice
Winslow in State v. Frear, 148 Wis. 456, 134 N. W. 673 (1912).
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provisions granting the taxpayers some means of redress against such
illegal employment of public funds and property. 2 Constantly arising
in connection with litigation brought under these statutes is the question of what qualifications a person must possess in order to maintain a taxpayer's action to test the legality of a contested contract.
The mere fact that illegal, unlawful, or unauthorized acts have been
or are about to be committed is not, by the weight of authority, sufficient to give a taxpayer capacity to sue.3 Generally, it is held that "in
order to maintain such a proceeding, the taxpayer and taxpayers as
a class must have sustained or will sustain some pecuniary loss." 4 An
illustration of the consequences of the application of this rule is found
in the recent case of Henderson v. McCormick,5 where the taxpayerplaintiffs brought an action against W. J. Henderson and Taylor Henderson, and members of the Town Council, under a statute prohibiting
a town officer from having an interest in a public contract. The complaint alleged that while the defendant Taylor Henderson was a
member of the Town Council, his nephew, W. J. Henderson, purchased
a truck from the city for the use and benefit of himself and councilman
Taylor Henderson, who were co-partners in business. In accordance
with prescribed procedure, the Council had directed the Town Clerk
to sell the truck and to call for bids on it. The highest of the three
bids received being that of defendant W. J. Henderson for $225, the
truck was sold to him. Evidence showed that the truck was not worth
more than $175 and that the sale was financially advantageous to the
town and its taxpaying inhabitants. Plaintiffs, as property owners and
taxpayers, brought suit to nullify the transaction, and the trial court
held the sale to be void and ordered the truck restored to the Town.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona unanimously reversed the
2

Ariz. Code Ann. (Bobbs-Merrill, 1939) § 12-40, furnishes a typical example:
"Officers not to be interested in public contracts. Members of the legislature, state,
county, city and precinct officers shall not be interested directly or indirectly in any

contract or in any sale or purchase made by them in their official capacity, or by any
body or board of which they are members. Every contract, sale or by any body or
board of which they are members. Every contract, sale or purchase made in violation hereof, may be avoided at the instance of any party except the officer interested."
Among the other states having the same or similar statutes are Alabama, Cali-

fornia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Montana, and
Virginia.
3See 52 Am. Jur., Taxpayers' Actions § 21, and cases cited, notes 4 to io infra.
'McClutchey v. Malwaukee County, 239 Wis. 139, 3oo N. W. 224, 917, 137 A. L.

R. 628, 629 (1941).
'70 Ariz. 19, 215 P. (2d) 6o8 (1950).
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judgment and dismissed the complaint, declaring that "The suit was
improvidently brought by plaintiffs." 6
The court did not dispute the jury's determination that the transaction came within the purview of legislation prohibiting a public
officer from having any interest in such contracts. Noting the declaration of the statute that "Every contract, sale or purchase made in violation hereof, may be avoided at the instance of any party except the
officer interested," 7 the court ruled that the determinative issue of the
appeal was whether a taxpayer's action would lie under the facts as presented. Two obvious alternative interpretation of the phrase "any
party" as meaning broadly "any person" or narrowly "any party to the
contract" were both rejected in favor of an intermediate construction.
The court said:
"In conformity with sound reason and the decisions of many
courts we do hold that the words should be construed to include a taxpayer of the town whose right to maintain the action
depends upon his ability to show some pecuniary loss to the taxpayers as a class ....the Town... having received all that the

truck was worth, the only right to be vindicated by its return to
the municipality was the securing of a determination that the
sale was within the prohibition ....We are convinced that
such a determination cannot be accomplished by a taxpayer's
suit in the absence of proof of pecuniary loss to the taxpayers." 8
Strong support for the decision was drawn from a New York case, 9 in
which it was declared:
"Mere illegality is not enough. The very nature and purpose
of a taxpayer's action.., presume that there will be more than
illegality in order to enable him to intervene. The basic theory
of such an action is that the illegal action is in some way in07o Ariz. 19, 216 P. (2d) 6o8, 61j (1950).
7o Ariz. 19, 215 P. (2d) 6o8, 61o (1950).
87o Ariz. 19, 215 P. (2d) 6o8, 6io (1950). Though the principal case speaks solely

of "pecuniary loss," other authorities have used varying terminology to connote
this same requirement, such as: "special damage," Ruark v. International Union of
Operating Engineers, 157 Md. 576, 146 At. 797 (1929); "injury," Smart v. Graham,
179 Md. 476, 20oAt. (2d) 574 (1941); "waste," Tillamook Peoples' Utility Dist. v.
Coates, 174 Ore. 476, 149 P. (2d) 558 (1944); "burden," Miller v. Huntington and
Ohio Bridge Co., 123 W. Va. 320, 15 S. E. (2d) 687 (1941); "financial injury," Jaeger

v. City of Hillsboro, 164 Kan. 533, i9o P. (2d) 420 (1948); "peculiar injury," Turner
v. King, 117 Md. 403, 83 At. 649 (1912); "injuriously affect," Blanton v. Merry, 116
Ga. 288, 42 S. E. 211 (1902); "substantial interest in the subject-matter," Zoercher
v. Alger, 20o2 Ind. 214, 172 N. E. 186, 7o A. L. R. 1232 (1930); and "special interest

in the subject matter," Mayor, etc. v. Keyser, 72 Md. io8, 19 At. 7o6 (189o).
ONVestern New York Water Co. v. City of Buffalo, 242 N. Y. 202, 151 N. E. 207
(1926).
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jurious to municipal and public interests, and that, if permitted
to continue, it will in some manner result in increased burdens
upon, and dangers and disadvantages to the municipality and
to the interests represented by it and so to those who are taxpayers. It was not the intention of the statute that a taxpayer
shall be allowed to intervene and bring to the decision of the
courts every act of a municipal officer which may be claimed to
be illegal....-10
In jurisdictions which adhere to the general rule, it would seem
that a careful scrutinization of the facts and circumstances of each particular case would be necessary to ascertain whether the requisite
pecuniary loss has been suffered. Yet, in most of the decisions sustaining the taxpayers' proceedings, the courts do not expound in any
length upon what the nature or extent of such loss must be, but merely
state that the plaintiffs are subject to financial burden, and then proceed to the merits of the case. However, the Maryland court has
pointed out one source of loss in observing that "The special damage
which the taxpayer.., sustains in a public wrong is the prospective
pecuniary loss incident to the increase in the amount of taxes he will
be constrained to pay by reason of the illegal or ultra vires act ... "11
Some further indications as to the meaning of the term "pecuniary
loss" or "special damage" in this respect may be obtained through an
examination of circumstances under which taxpayers' suits have been
sustained or denied.
The requisite was met and the right of action recognized where
taxpayers sought to set aside an allegedly illegal purchase of a highway toll bridge on the basis that the maintenance and operation of the
bridge would impose a burden on the public; 12 where taxpayers sought
to have declared illegal an assessment made pursuant to an unlawful
construction contract with a company in which a councilman was a
large stockholder; 13 where it was asserted that the object of an
ordinance was to tax property and people of the city for the benefit
of a railroad; 14 where the terms of a building lease entered into be10242 N. Y. 202, 206, 151 N. E. 207, 208 (1926). The court here assumed illegality
in the city's action of selling water to a corporation which transported it outside the

city, but then dismissed the complaint on finding no possible waste or injury to
any property or funds of the municipality or the taxpayer.
1

'Ruark v. International Union of Operating Engineers, 157 Md. 576, 146 Ad.

797, 802 (1929).
21Miller v. Huntington and Ohio Bridge Co.,

123

W. Va.

320,

15 S. E. (2d) 687

('94')"Montgomery v. City of Atlanta, 162 Ga. 534, 134 S. E. 152, 47 A. L. R. 233
(1926).

1

'New Orleans, Mobile & Chattanooga R. Co. v. Dunn, 51 Ala. 128 (1874).
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tween the city and a brother of a selectman were intentionally made
extremely detailed in order to eliminate true competitive bidding;' 5
and where a county clerk was about to refer an ordinance to the
voters and the mailing and printing cost entailed would materially
increase taxes. 16 In general, it seems that the courts will recognize
pecunairy loss where the taxpayer's purse has been or will be affected
by an assessment, an increased tax levy, a bond issue, or the creation of
a debt which must be paid out of public funds.
On the other hand, no pecuniary loss was found where a city's
money was paid to a company, whose manager was also, mayor, for
gasoline supplies which were consumed by municipal agencies in the
operation of city business; 17 where city officials accepted a proposition
to lease part of a public park for horse racing because the use of the
park for this purpose was not foreign to the object for which it was
purchased, inasmuch as it would give recreation and pleasure to many
people, and the city derived a benefit from the lease;' 8 where a salary
was paid to an illegally appointed employee who adequately and
efficiently performed services;' 9 where an ordinance was passed for the
city to operate a liquor dispensary, all the expenses and debts to be
paid out of the profits and no town funds to be appropriated; 20 and
where a public officer made an ultra vires contract for the purchase of
water supply equipment and had actually borrowed money in pursuance thereof, there being no allegations that current funds would
be used to repay the debt or that a tax levy had been made or threatened
as a result of the transaction. 2 '
"Tuscan v. Smith, 13o Me. 36, 153 Ad. 289, 73 A. L. R. 1344 (1931).
"Tillamock Peoples' Utility Dist. v. Coates, 174 Ore. 376, 149 P. (2d) 558 (1944).
17Grady v. City of Livingston, 115 Mont. 47, 141 P. (2d) 346 (1943). In spite of the
typical prohibitive "officers interest in contracts" statute, the Montana court declared: "A contract may be obviously void, but if the parties thereto elect to
proceed thereunder they may do so if no other parties are injured. If the city...
chose to accept the goods it would be absurd to contend that ...
any party ...
could be compelled to bring an action to have the contracts declared void." 141 P.
(2d) 346, 350 (1943)"Bryant v. Logan, 56 W. Va. 141, 49 S. E. 21 (1904).
"McClutchey v. Milwaukee County, 239 Wis. 139, 300 N. W. 224, 137 A. L. R.
628 (1941).

"Blanton v. Merry,

116 Ga. 288, 42 S. E. 211 (1902).
"McCloy v. Christian, 2o6 Ga. 644, 58 S. E. (2d) 171 (1950). The court stated that
a complaint based upon mere speculation and apprehension was not enough.
In order to cover adequately the requirements necessary for the maintenance of
a taxpayer's action, two other rules which are respected by most courts should be
noted: (1)A taxpayer's suit will not lie to control or interfere with the discretion
of a municipal board or officer unless there is fraud or gross abuse of discretion,
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Considerations of public policy rather than technical legal principles appear to be the basis of support for the majority rule as announced in the Henderson case. 2 2 The Arizona court discloses this
to be its true concern in saying that "to uphold the judgment of the
lower court would encourage disgruntled citizens to resort to the
courts in the guise of taxpayers' suits, thereby, in effect, taking over
and throttling the administration of municipal affairs." 23 The West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has summed up the policy considerations succinctly:
"....

it is of high import that the action of constituted authori-

ty of government should not be hampered and delayed by assailment by any and every individual from disappointment, whim,
or caprice. The door would be open wide to multitudinous suits,

filling the courts with litigation. They would arise constantly
to carry out the individual idea of each person on good and bad

grounds. Public policy argues against this. Though bad action
of the city authorities would loudly call for redress, better that
some instances of it go without redress, and that such redress be
'24
left to the public officials."
It

must be conceded that there is some reason behind such conten-

tions for restriction of the taxpayer's action; nevertheless, it is extremely
hard to accept a "policy" rule which declares that officials should not
be "delayed and hampered" or be subject to redress when they are act-

ing unlawfully. Since the remedy of prosecution by constituted lawenforcement agencies, advocated by some courts as sufficient, 25 often
Christie v. Port of Olympia, 27 Wash. (2d) 534, 179 P. (2d) 294 (1947); 52 Am. Jur.,
Taxpayers' Actions § 19. (2) In the absence of a controlling statute, the taxpayer
as a condition precedent must request proper authorities to bring an action, See
Mississippi Road Supply Co. v. Hester, 185 Miss. 839, 188 So. 281, 124 A. L. R. 574
(1939); 52 Am. Jur., Taxpayers' Actions § 26; or show that such a demand would have
been useless, Darnell v. City of Broken Bow, 139 Neb. 844, 299 N. W. 274, 136 A.
L. R. 1o (1941); Northern Trust Co. v. Snyder, 113 Wis. 5t6, 89 N. W. 460, 90 Am.
St. Rep. 867 (1902).
2In
the comparatively older case of Brill v. Miller, 14o App. Div. 602, 6o8, 125
N. Y. Supp. 865, 869 (191o), Justice Laughlin in a strong dissenting opinion stated in
effect that such a rule was necessary to prevent the administration of government
from being taken over by the courts at the instance of the taxpayers and to protect
public officials from undue interference.
23Henderson v. McCormick, 70 Ariz. 19, 215 P. (2d) 6o8, 611 (195o).
"'Bryant v. Logan, 56 W. Va. 141, 49 S. E. 21, 22, 3 Ann. Cas. 1011, 1012 (1904).
2In
Milwaukee Horse & Cow Commission Co. v. Hill, 207 Wis. 420, 241 N. W.
364, 366 (1932), the Wisconsin court, which is among the leading proponents of the
general rule, compared the taxpayer's action to those brought by a person to abate
a nuisance, to challenge the constitutionality of a law and to challenge the validity

of a franchise; and McClutchey v. Milwaukee County, 239 Wis. 139, 3oo N. W. 224,

137 A. L. R. 628 (1941), held that if a mere public right is to be vindicated or evasion
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proves illusory, a taxpayer's action may be the only means by which
26
illegal proceedings may be thwarted.
A limited number of courts, perhaps best represented by California,
have disputed the position taken by the principal case, and have given
a literal construction and application of the statutes authorizing taxpayers' suits. In Hobbs, Wall &' Co. v. Moran,21 where one of the councilmen was merely the business manager of a company from which the
city purchased supplies, the court allowed the action to be contested
without a showing of pecuniary loss to the public, declaring that
"It is not necessary to show actual fraud, dishonesty, or loss to invalidate the transaction. The purpose of the statute is to remove all indirect influence of an interested officer as well as to discourage deliberate dishonesty."28 Further support is given the minority view by
the Georgia court in Trainer v. City of Covington,29 which held invalid a contract of sale of a truck to the city by its mayor. Although
the contract was fair and free from fraud and based on the lowest and
most advantageous bid, the court stated that even though there was no
statute or charter prohibiting such contracts, they were nevertheless
prohibited by public policy.
It has been forcefully pointed out that decisions following the majority rule are in direct violation of an established public policy as
formulated by prohibitions of the legislature and well-considered court
decisions; that the prohibitions of the legislature cannot be disregarded by the courts; that to permit an official to contract with the
body of which he was a member is to throw the door wide open to
of the law prevented by injunction, the action should be brought by the officer
or body expressly charged with the duty of enforcing the law.
- Some courts would further limit the taxpayer's action by making a distinction
between preventive and remedial relief, Tuscan v. Smith, i8o Me. 36, 153 Ad. 289,
73 A. L. R. 1344 (1931); City of Concordia v. Hagaman, 1 Kan. App. 35, 41 Pac.
13 (1895). However, in Cawker v. City of Milwaukee, 13 Wis. 35, 113 N. W. 417, 418
(19o7), the court said: "The power to successfully maintain such an action has never
been limited to cases where the work has not yet been done ....
The right does not
depend upon the speed with which the law is broken." To make such a restriction
without qualification would render it practically impossible to prevent the despoiling of the public treasury or property. See also dissenting opinion in Grady v.
City of Livingston, 115 Mont. 47, 141 P. (2d) 346, 355 (1943).
27,o9 Cal. App. 316, 293 Pac. 145 (1930).
2sio9 Cal. App. 316, 293 Pac. 145, 147 (1930). In another California case, Miller
v. City of Martinez, 28 Cal. App. (2d) 364, 82 P. (2d) 519 (1938). A taxpayer brought
an action to recover money paid to a company for products purchased while the
company's manager was also the mayor. Even though the city had received the
benefits of the merchandise and had not suffered financially by reason of the
contracts, the court declared the contracts void and allowed recovery.
'0 183 Ga. 759, 189 S.E. 842 (1937).
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fraud and corruption; and that contracts made in violation of
statutes expressly forbidding the same contravene public policy and
are absolutely void and of no legal effect. 30
As the whole issue seems to revolve around principles of public
policy, no rule should be adopted until there has been a careful weighing and balancing of all pertinent factors and considerations. Thus,
it may be said that the majority rule does result in less litigation, less
work for the courts, and in protection for public officials against the
harassment of having to justify legally their every official act. However,
most of the majority courts do not question the propriety of the law,
either common or statutory, rendering it illegal for officers to be
interested in public contracts; yet these same courts have greatly reduced the effect of this salutary doctrine by judicially construing or
legislating "pecuniary loss" into the rule as a requisite for its enforceability by the taxpayer. A condition which makes possible wilful
violations and disobedience of the law, such as is created by the rule
of the Henderson case, is undesirable. The sounder position is that
when power is vested in public authorities there should go with it an
implied right in the taxpayer to use every useful process of law to see
that the power conferred is lawfully employed. Even though, as in the
Henderson case, it cannot be shown that the illegal transaction caused
any monetary loss to the public, more is at stake than merely the specific result of the acts in controversy. The principle involved is "the
self-evident truth, as trite and impregnable as the law of gravitation,
that no person can, at one and the same time, faithfully serve two
masters representing diverse or inconsistent interests with respect to the
services to be performed ....[And] the policy of the law [is] that a
public officer in the discharge of his duties as such should be absolutely
free from any influence other than that which may directly grow out of
the obligations that he owes to the public at large." 3'
HARRY G. CAMPER, JR.
PROPERTY-EFFECT

OF LACK OF NOTICE OF SEVERANCE

OF MINERAL

ESTATE ON ADVERSE POSSESSION CLAIM OF SURFACE HOLDER.

[Federal]

The branch of the law of adverse possession' dealing with estates
in minerals becomes of increasing importance as the greatly expanded
"See Grady v. City of Livingston, 115 Mont. 47, 141 P. (2d) 346, 355 (1943) (dissenting
3 1 opinion).
Stockton Plumbing & Supply Co. v. Wheeler, 68 Cal. App. 592, 6oi, 229 Pac.
1020, 1024 (1924).

'Acquisition of title by adverse possession is, of course, the result of statutes
limiting actions for the recovery of land, rather than the purpose thereof, and the
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modern demands for coal, gas, and other minerals are reflected by
prices making the exploitation of such minerals, even by individual
landowners, economically feasible. It is not unlikely that the next
few years will see an increased number of suits involving title to minerals in those sections where minerals occur in usable quantities. In
that event, the long-standing question as to what constitutes adverse
possession will recur frequently, perhaps imposing upon the courts
the necessity for re-examination of the laws as developed chiefly for the
quieting of surface titles, and for adaptation of that law to meet the
2
somewhat different circumstances involved in mineral estates.
In accord with the rules governing adverse possession generally,3
for the acquisition of title to a mineral estate it is required that the
possession be "actual," so as to prevail over the absentee owner's constructive possession in law and entitle him to an action for the land's
recovery; "continuous" and "uninterrupted," so that the owner's constructive possession not revest in him nor the running of the statute
of limitations be stopped; 4 "adverse," "exclusive," and "under claim
"law of adverse possession" is really but the converse side of the law of limitations
of actions for the recovery of land. The basic policy underlying such statutes is
exemplified by Stat. 21 Jac. I, c. 16 (1623), the opening phrase of which asserts the
purpose "For quieting of men's estates, and avoiding of suits...."
2
Analysis of the purely physical situation of a separate mineral estate, as underlying rather than surface, and having a vertical as well as horizontal joinder with
the surrounding estates, suggests the probability that courts must take into account,
in determining the existence of possession, possessory acts different from those
encountered with surface estates. A mineral vein is not fenced, farmed, grazed, nor
built on in the ordinary manner. The greater necessity of color of title to an adversely held mineral interest is evident; so is the fact that the true owner of a mineral estate is almost always out of any truly actual possession or occupancy. In addition to these differences the doctrine of severance, subsequently discussed in this
comment, is frequently encountered in the adjudication of adverse claims to
mineral estates.
3
These rules have been developed by the courts in the interpretation of the
statutes, and are rarely mentioned in the statutes themselves. For more elaborate
discussions of the general law relating to adverse possession see i Am. Jur., Adverse
Possession, especially §§ 126-184; 4 Tiffany, Real Property (3d ed. 1939) § 1132 et seq.
"'Tacking"-the adding of periods of adverse possession by different possessors
to meet the statutory time requirements- by successive holders with privity of
estate existing between them is universally permitted. For examples of conflicting
views as to the necessity of privity, dependent upon whether the policy of the
statutes are to be construed to reward the adverse possessor, or to punish the owner
out of possession for his laches, see Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession (1918)
32 Harv. L. Rev. 135, who states the real object of such a statute to be "not... to
reward the diligent trespasser for his wrong nor yet to penalize the negligent and
dormant owner for sleeping upon his rights; the great purpose is automatically to
quiet all titles which are openly and consistently asserted, to provide proof of
meritorious titles, and correct errors in conveyancing."

256

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. VIII

or color of title," 5 so as to manifest an intention and dominion inconsistent with a holding in subjection to the owner; "open and notorious," both as indicating the adverse nature of the holding and in
order that the owner may be apprized of the invasion of his interests
so as to bring action for the recovery of possession; 6 and "continuing,"
of course, for the time established by the statute limiting actions for
the recovery of land. It is apparent, however, that those customary acts
of dominion whereby a surface tract is reduced to possession would be
impractical, impossible, or insufficient with regard to a mineral estate.
Different actions must be taken into account. It is not surprising, in
view of the courts' latitude in determining what weights are to be
ganted those acts operative to create adverse title, to find that in
states where the extraction of minerals comprises an important part
of the total industry the courts evidence a greater hostility toward the
adverse possession of minerals than is likely to exist in states having
7
small mineral resources.
Perhaps the chief distinctive consideration involved in cases dealing with title to minerals is that of the effect of severance of an underGFor effect and examples of color of title see I Am Jur., Adverse Possession §§
185-209; 4 Tiffany, Real Property (3d ed. 1939) § 1155.
"Statements are common to the effect that possession is or is not adverse because it did or did not "give notice to the owner ... that his rights were being invaded or subject the possessor to suit at his hands, which is the crucial test of adverse possession." United Fuel Gas Co. v. Dyer, 185 F. (2d) 99, 1o3 (C. A. 4th, 1950).
'Thus the Court of Appeals of Kentucky has said that an adverse holder's
possession on the surface may be extended by construction through color of
title, "...but, when he gets below the surface and attempts to take possession of
minerals, he can have no immediately potential use or occupation of the whole
of the minerals over which the law can by construction extend his actual possession;
therefore, he can have no posession of the unmined portion. Their [the adverse
possessors'] possession was never in advance of their operations, unless they surrounded a block; then they had possesion of that block, but no more. They got
no more than they loosened or around which they had established a confine." Piney
Oil & Gas Co. v. Scott, 258 Ky. 51, 79 S. W. (2d) 394, 400 (1934). Such a view would
appear unduly strict, if the propriety of title by adverse possession be admitted at
all, and would seem practically to nullify the doctrine of adverse possession as far
as minerals are concerned. A better view, applicable to surface and minerals alike,
and more in harmony with the general precepts of adverse possession, appears in
the statement that "Much must depend upon the uses to which the land may be
put. To be adverse the possession is not required to be more full than the character
of the land admits. What acts constitute adverse possession are necessarily varied, depending upon the nature, locality, and use to which the property may be applied."
Davis v. Haines, 349 Ill. 622, 182 N. E. 718, 720 (1932). For sufficiency of acts to
constitute adverse possession of minerals generally, see Hooper v. Bankhead, 171
Ala. 626, 54 So. 549 (1911); Campbell v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co., 15o Tenn.
423, 265 S. W. 674 (1924); Central Trust Co. v. Harless, 1o8 W. Va. 618, 152 S. E.
209 (1930); Thomas v. Young, 93 W. Va. 555, 117 S. E. 909 (1923).
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lying mineral estate from the rest of the land. 8 Prior to severance, in
accord with the historical concept of land ownership as extending
indefinitely above and below the surface, cujus est solum ejus est usque
ad coelum et ad inferos, and in recognition of the impossibility of
actual possession of all that inverted pyramid 9 of land of which ownership may be claimed, adverse possession of the surface is deemed to
extend, as does lawful ownership, to all land and minerals underneath
the surface.10 Severance, however, is held to create entirely separate
and distinct estates analogous to those existing in horizontally adjoining parcels after the alienation by a landowner of only a part of his
land," and after such severance of a mineral estate, courts universally
agree in holding adverse possession on the surface not to extend to the
severed mineral estate, at least in the absence of separate hostile, actual,
2
etc., action taken with respect to such minerals.
6Severance may be accomplished by direct deed of the minerals, or by exception or reservation of them. It has been held accomplished by mining underneath
an adjoining tract by the owner of the minerals underlying both tracts, so as to
defeat a claim to the minerals by the adverse possession of the surface. Delaware
& Hudson Canal Co. v. Hughes, 183 Pa. St. 66, 38 At. 568 (1897).
"This term is intended to be illustrative only; it will not be argued that this is
the true geometric shape of the land owned.
'-Virginia Coal & Iron Co. v. Hylton, 115 Va. 418, 79 S. E. 337 (1913). For cases
the comment on the adverse possession of coal both before and after severance, see
notes (1934) 93 A. L. R . 1232; (193o) 67 A. L. R. 144o; (1921) 13 A. L. R. 372.
uSee Tiffany, Real Property (3d ed. 1939) § 1158, and cases cited therein. Courts
sometimes make the analogy to surface estates complete by taking a cross-sectional
view so that the land and mineral estates appear in alternate strips, and apply
the rules of law developed for the determination of conflicting interests in horizontally adjoining parcels to determine conflicting interests in vertically adjoining
parcels. See Pyramid Coal Corp. v. Pratt, 92 N. E. (2d) 858 (Ind. 1950), criticized in
this law review, page... That such a view may not be taken in every case is indicated by the fact that interests such as easements necessary for the full enjoyment
of surface or minerals may need to be more freely granted where surface and underlying estate are severed, and by the fact that though in the absence of severance
possession of the surface tract extends to the minerals, it does not so extend to
adjoining parcels on the surface.
fhe seeming inconsistency resulting fron the fact that the very same acts
which before severance constitute adverse possession do not constitute such possession after severance vanishes when due consideration is given another requisite for
the acquisition of adverse title additional to action by the adverse possessor, that
being the failure of the owner of the estate to assert the cause of action which has
arisen for the recovery of the land. Court, manifesting a not unreasonable sympathy
with the owner, have required that the acts of possession be such as would be
brought home to a diligent landowner so that some laches may be imputed to him
in the failure to oust such possessor. Thus the possession of the surface by another,
without more, would not apprise a mineral owner not owning the surface of an
adverse holding, whereas the owner of both the general and the mineral estate might
justifiably be taken to be placed on notice of adverse claim to the entire estate by
the possession of the surface.
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In the recent case of United Fuel Gas Company v. Dyer 3 an exception was sought to be engrafted upon the general rule regarding
severance which would have been a departure not only from that
generally more restrictive view taken with regard to adverse possession
of minerals, but also from the rules of notice applicable to adverse
possession generally. In about 1870, one Neece had taken possession
of the tract in controversy, through an oral sale to him by Hinkle, the
holder under an admittedly invalid junior patent from the Commonwealth of Virginia. In 1874, however, his wrongful possession under
such claim of title was interrupted by an ejectment judgment and writ
of entry obtained by the then holders under the superior senior patent,
the effect of which judgment and writ was to bar any further claim
under the previous adverse possession by either Neece or Hinkle, his
vendor, because of the privity of estate existing between them.14 In
1879, no entry having been made under the writ, and Neece still remaining in possession, the holders under the senior patent executed a
"severance" deed to him-i.e., a deed conveying the surface but excepting the minerals, so as to create separate estates. 15 The following year
plaintiffs' predecessor, Dyer, took a deed of the tract, without reservation or exception of the minerals, from Neece's predecessor, Hinkle,
and shortly thereafter, through a collateral agreement with Neece, Dyer
was allowed possession of the tract. 16 He had no knowledge of the
severance deed previously executed when he went into possession.
Plaintiffs, holders and lessees under Dyer, sought a declaratory
judgment as to their title to the minerals and cancellation of the severance deed to Neece as a cloud on title, in spite of the fact that no
sufficient separate acts of adverse possession had been taken with regard
to the minerals to vest title to them if the severance were to be considered effective as to Dyer and plaintiffs holding under him.
1385 F. (2d) 99 (C. A. 4th, 195o).
"Thus, at this point the entire adverse claim of title was cut off, making it
necessary for Neece or Hinkle, if either would assert an adverse possession, to
start the period once again.
"'Though the rule is that severance through a deed to another by the absentee
owner during the adverse possession of the general estate is ineffective against the
adverse possessor in the absence of an actual entry under the severance deed, Rio
Bravo Oil Co. v. Staley Oil Co., 138 Tex. 198, 158 S. W. (2d) 295 (1942), the lower
court found, and the Court of Appeals approved its finding, that Hinkle's color
of title under the junior patent was rendered invalid by the ejectment judgment,
and that Neece's adverse possession after such judgment was in his own right,
which possession's adverse nature was changed by the severance deed to him. Dyer
v. United Fuel Gas Co., 90 F. Supp. 859, 865 (S. D. W. Va. ig5o).
"Thus, Dyer at this point had lawful possession of the surface as grantee
under the senior patent. He claimed the general estate, however, including the
minerals, under the invalidated junior patent.
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One of the theories asserted by plaintiffs was that since Dyer was
without notice of the severance deed it was ineffective as to him and
those holding under him, and that therefore their possession of the
surface extended to the minerals. The lower court sustained this argument, stating that the fact that the severance deed may have been
made before possession began made no difference, and that although
such deed may have been perfectly valid as between the grantor and
the grantee and those claiming under them, "as against one holding
possession adversely under color of a hostile title, if the severance deed
is to prevent his actual possession of the surface from extending to
the minerals, notice thereof must in some way be brought home to
7
him."1
Such a view is startling, amounting to a rule that in the absence
of notice of severance to the adverse possessor mere possession of the
surface, beginning after such severance, constitutes an adverse holding of the minerals, and being an absolute inversion of the general
rule requiring the adverse possessor, rather than the true owner, to
give notice or do acts imputing such notice to the owner. But the lower
court's decision was reversed upon appeal to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and Judge Parker stated the general
rule in writing the court's opinion when he said that "a deed effecting
a severance is not binding upon a subsequent grantee without notice
unless it is recorded; but there is nothing in this that requires notice
to an adverse possessor not claiming under the same chain. Such adverse possessor is manifestly not entitled to any notice with respect
to the estate of the true owner which he is invading. On the contrary,
it is he who must give notice by exercising possession of such character
as will apprise the true owner that the right of the latter is being challenged."' 18 Thus, if 'there has been a valid prior severance the adverse
possessor's possession of the surface will be ineffective against the
severed mineral estate, whatever may have been his belief as to the
extent of his possession, unless, indeed, the possessor has gone further
and done those overt and unequivocal adverse acts with reference to
the mineral estate which impute notice to the mineral owner and start
the running of the limitation period.
It may be wondered how the view overruled could ever have arisen,
"'Dyer v. United Fuel Gas Co., 9o F. Supp. 859, 866 (S. D. W. Va. 1950). The
court pointed out, in addition, the fact that Dyer, claiming in a different chain of
title from Neece, had no constructive notice of the severance.
1sUnited Fuel Gas Co. v. Dyer, 185 F. (2d) 99, lo2 (C. A. 4th, 1950).
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considering the strongly established contrary doctrine. The error appears to have had its origin in a misconception of the subsequent purchaser doctrine embraced in the recording statute, and an extension of
the protection therein granted to persons not contemplated within the

statute. In 1918, in Midkiff v. Colton,19 a basis for equity's jurisdiction
to re-establish a lost or destroyed and unrecorded severance deed reserving the minerals to the grantor was found in the possibility that the
conveyee in such deed might, by a later conveyance to a purchaser for
value without notice of the severance, cut off the reserved title to the
minerals. 20 And in 1926, in Gill i. Colton,2 1 in an opinion written by
Judge Parker himself, upon which the district judge in the Dyer case
placed much reliance, the contention of plaintiffs that there had been
a severance in that case, so as to prevent adverse possession of the
surface from extending to the minerals, was denied " () because there
was no acceptance of the deed relied upon to create the severance... ;
(2) because Holton had contracted for the purchase of the land prior
to the attempted delivery to the Gills; and (3) because Holton had no
notice of the deed, which was unrecorded, or of the attempted reser

vation of the mineral interests therein."22 Judge Parker further stated
that "even if there had been an acceptance of the deed by the Gills and
"252 Fed. 420 (C. C. A.

4 th,

1918).

'It is submitted that no such possibility actually existed, since the mineral
estate purportedly conveyed by the grantee to his purchaser certainly was not derived from the original grantor, who had expressly reserved the mineral estate.
Such new claim of title to the minerals must be taken as in a separate adverse
chain. See last paragraph in this comment. That a grantor reserving either a vendor's lien or the mineral underlying the tract conveyed cannot be deprived thereof
in favor of his purchaser's grantees by failure of the purchaser to disclose his
rights or to record has been established. Carter v. Thompson, 167 Ark. 272, 267 S. W.
790, 38 A. L. R. o53 (1925); Chapman v. Kendall, 145 Oklo. 107, 291 Pac. 97 (1929).
See 55 Am. Jur., Vendor & Purchaser § 7o8 and cases cited therein in spport of
the general rule that a purchaser is charged with notice of what appears in the deed
or muniments in his grantor's chain of title regardless of lack of recordation or
actual notice.
2112 F. (2d) 531 (C. C. A. 4th, 1926). It may be noted that the same tract in
cluded in the senior patent to Smith and the same holders under Smith were involved in the Midkiff, Gill and Dyer cases. A diagram of the fact situation in the
Gill case shows lines almost identical to those of the Dyer case, the significant difference being that in the Gill case the severance deed executed to the former
claimant under the inferior chain was not accepted by him, and that the immediate
claimant's predecessor, Holton, had been in possession claiming title to the whole
by previous contract with the Gills before even any attempt was made to effect the
severance. Either of these two factors alone would have rendered the attempted
severance ineffective, so that Holton's lack of notice of the deed was unnecessary
to the decision reached.
212
F. (2d) 531, 533 (C. C. A. 4 th, 1926) [italics supplied].
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no conveyance or contract to convey to Holton until afterwards, still,
as there is no evidence that he had knowledge of the deed or of the
reservation contained therein or the estoppels created thereby, and
as it was not recorded, he could not be affected by it. It was not within
the chain of title under which he claimed, and consequently he was
not chargeable with notice of its provisions .... And in West Virginia

it is well settled that an unrecorded deed is void as to a subsequent
23
purchaser for value and without notice."
Thus, for some time the idea of requiring notice to an adverse possessor, at least in supporting decisions determined in part by other
factors, had been in evidence within the jurisdiction, so as to mislead
the lower court in its decision. That the Court of Appeals corrected
a trend toward a departure from the proper rules governing adverse
possession of minerals appears evident. The general view taken under
most recording systems is that the subsequent purchaser intended to
be protected by the recording acts is only that purchaser of the same
interest or title previously conveyed to another by a grantor common
to both prior and subsequent grantees-i.e., a subsequent purchaser
without actual notice who on searching his record chain of title finds
no conveyance of the same interest from his grantor or any of his
predecessors recorded prior to the conveyance by such grantor or
predecessor to the grantee under whom he (subsequent purchaser)
claims. 24 the subsequent purchaser contemplated is not that one who,
even though innocent and paying value, purchases some other interest
or claim not derived from a common grantor.25 It is apparent that
212 F. (2d) 531, 534 (C. C. A. 4th, 1926). While it appears true that the mere
acceptance of a severance deed by the Gills during the adverse possession by Holton in his own right would not have accomplished a severance effective against
Holton, at least in the absence of entry by the Gills so as to interrupt his possession,
if his entry under the conveyance or contract had occurred after the severance by
deed to the Gills no basis appears for holding his possession to extend to the
minerals. The fact situation in such case would be the same as that if the Midkiff
case. See note 2o and text for which it is cited.
2
,This reasoning is applicable where the ordinary grantor-grantee recording
system is in effect. That the rule may be otherwise where recordation is by reference
to the tract rather than to grantors and grantees in the chain of title, see Philbrick,
Limits of Record Search and Therefore of Notice (1944) 93 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 125,
165; 5 Tiffany, Real Property (3 d ed. 1939) § 1265.
-"... the recording acts do not affect the fact that a man who has no title can
convey none, and that no would-be purchaser can be a purchaser merely because he
gives value, whatever his innocence. Those statutes presupposes a title holder who
gives title to a first grantee, but who, though left without title, retains a power to
divest his first grantee and give title to a second under the conditions imposed by the
statutes." Philbrick, Limits of Record Search and Therefore of Notice (1944) 93
U. of Pa. L. Rev. 125, 169.
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within this view a possessor of the surface whose possession begins after
severance, and whose claim or color of title to the minerals is derived
from some source entirely foreign to the valid record title, cannot be
a purchaser within the protection of the recording acts; this being so,
the usual rule applies that one claiming adversely to the true owner
must, if his possession is to ripen into title, do those overt acts in the
exercise of dominion which are taken to impart notice to an absentee
owner. The decision of the Court of Appeals in the Dyer case is in accord with the general view; it may only be regretted that the court
did not at this point unequivocally overrule or limit the erroneous
26
or ambiguous language in the Gill case.
FRANK E. BEVERLY

PROPERTY-REMEDIES

OF

OWNER AGAINST

ENCROACHMENT

BY TREES

FROM ADJOINING PROPERTY. [District of Columbia]

It has long been generally stated' that overhanging tree branches
and penetrating tree roots are a nuisance and that the person whose
land is invaded by these encroachments has the right to abate the
nuisance by trimming the branches or cutting the roots 2 at the property boundary, has an action at law for any damages sustained and has
a right to require the owner of the offending trees to abate the nuisance.
Yet despite the fact that these three alternative remedies have been
said to be available, the majority of the American courts have been
reluctant to allow the injured landowner the use of any but the right of
self-help, 8 and those courts which have allowed damages or injunc2"The court dismissed the Gill case with but little more than the statement
that there was nothing contrary to its present decision in the Gill case. United Fuel
Gas Co. v. Dyer, 185 F. (2d) 99, io3 (C. A. 4 th, 195o). Is this to be taken to mean that
the contrary language in that case, being mere dicta, was of no effect, or that the'

hypothetical situation mentioned in the Gill decision, which seems to be just the
situation involved in the Dyer case, is actually distinguished from it? The Dyer

decision appears effectively to have overruled such language. See notes 2o and 23
and text for which cited.
'Wood, The Law of Nuisances (2d ed. 1883) § 1O8; 2 C. J. S., Adjoining Landowners § 38; Notes (1922) 18 A. L. R. 655, (1932) 76 A. L. R. 1111, (1940) 128 A. L. R.
1221.

'That encroaching tree branches and roots have been considered to be of the
same general character see: Michalson v. Nutting, 275 Mass. 232, 175 N. E. 490
(1931); Buckingham v. Elliott, 62 Miss. 296, 52 Am. Rep. 188, 189 (1884).

'Cases involving the specific point of damages or injunctive relief in jurisdictions
following the common law rule: Sterling v. Weinstein, 75 A. (2d) 144 (Mun. Ct. of
App., D. C. 1950) (no court remedy in case of invading non-noxious limbs and
roots); Michalson v. Nutting, 275 Mass. 232, 175 N. E. 490 (1931) (injunction and dam-
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tive relief have done so on thebasis of nuisance statutes.4
Illustrative of the effect of the usual operation of the common law
rule is Sterling v. Weinstein,4 a recent case of first impression in the
Municipal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. The plaintiff alleged that branches from trees growing on defendant's land extended over the plaintiff's house, that one of the trees leaned at a
dangerous angle and that buds and leaves from these limbs had fallen
on the roof of the building, causing the drainage gutters to be clogged.
As a result, water which normally would have drained off overflowed
the wall of the building, making it necessary for plaintiff to expend
money to have the gutters cleaned and the walls waterproofed. The
plaintiff asked for damages and abatement of the nuisance constituted
by the encroaching branches and the leaning tree.
The trial court allowed the action for damages and issued an
order requiring the defendant to keep the encroaching branches cut.
No mention was made of the allegation concerning the leaning, tree
and presumably the contention concerning it was rejected. On appeal,
ages refused in case of invading tree roots); Granberry v. Jones, 188 Tenn. 51, 216 S.
W. (2d) 721 (1949) (damages and injunction denied in case of non-noxious encroaching hedge limbs); Smith v. Holt, 174 Va. 213, 5 S. E. (2d) 492 (1939) (damages and injunction refused in case of non-noxious encroaching hedge).
Other jurisdictions which follow the common law rule and presumably would
deny damages and injunctive relief: Harndon v. Stultz, 124 Iowa 440, ioo N. W.
329 (19o4); Hickey v. Michigan C. R. Co., 96 Mich. 498, 55 N. W. 989 (1893); Tanner
v. Wallbrunn, 77 Mo. App. 262 (1898); Countryman v. Lighthill, 24 Hun. 4o5 (N. Y.
188t); Murray v. Heabron, 74 N. E.(2d) 648 (Ohio Com. P1. 1947); Cobb v. Western
Union Telegraph Co., 90 Vt. 342, 98 At. 758 (1916). Contra: Buckingham v. Elliott,
62 Miss. 296, 52 Am. Rep. 188 (1884) (damages can be recovered if the encroaching
part extended from a planted tree); Ackerman v. Ellis, 81 N. J. L. 1, 79 At. 883 (1911)
(damages, however slight, caused by invading tree parts can be recovered by an
action at law).
'Stevens v. Moon, 54 Cal. App. 737, 202 Pac. 961 (1921); Mead v. Vincent, 199
Okla. 5o8, 187 P. (2d) 994 (1947); Gostina v. Ryland, 116 Wash. 228, 199 Pac. 298,
18 A. L. R. 650 (1921). In Stevens v. Moon, 54 Cal. App. 737, 202 Pac. 961, 962 (1921),
the court set out the statutory provisions which made the action allowable. Cal.
Code of Civ. Pro. § 731: "'An action may be brought by any person whose property
is injuriously affected, or whose personal enjoyment is lessened by a nuisance, as
the same is defined in section thirty-four hundred and seventy-nine of the Civil
Code, and by the judgment in such action the nuisance may be enjoined or abated as
well as damages recovered therefor'." Cal. Civ. Code § 3479 defines a nuisance as,
"anything which is an obstruction to the free use of property so as to interfere with
the comfortable enjoyment thereof...." That without statutory provisions, relief
would not be given see Gostina v. Ryland, 116 Wash. 228, 199 Pac. 298, 300, 18
A. L. R. 65o, 653 (1921) where the court said, "were it not for our statute of nuisances,
the respondents herein would not be accorded any judicial relief. But our statutes
accord a remedy to one 'whose personal enjoyment is lessened,' or for a very slight
nuisance...."
175 A. (2d) 144 (Mun. Ct. of App., D. C. 195o).
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the court decided that trees ordinarily are not nuisances, nor are overhanging branches unless they do substantial damage, and that, whether
nuisances or not, the landowner always has the right to cut away to his
property line branches and roots from trees of the adjoining landowner. Self-help being regarded as a simple and certain remedy affording protection to the owner of property subjected to non-noxious encroachments, damages and injunctive relief were denied. The policy
of the decision was summed up in the court's declaration that, "The
common sense of the common law has recognized that it is wiser to
leave the individual to protect himself, if harm results to him from
this exercise of another's right to use his property in a reasonable way,
than to subject the other to the annoyance, and the public to the burden, of actions at law, which would likely be innumerable and, in
many instances, purely vexatious." 6
In dissent, the chief justice agreed that though self-help is one of
the landowner's remedies and might be sufficient in most instances,
it is not his only remedy and is not adequate in this case. In regard
to the leaning tree, the dissent would rule that plaintiff has the right
to demand that defendant abate the nuisance or pay for any damage
caused thereby, just as he would have the right to demand that an
adjoining landowner remove an unsafe structure which constituted a
threat of danger.
As both elements of the court agreed, self-help does afford an adequate solution to the ordinary tree-encroachment controversy 7 because
of the action which is permitted in exercise of the right. In a number
of cases the courts have defined the scope of the remedy of the landowner as including the right to cut intruding branches,8 hedges, 9 or
roots10 back to his property line. The remedy, however, is limited to
removal of the overhanging branches or penetrating roots and does
not include the right to trespass to remove them" or to cut the tree
from which they stem.12 Both the tree and its products are said to be
'Sterling v. Weinstein, 75 A. (2d) 144, 147 (Mun. Ct. of App., D. C. 95o) quoting
from Michalson v. Nutting, 275 Mass. 232, 175 N. E. 490, 491 (1931).
'One court has stated that the rule is so firmly established that a statute abrogating it would be unconstitutional. See Murray v. Heabron, 74 N. E. (2d) 648,
649 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1947).
82C. J. S., Adjoining Landowners § 38.
'Granberry v. Jones, 188 Tenn. 51, 216 S. W. (2d) 721 (1949); Smith v. Holt,
174 Va. 213, 5 S. E. (2d) 492 (1939).
"°Michalson v. Nutting, 275 Mass. 232, 175 N. E. 490 (1931); Buckingham v.
Elliott, 62 Miss. 296, 52 Am. Rep. 188 (1884).
'2 C. J. S., Adjoining Londowners § 38.
'"Butler v. Zeiss, 63 Cal. App. 73, 218 Pac. 54 (1923); Toledo, St. L. & K. C. R.
Co. v. Loop, 139 Ind. 542, 39 N. E. 3o6 (1894).

.19511

CASE COMMENTS

the property of the person on whose land the tree stands13 and there
is no right to convert the severed parts. 14 No cases have been found
which hold that the portions cut off must be returned to the owner
of the tree. However, since the owner of the tree also owns the parts
which stem therefrom, it would appear that he would be entitled to
the parts removed, the same as he is entitled to the fruit on the encroaching part.' 5 Where these limitations of the remedy have been
exceeded, the courts have subjected the person who abused the privilege to actions for damages for trespass' 6 and injunctions restraining
7
further interference.1
The majority of the District of Columbia court would make selfhelp the exclusive form of relief, except where noxious factors are involved. However, as the dissent recognized, situations frequently arise
where self-help alone is not sufficient and some additional relief should
be provided. In the principal case, where there was danger that the
defective tree would fall on adjoining land, the inadequacy of self-help
is patently illustrated. Full utilization of the right would not protect
the owner of the neighboring land, for he can neither cut the tree nor
render it safe without being liable as a trespasser.' s Another illustration of the incompleteness of self-help is brought out in Stevens v.
Moon' 9 where roots from a long row of eucalyptus trees invaded
adjoining land, rendering the soil unproductive and stunting the
growth of walnut trees and crops planted thereon. Considerable expense would have to be incurred in removing the roots, yet the cause
"Lyman v. Hale, 11 Conn. 177, 27 Am. Dec. 728 (1836); Wideman v. Faivre, 1o
Kan. 102, 163 Pac. 619, Ann. Cas. i9i8B, x168 (q917); Oglesby v. Town of Winnfield, 27 S. (2d) 137 (La. App. 1946); Skinner v. Wilder, 38 Vt. 115, 88 Am. Dec.
645 (1865).
uLyman v. Hale, 11 Conn. 177, 27 Am. Dec. 728 (1836).
17That he is entitled to the fruit: Hoffman v. Armstrong, 46 Barb. 337 (N. Y.
1866); Lyman v. Hale, ii Conn. 177, 27 Am. Dec. 728 (1836).
"Fick v. Nilson, 220 P. (2d) 752 (Cal. App. 195o); Luke v. Scott, 187 N. E. 63
(Ind. App. 1933); Oglesby v. Town of Winnfield, 27 S. (2d) 137 (La. App. 1946).
"7Jurgens v. Wiese, 151 Neb. 549, 38 N. W. (2d) 261 (1949).
"As the dissenting justice pointed out, "Under these circumstances it appears
highly unrealistic to commend the injured property owner to the 'self-help'
remedy." Sterling v. Weinstein, 75 A. (2d) 144, 148 (Mun. Ct. of App. 1950). Query:
If self-help does not permit the landowner who is threatened injury by a dangerous
or defective tree standing on adjoining land to compel the owner of the tree to
render it safe or remove it, or does not allow the party endangered to take this
action, should the trunk of the tree be included in the scope of self-help?
"54 Cal. App. 737, 202 Pac. 961 (1921). Relief was given in this case under the
California nuisance statute. The fact situation of the case is used to demonstrate
that damage can be caused by encroaching tree parts.
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of the injury would not necessarily be terminated, for the roots would
grow back.
Recognizing that self-help is not always satisfactory, some courts
have introduced qualifications to the rule based on the nature of the
encroachment. One court has said that all such intrusions are actionable nuisances, the insignificance of the injury going to the amount of
recovery and not to the cause of action. 20 This obviously is not desirable
for it opens the doors to a large amount of petty litigation, the very
evil the self-help rule was designed to prevent. Other courts state that
if the encroaching growth can be classed as "noxious" the owner of
the land invaded may have damages or other appropriate relief. 21 What
is to be classed as noxious is not clear, however, and a review of the
authorities indicates that the term probably defies definition. 22 The
principal case, while accepting the validity of this qualification, rejected another which has gained some recognition, though it is equally
difficult to apply with certainty. Under this qualification of the general
rule the necessary court remedy may be had if the tree from which the
encroaching parts grow is a planted tree-that is, the result of human
23
activity-but only self-help is available if the tree is of natural growth.
Such a distinction would seem to be unsound since it bases recovery,
not on the injury, but rather on the origin of the tree; and further, the
practical difficulty of ascertaining whether or not the tree is of natural
growth would render the remedy ineffective in many cases.
It seems clear that in the usual case of encroaching tree branches
or roots the common law right of self-help gives the landowner adequate protection since the damage is normally slight and the injury
probably could have been prevented by exercise of the remedy available. Further, exercise of the right does not impose too great a burden
or hardship on neighboring landowners in the typical situation. How-'Ackerman v. Ellis, 81 N. J. L. 1, 79 At. 883 (1911).
'See Granberry v. Jones, 188 Tenn. 51, 216 S. W. (2d) 721, 723 (1949); Smith
v. Holt, 174 Va. 213, 219, 5 S. E. (2d) 492, 494 (1939).

nThe only cases found where relief was given for a "noxious" encroachment are
Crance v. Hems, 17 Cal. App. (2d) 45o, 62 P. (2d) 395 (1936) and Shevlin v. Johnson, 56 Cal. App. 563, 205 Pac. 1087 (1922), and it is possible that those cases were
decided under the California nuisance statute rather than under the "noxious"
theory, since many of the cases cited in the opinion as authority were based upon
such statutes. However, even if the decisions were not based on the statute, they
are not helpful in defining "noxious" for it appears that the encroachments in
those cases were termed "noxious" because they did substantial injury, not because
of any inherent quality of the tree and its parts.
nRestatement, Torts (1939) § 84o, Comment A, Illustration 4. Adopted in Griefield v. Gibraltar Fire and Marine Insurance Co., 199 Miss. 175, 24 S. (2d) 356 (1946).
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ever, it is equally obvious that there are situations in which it does not
give complete relief and in which it does impose an undue burden on
the landowner. Since the courts have not been able effectively to extend
the scope of the self-help remedy by use of undefinable or ineffective
classifications so that relief can be obtained in cases where it is needed,
legislative action to provide such relief is in order. To give the landowner protection from encroaching tree parts, statutory provisions
could appropriately be enacted which adopt the common law rule of
self-help, but which also allows damages where actual injury has been
incurred and injunctive relief where future or continuing injury is
threatened. In the usual case, the result would be the same as it is
under the strict common law rule, but where a court remedy is needed,
it would be available.
JoHN Q. MIr.LE,

PROPERTY-RIGHT

JR.

OF SURFACE OWNER TO EASEMENT OF NECEssITY

THROUGH MINERAL STRATUM To REACH UNDERLYING ESTATE. [Indiana]
An easement of necessity may be created by implication in favor of
either the grantor or grantee upon a conveyance of land, if the enjoyment of such an easement is necessary for the beneficial use of the
land sold or for the land retained.' Public policy has favored easements
of necessity, especially rights of way, since land without means of
access is practically useless, and it is advantageous to society generally
that land be capable of utilization. 2 Although the most frequent application of the policy allowing such easements has been in connection
with rights of way by necessity over the surface, 3 the same doctrine has
been applied, though with some uncertainty, to underlying estates in
4
land.
'Burby, Real Property (1943) § 67; 3 Tiffany, Real Property (3d ed. 1939) § 792;
17 Am.
Jur., Easements § 48.
2
Simonton, Ways by Necessity (1925) 25 Col. L. Rev. 571, 574.
3
3Tiffany, Real Property ( 3 d ed. 1939) § 793.
'In the cases dealing with the right of access to oil and gas deposits and
to water the right is clearly recognized, but the decisions are not clear as to
basis of the right. Telford v. Jenning Producing Co., 2o3 Fed. 456 (C. C. A.
1913); Pennsylvania Central Brewing Co. v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 250 Pa.
95 Atl. 471 (1915); Chartiers Block Coal Co. v. Mellon, 152 Pa. St. 286, 25

also
the
7th,
3oo,
At.

597 (1893). Also see Pace v. State, 191 Miss. 780, 4 S. (2d) 270, 275 (1941). In

the

decisions relating to access to solid minerals, no such uncertainty exists, as the
right is clearly recognized to be an easement of necessity. Baker v. Pittsburgh C.
&. W. R. Co., 219 Pa. 398, 68 Adt. 1014 (1908). Also see Moore v. Indian Camp Coal
Co., 75 Ohio St. 493, 8o N. E. 6, 7 (1907).
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The problem involving the surface owner's right of access to that
part of his estate lying beneath a stratum of coal which has been severed
by a conveyance without express reservation of any such right came before the Indiana courts for the first time in the recent case of Pyramid
Coal Corporationv. Pratt.5 Plaintiff's predecessor in title had conveyed
the coal underlying his twenty-five acre tract to defendant's predecessors
in title, without any mention of a reservation of right of way through
the coal to that part of the estate beneath the coal seam. After plaintiff
became owner of two acres of the land subject to the coal rights, he
built a house and drilled a well down through the seam of coal into the
strata below, in order to obtain water for his domestic needs. Defendant, while mining coal, destroyed part of the well casing. Plaintiff sued
for damages for loss and contamination of his water supply, basing his
complaint on an alleged implied right of way by necessity through the
coal to reach his underlying estate.
In considering defendant's appeal from a judgment for plaintiff,
the appellate court quoted with approval the general rule that the
owner of the surface who has sold a stratum of minerals may have a
right to penetrate the mineral stratum by shaft or well to reach the
underlying estate, apart from any reservation, and can transfer the
right to another. 6 However, the case was remanded on the ground
that the degree of necessity required to create such an easement was
not shown to have existed at the time of severance. Having failed to
find such an easement existing in favor of the previous owner, the
court felt that there was no way the plaintiff could have acquired one
when he purchased the land.7 It would seem that because of the public
need for coal the court felt that a rule of strict necessity should apply.
However, it was pointed out that the decision was to be limited to the
particular set of facts involved and was not intended to apply to
similar situations involving gas and oil or a public water supply.
The dissenting justice set forth two grounds for imposing liability
on the defendant. First, it was argued that the right to pass from the
surface to the estate below the coal was made available to the owner
of the surface at the time the estate in the coal was conveyed under
N. E. (2d) 858 (Ind. App. 195o).
6The rule as stated by the court and the cases cited as authority therefor are
set out in 58 C. J. S., Mines and Minerals § 16o.
'An implied easement of necessity is an incorporeal right that arises out of a
conveyance and can exist only where there has been unity of ownership of both
the dominant and servient tenements. It cannot be acquired over the land of a
stranger. Hillery v. Jackson, 56 N. E. (2d) 921 (Ohio App. 1944); Bowles v. Chapman,
i8o Tenn. 321, 175 S. W. (2d) 313 (1943).
592
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the modification of the right of way rules as applied to mining law,8
and passed to the plaintiff when the surface estate was subdivided.
Second, it was reasoned that liability could be imposed on the basis
of a rule stated in the Virginia case of Clinchfield Coal Corporation
v. Compton,9 in which the court said that if a spring of water had been
cut off by the removal of the support underlying the plaintiff's surface, the coal company would have been liable. Since the spring would
have been in existence prior to the severance of the mineral estate, the
Virginia court might have based this supposed liability on the doctrine
of "quasi-easements."' 1 Though a person cannot have an easement
over his own land, yet where before separation takes place the grantor
has been using one portion of his land for the benefit of another, the
parties should be regarded as assuming that this benefit should continue if the use was apparent as well as necessary for the beneficial enjoyment of the land sold or the land retained. This doctrine is based
on the presumption that the parties had in mind the property as it was
at the time the division was made, and that afterwards neither party
should have the right to change to the detriment of the other a condition which existed while there was a unity of title, so long as it is to
a considerable degree necessary to the usefulness of the land."1 Since
in the principal case the plaintiff's well did not exist at the time the
coal estate was sold, the same reasoning would not necessarily apply.
In cases involving rights of access to the lower estate where the
ownership of the mineral stratum has been severed, courts have not hesitated to find a right of access, but they have not all been clear as to the
principles on which it is based. 12 The suggestion has been made that
SThe opinion gives no indication as to what these modifications are, but presumably the dissenting judge had reference to at least some of the changes suggested in the body of this comment at notes 17 to 20.
'148 Va. 437, 139 S. E. 308, 55 A. L. R. 1376 (1927).
"0"The so-called quasi easement is ...not a legal relation in any sense, but
the expression is a convenient one to describe the particular mode in which the
owner utilizes one part of the land for the benefit of the other, as bearing on the
question ...whether, when the two parts subsequently become the property of
different persons, an actual easement is to be regarded as existing, which corresponds to the use which was previously made of the land by the owner of both
parts." 3 Tiffany, Real Property (3 d ed. 1939) § 781.
"See Shandy v. Bell, 207 Ind. 215, 189 N. E. 627, 630 (1934); Van Sandt v. Royster,
148 Kan. 495, 83 P. (2d) 698, 700 (1938).
-Telford v. Jenning Producing Co., 20o3 Fed. 456 (C. C. A. 7th, 1913); Pennsylvania Central Brewing Co. v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 250 Pa. 3oo, 95 Ad. 471
(1915); Chartiers Block Coal Co. v. Mellon, 152 Pa. St. 286, 25 At. 597 (1893). With
the exception of the Central Brewing Co. case, which involves a water supply, the
decisions cited deal with the right to extract gas and oil.
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the right of access to the underlying strata is a natural right, and
"must exist, not because of any grant implied or real, but for the
same reasons that riparian rights and rights of support exist."'u When
it is considered that natural rights or natural easements are those given
by law to every owner of land, independent of grant or prescription,
as contrasted with true easement rights created by acts of the owners
in the form of a grant either expressed or implied, it is difficult to see
how a right of access to the lower strata could be classified as a natural
one. This would be a right in the land of another, whereas natural
rights are not rights as to the use of another's land, but merely the
rights of the landowner to enjoy the use of his land in its natural
condition without interference by adjoining landowners.' 4 It has also
been asserted that such a natural right would violate a covenant against
incumbrances in a deed of the servient tenement, the mineral estate,
which further militates against the "natural" designation1 5
Conceding that the right of access to the lower estate may be entitled to recognition, it would seem that the cases could be more appropriately handled on the principles of true easements created by necessity. Such a surface easement "usually arises where there is a conveyance
of a part of a tract of land of such nature and extent that either the
part conveyed or the part retained is entirely surrounded by the land
from which it is severed or by this land and the land of strangers."'"
The situation involved in the mining cases is the same so far as the
needs of the surface owner are concerned. Yet in order to establish the
right of access to the lower estate on the basis of an easement of necessity some modifications to the strict common law rules must be recognized. It must be admitted that more than one way of necessity may be
required,' 7 that the proper test is reasonable necessity, not strict
"Note (1893) 7 Harv. L. Rev. 47, 48. This is evidently the basis on which the
concurring opinion in Chartiers Block Coal Co. v. Mellon, 152 Pa. St. 286, 25 At.
597, 600 (1893) would recognize the right. However, instead of the term "natural
rights" the words "reciprocal servitudes" are used.
" the so called natural easements give one landowner neither rights nor
privileges in the land of another; they are merely a statement of rights against the
world at large that every landowner has as such not to have certain consequences produced upon or with respect to his land: the fundamental characteristics of a true
easement is that it is a lessening of the normal rights of the owner in a given piece
of land and a transferring of those rights to some third person, ordinarily the owner
of another piece of land." Bigelow, Natural Easements (1915) 9 Ill. L. Rev. 541, 546.
"Simonton, Ways by Necessity (1925) 25 Col. L. Rev. 571, 595.
117 Am. Jur. 960.
"'Particularly is this so where gas and oil deposits are concerned, as it is frequently necessary to drill numerous wells in order to extract all the oil and gas.
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necessity,' 8 that the presumed intention of the parties to create such a
right is fictional rather than real, 19 and that implied reservations must
20
be treated the same as implied grants.
In surface cases, where the social interest has been sufficiently strong
the courts have been willing to sustain the easement, even though one
or more of the suggested modifications had to be adopted. 2 ' The same
social interest is present in the mining cases, with even perhaps a more
forceful appeal. The right of the surface owner to access to his underlying estate for the purposes of obtaining water was sustained in an
important mining jurisdiction in the Pennsylvania decision of Pennsylvania Central Brewing Co. v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co. 22 under a fact
situation almost identical with that of the Pyramid case. But the nature
of the court's reasoning and cited authority makes it impossible to ascertain on what theory the right to obtain water from the lower estate
23
is based.
If the coal seam completely separates the surface from the lower estate it is
absolutely necessary to pass through the coal seam to reach the lower estate. What
actually has to be considered, however, is the necessity for the owner of the surface
in order beneficially to use his land to pass from the upper to the lower estate.
"In most instances the value of the estate below the mineral stratum conveyed
is unknown to the parties when the title is severed, and under such circumstances
it cannot be concluded that an easement arises because of any real intention of the
parties to create such an easement.
20If the right is to be based on public policy rather than any real intent of
the parties, there could hardly be any justification for construing the grant more
strongly in favor of the grantee.
"InNichols v. Luce, 24 Pick. 102, 35 Am. Dec. 302 (Mass. 1834) it was said that
when an impassible barrier separated the dominant tenement into two or more
portions so that a way was necessary to reach each portion, more than one way by
necessity may arise. In Krueger v. Beecham, i6 Ind. App. 89, 61 N. E. (2d) 65 (1945)
it was held that reasonable necessity, rather than strict necessity was sufficient to
establish a way over another's land. In Howley v. Chaffee, 88 Vt. 468, 93 At. 1so,
122 (1915) the court citing Buss v. Dyer, 125 Mass. 287 (1878) said: "It thus appears
that in the matter of these ways [surface ways by necessity] implied grants and implied reservations stand alike. The foundation of this rule regarding ways of necessity is said to be a fiction of law, by which a grant or reservation is implied, to meet
a special emergency, on grounds of public policy, in order that no land be left inaccessible for the purposes of cultivation."
125o Pa. 00, 95 Atl. 471 (1915). The court treated the law as settled on the
basis of the decision reached in Chartiers Block Coal Co. v. Mellon, 152 Pa. St. 286,
25 Atl. 597 (1893). In the Mellon case it was held that the surface owner who had

conveyed to another the underlying coal was entitled to access to the strata beneath
the coal for purpose of extraction of oil and gas. However, the court said that the
basis of the right was one to be worked out by the legislature rather than the
judiciary, since to allow the right on the basis of a way by necessity would require
a large modification of the common law rules relating to ways by necessity over the
surface.
2"This is probably due to the confusion of ideas manifested in the Mellon case
as to the basis for allowing such a right. It has been said "the only admirable thing

272

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. VIII

In the Pyramid case the court decided the problem on the basis of
an implied easement of necessity, and the result seems to have turned
on the degree of necessity required to create such an easement. The
court evidently was of the opinion that if the owner of the twenty-five
acre tract had any means of access to the estate below the coal other
than down through the actual coal seams, then no easement could
have been created when the estate in the coal was severed. But the
court seems to have failed to consider the fact that at the time of severance more than one well might have been necessary in order to provide the estate with a reasonable supply of water. This would tend to
refute the idea that no easement of necessity could have arisen at the
time of severance, so long as there was any space in the twenty-five acre
plot where the owner could reach the lower depths of his estate without passing through the coal deposits.
Deciding whether or not a right of way existed in favor of plaintiff
necessitated a balancing of conflicting interests-the advantage the surface owner derived from the existence of the well as compared to the
detriment suffered by the coal company as a result of the well passing
through the coal seam. 24 The result reached would seem to imply that
the surface owner's right to use his surface estate is limited so far as
a water supply is concerned to uses that will not require any greater
disturbance of the coal stratum than would have arisen in the use
being made at time of severance. This is contrary to the general policy
of the law to protect the unrestricted legitimate use of reality. Of
course, the surface owner could not adopt a use which would defeat
the coal owner's beneficial enjoyment of his coal estate, but nothing
of the sort was involved here, unless the court was afraid surface owners
might commence to drill many wells on the tract.
There is nothing to indicate that the owner of the land at the time
of the severance of the coal estate expressed an intention to give up
the right of access of his lower estate, and in the absence of such an
expressed intention, it would seem that the dissenting opinion is more
about the [Mellon] decision was that it permitted the decree to stand." Simonton,
Ways24 by Necessity (1925) 25 Col. L. Rev. 571, 592.
AIso the court might have considered the nature of the coal estate. When the
coal has been removed all that was granted will have been carried away. The space
occupied by the coal will revert to the surface owner. This means that, at most,
the surface owner's right of access to the lower estate is suspended pending the
removal of the coal. If there had been a definite time limit set for the removal,
then there might have been strong argument for denying the right pending the removal. But here there was no certainty as to when the coal would be mined, if at
all, and it would seem unjust to deny the right of access to the surface owner for
as long a period of time as the coal company chose to let the coal remain in place.
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in line with public policy calling for the maximum utilization of
land, and is not so obviously harsh to the plaintiff.
JAiFS C. TumK

SALES-RIGHT OF SUB-VENDEE

To

REcovER FRoI

MANUFACTURER FOR

PROPERTY DAMAGE CAUSED BY DEFECTIVE GOODS. [Ohio]

Though the time-honored rule that the action of assumpsit requires
privity of contract is still a fundamental principle of the common law,'
it is said: "There is no general prevailing definition of privity which
can be automatically applied to all cases. Who are privies requires careful examination into the circumstances of each case as it arises."'2 One
important effect of the rule is to make difficult a recovery by the ultimate consumer against the manufacturer for damages suffered as a re3
sult of a breach of a warranty on defective goods.
In the case of Jordon v. Brouwer,4 the Ohio court was confronted
with the application of the doctrine in determining whether an automobile owner who purchased defective anti-freeze from a retailer, can
maintain an action for breach of warranty against the manufacturer
of the -defective goods which caused substantial property damage. The
court refused to allow a recovery, citing the general rule5 that a manufacturer is not liable to any person other than his immediate vendee
for breach of warranty, because privity, an essential element for a
breach of warranty cause of action, exists only as between the vendor
"Pelletier v. DuPont, 124 Me. 269, 128 Ad. 186, 189 (1925): "No good reason
[exists] for repudiating or modifying, even in the case of food products, however
prepared, the well-established rule that, in order to recover on a warranty, there
must be a privity of contractual relations between the parties." Chanin v. Chevrolet
Motor Co., 89 F. (2d) 889 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937); Birmingham Chero-Cola Bottling Co.
v. Clark, 2o5 Ala. 678, 89 So. 64 (1921); Nelson v. Armour Packing Co., 76 Ark.
352, 90 S. W. 288 (19o5); Welshausen v. Charles Parker Co., 83 Conn. 231, 76 At.
271 (191o); Asher Lumber Co. v. Cornett, 22 Ky. L. Rep. 569, 58 S. W. 438 (1900);
Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co., 235 N. Y. 468, 139 N. E. 576 (1923).

'Old Dominion Copper Mining and Smelting Co. v. Bigelow, 203 Mass. 159,
89 N.

E. 193, 217 (19o9).

Bouvier's Law Dictionary (Rev. ed. 1934) 983, defines

privity of contract merely as the relationship that exists between two contracting
parties. See 50 C. J. 408: "Privity of contract denotes the relationship or connection
between two or more contracting parties ....A vendee or an assignee is a privy in
contract ....
"
'Pease and Dwyer Co. v. Somers Planting Co., 130 Miss. 147, 93 So. 673 (1922);
Redmond v. Borden's Farm Product Co., 245 N. Y. 512, 157 N. E. 838 (1927); Thomason v. Ballard and Ballard Co., 2o8 N. C. 1, 179 S. E. 30 (1935). These cases illustrate the difficulties confronting the sub-vendee.
'86 Ohio App. 505, 93 N. E. (2d) 49 (1949)54 "Williston, Contracts (Rev. ed. 1936) § 998.
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and his vendee. If the sub-vendee is to recover on the warranty, he
must seek the restitution from his immediate vendor, the retailer.
Since privity had been broken by the retailer, the consumer is compelled to base his action on a negligence theory if he is to impose on
the manufacturer liability for damages for the property loss. 6
Such rules may have been adequate for the handicraft economic
system under which they were developed, but after the industrial
revolution brought about mass production and opened up vast new
markets on a national and world scale, the law failed to keep the
manufacturer's obligation to the ultimate consumer abreast of the
changing relations. 7 Although the manufacturer now has a greater
potentiality of inflicting harm on unsuspecting consumers by representations made through national advertising, the law is still inclined
8
to provide him with a cloak of immunity, unless privity exists.
While attempts to abolish this requirement of privity have not met
with favor, the courts have shown few scruples in developing ingenious
ORoberts v. Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n, 211 Mass. 449, 98 N. E. 95 (1912);
Crigger v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 132 Tenn. 545, 179 S. W. '55 (1915). Although
there are a large number of cases involving personal injury to a sub-vendee from an
article placed on the market by the manufacturer, most decisions are based on an
action sounding in tort, rather than contract. E.g., Tomlinson v. Armour and Co., 75
N. J. L. 748, 70 Atl. 314 (19o8); Thomas v. Winchester, 2 Selden 397, 57 Am. Dec.
455 (N. Y. 1852); Armstrong Packing Co. v. Clem, 151 S. W. 576 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912).
'1n Chanin v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 89 F. (2d) 889, 891 (C. C. A. 7 th, 1937),
plaintiff having purchased from a retailer an automobile which was falsely warranted to be equipped with shatter-proof glass, brought suit against the manufacturer. The court ruled that the complaint did not state a good cause of action
against the manufacturer since privity was lacking. Plaintiff insisted that he had
stated a valid cause of action ex contractu though privity did not exist in its
strict sense since the manufacturer and retailer carried on extensive advertising
that certain qualities of workmanship, operation and performance exist, and thus
"has brought about a relationship between himself and the consuming public out of
which grows a direct contractual liability of the manufacturer to the purchaser from
the dealer for breach of warranty." The court implied that there was some merit
in such an argument, but concluded: "But such a statement of facts is not disclosed here. We cannot read such allegations into the complaint."
$Standard Oil Co. v. Murray, i19 Fed. 572 (C. C. A. 7th, 1902) (Engineer injured
by an explosion from oil purchased by his employer cannot maintain an action
against a seller for breach of warranty, such action being grounded on a breach of
contract of sale to which plaintiff was not a party or privy.); Turner v. Edison
Storage Battery Co., 248 N. Y. 73, 1i6 N. E. 423, 424 (1928) (Plaintiff sub-vendee sued
the manufacturer of a battery for injuries sustained due to a defect in the product,
but the court ruled: "In pleading the second cause of action, he alleges that defendant warranted the battery to be safe; that he relied on the warranty; and that
injury was sustained by breach of warranty .... There can be no warranty where
there is no privity of contract."); Jordon v. Brouwer, 86 Ohio App. 5o5, 93 N. E.
(2d) 49 (1949).
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ways by which to circumvent the doctrine.9 Even the Ohio court was
quick to point out that in cases involving personal injury the requirement of privity had been relaxed. 10
Several devices have been created by judicial fiat to rationalize
the extension of the manufacturer's warranty to his consumer in the
personal injury cases. One court has adopted the fiction of making a
warranty run with the chattel,1 ' and although this theory has not
been widely accepted in the same terms, other courts have reached the
same results on the reasoning that "a manufacturer of food products
under modern conditions impliedly warrants his goods when dispensed
in original packages, and.., such warranty is available to all who may
be damaged by reason of their use in the legitimate channels of
trade."'12 This convenient logic was developed as a means of imposing
absolute liability upon the manufacturer of packaged foods, and
could be applied to the sale of anti-freeze in a sealed container. Though
the defective anti-freeze caused a property damage, it does not seem
logical that the type of damage incurred should determine the nature
of the cause of action which must be brought.
In Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, the Ohio court found a way to
avoid the harshness of the privity requirement by resorting to a second
type of fiction, called the third party beneficiary theory.'3 It was reasoned that the contract warranty between the manufacturer and the
dealer was made for the benefit of the third party ultimate consumer,
and that he might go directly against the manufacturer on breach
of warranty to enforce that contract right.
It has even been suggested that in order to allow the plaintiff to
proceed directly against the manufacturer, the retailer's cause of action should be assignable to the sub-vendee. "It is a general rule that
one who has a right in contract may assign that right in effect by giving
the assignee the power to enforce it in the name and stead of the assignor. There seems no reason why a warranty should be an exception
to this rule; and, therefore, a right of action of the first buyer should be
assignable to a subpurchaser."' 4
"Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N. E. 557 (1928); CocaCola Bottling Co. of Fort Worth v. Smith, 97 S. W. (2d) 761 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
"'Jordon v. Brouwer, 86 Ohio. App. 505, 93 N. E. (2d) 49, 52 (1949); "There are
exceptions to the rule of privity, where injury results to the person of plaintiff."
"Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Fort Worth v. Smith, 97 S. W. (2d) 761 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1936). Contra: Pelletier v. DuPont, 124 Me. 269, 128 Ad. 186 (1925); Chysky v.
Drake Bros. Co., 235 N. Y. 468, 139 N. E. 576 (1923).
"Mazetti v. Armour and Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633, 636 (1913). Also CocaCola Bottling Works of Greenwood v. Simpson, 158 Miss. 390, 130 So. 479, 48o (193o).
F27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N. E. 557 (1928).
"14Willitson, Contracts (Rev. ed. 1936) § 998.
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In some instances courts have created a novel form of privity out
of the circumstances in which modern merchandising is carried on.
Thus, in Madouros v. Kansas City Coca Cola Bottling Co., it was observed: "Under modern conditions, when products of food or drink
have been prepared under the exclusive supervision of the manufacturer and the consumer must take them as they are supplied, the representations constitute an implied contract, or implied warranty, to
the unknown and helpless consumer that the article is good and wholesome and fit for use. If privity of contract is required, then, under
the situation and circumstances of modern merchandise in such matters, privity of contract exists in the consciousness and understanding
of all right-thinking persons."' 5 And in Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 6
the Washington court implied that representations made in a manufacturer's catalogue were made to the ultimate consumers.
It appears that in the cases involving injuries to the person, the
courts have accepted the view that privity is not a condition to bringing an action for breach of warranty. Even in the absence of privity,
public policy demands that the warranty of the manufacturer be extended to the ultimate consumer. The same reasoning should be applied to cases covering damages to property. The hardships resulting
to the plaintiff are just as real in the one case as in the other, and the
legal theory sustaining recovery for one type of damage should apply
as well to the other. However, only a few courts have taken that position. In Timberland Lumber Co. v. Climax Mfg. Co., 1 7 a case involving property damage, a federal court held that it would be possible for a manufacturer to express his warranty in such a manner as to
contract not only with his immediate vendee, but also with an ultimate consumer. This view of the transaction serves to eliminate the
privity argument, since two contracts independent of each other are
regarded as having come into existence, one involving privity between
manufacturer and consumer.
On similar reasoning the offer and acceptance theory has developed.
It is said that "If the manufacturer's representations were made in such
a way that the natural tendency was to induce the sub-purchaser to
rely upon them, one could spell out the promise or offer of the manufacturer to be bound. Then if the sub-purchaser accepted this offer and
did the acts requested by the manufacturer it would seem proper to
"23o Mo. App. 275, 90 S. W. (2d) 445, 450 (1936).
16168 Wash. 456, 12 P. (2d) 409 (1932).

'761 F. (2d) 391 (C. C. A. 3d,

1932).

1951]

CASE COMMENTS

hold the manufacturer liable directly to the sub-purchaser upon the
unilateral contract that was thereby created."1 s
In the principal case, the dissenting judge points out that the
manufacturer "must be taken to have made the representation and
warranty to the ultimate consumer, who would be the only person
likely to suffer by reason of the falsity of the representation and the
breach of the warranty."' 9 On this basis, it is possible to establish the
necessary privity: "Placing such a warranty on the article sold brings
the producer into jural relations with the ultimate consumer, because
the producer so intends. It is a representation and a warranty made by
the producer to the ultimate consumer and creates a privity between
them." 20
The consumer who, after purchasing the goods in reliance on an
expressed warranty, has been seriously damaged in his property rather
than his person, should not be faced with the difficult task of proving
negligence. To be sure, he might proceed against his immediate vendor,
but a right against an insolvent or irresponsible dealer will give little
satisfaction. Such risk should not be cast on a passive victim of circumstances. The injured party should be permitted to base his action on a
breach of warranty of the manufacturer, who is, admittedly, the original wrongdoer.
The decision remains with the courts whether to continue to deny
recovery on breach of warranty if privity be lacking, to allow an occasional recovery by means of some judicially created fiction, 21 or to
recognize that such a rule has no place in contemporary law. The rule
has outlived its usefulness, if indeed, there ever existed a need for it.
However, if the courts feel, as presently appears, that the problem
is not to be solved by judicial abolition of the privity doctrine, they
may still place the responsibility for the damages caused by the defective goods where it should lie. Since handcrafts have given way to
modern mass production and the public now buys primarily on the
faith of national advertising of the manufacturers, the courts have
only to accept the fact that the representations by advertisements are
1Jeanblanc, Manufacturers' Liability to Persons Other Than Their Immediate
Vendees (1938) 24 Va. L. Rev. 134, 150.
"'Jordon v. Brouwer, 86 Ohio. App. 5o5, 93 N. E. (2d) 49, 53 (1949).
"Jordon v. Brouwer, 86 Ohio App. 505, 93 N. E. (2d) 49, 53 (1949). See Baxter
v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P. (2d) 409, 412 (1932); Mazetti v. Armour
and Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633, 636 (ig3).
21 Jeanblanc, Manufacturers' Liability to Persons Other Than Their Immediate
Vendees (1938) 24 Va. L. Rev. 134, 150.
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made to the ultimate purchaser by the producer, thus giving rise to a
contract of warranty between them. By applying this reasoning to property damages as well as personal injury damages, the privity problem
will be virtually eliminated.
ROBERT
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